Wilson v. State, 1 Div. 499
| Citation | 53 Ala.App. 653,303 So.2d 153 |
| Decision Date | 12 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | 1 Div. 499 |
| Parties | Robbie WILSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
No brief for appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was indicted for an assault with intent to murder. The indictment followed the language prescribed by Form 16, Title 15, Section 259, Code of Alabama 1940. The jury found him guilty of an assault with a weapon and assessed a fine of $500.00. The court entered a judgment accordingly and as additional punishment imposed a sentence of four months imprisonment in the county jail or hard labor for the county. Defendant gave due notice of an appeal and filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the trial court.
Upon arraignment and a plea of not guilty, the case was set for trial on a definite date approximately three weeks after arraignment, at which time defendant through his employed counsel objected to defendant's being put to trial in this case because of the fact that he also was charged in another case that was on the docket for the same day ahead of this case. The other case was an older case than this one. The court overruled defendant's objection, which was a matter within the discretion of the court, in accordance with what was held in Smith v. State, 20 Ala.App. 442, 102 So. 733, that the court may in its discretion put a defendant to trial under a subsequent indictment, where two cases are set for the same day, and where the second case has been on the docket for at least an entire day prior to the trial. It should be said also that the record indicates that this case was not selected by counsel for the State for trial ahead of the other case against defendant, but that an important witness in the other case, who happened to be a defendant in a third case, had asked to be excused on account of the urgency of his work, and that apparently counsel for the State had agreed to excuse him. The record is not altogether clear as to the details, but it appears that if there was any misunderstanding between counsel, there was no fault on the part of defendant's counsel or on the part of the State's counsel, that there was no advantage to the State in trying this case instead or ahead of the other. The action of the trial court did not constitute an abuse of its discretion.
Testimony of Mr. Eddie Slayton, the person alleged to have been assaulted, was to the effect that he, while in the performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff of Clarke County, went to the home of appellant's mother looking for appellant, for whom the witness had a warrant of arrest. He was met there by two other law enforcement officers, one of whom had another warrant of arrest for appellant. On seeing them, the defendant 'broke and ran' to his automobile in the yard near a driveway; he was told to stop by the witness, but he did not stop; he jumped in his car, locked all four doors, put his car in gear and, while looking at the witness and one of the other officers, drove at a high speed directly toward them. He came within ten or fifteen feet of them, and they then jumped on a nearby porch; defendant ran his car against the porch and hit another automobile parked in the driveway; his car became wedged lengthwise between the porch and the other automobile; he alternated forward and backward movements and backed his automobile into the porch a half dozen times knocking down two posts of the porch in the process, and one of the posts hit Deputy Slayton. Upon obtaining clearance to move along the driveway, defendant hurriedly drove away, but his car went out of control as one of the officers fired a weapon and blew out the left rear tire. Defendant then jumped out of the automobile and ran.
The testimony of Mr. Slayton was corroborated in all material details by the testimony of the other officers.
The testimony of two witnesses for defendant was to the effect that the hitting of the porch by the automobile being driven by defendant was accidental, after his automobile had struck the other automobile in the driveway. Defendant did not testify.
The evidence on behalf of ...
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