Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 22 October 1985
• Docket Number: 5 Div. 852
• Parties: Stephen WILSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 78

480 So.2d 78

Stephen WILSON v. STATE.

5 Div. 852.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 22, 1985.

George Beck and Jeffery H. Long, Montgomery, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Louis C. Colley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TAYLOR, Judge.

The appellant, Stephen Wilson, was indicted by a Macon County Grand Jury, and thereafter convicted and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, for the murder of Fletcher D. Morris. The only issues raised on appeal are that the trial court erred in not granting 1) a motion for change of venue, and 2) a motion for new trial. During a pre-trial hearing, the appellant presented strong reasons why the change of venue should have been granted. However, the motion was denied, and it is that ruling that we find to be reversible error.

Not in all circumstances will a change of venue defeat the effects of pretrial publicity, but it will help assure a fair trial when the prejudicial atmosphere is limited to a particular area from which the trial can be moved.

"A change of venue is not, in present theory, a panacea to the problems posed by pretrial publicity. Its effectiveness depends not upon its ability to prevent publicity tending to generate or nurture the growth of prejudice, but upon its ability to remove a defendant from a poisoned atmosphere. Thus, where the prejudicial publicity is widespread, or of the kind likely to follow a defendant wherever he goes, change of venue is an impotent protective device. On the other hand, when the prejudicial publicity is rooted in circumstances peculiar to a particular community and draws its strength from only those circumstances, removal is indeed a most effective protective device.

"An examination of the cases reveals that more often than not, removal is an inherently effective protective device. Thus, writers in the field are correct in concluding that courts have failed to use venue change to its fullest possible extent in promoting the ends of justice.

"The reasons that explain this judicial hesitancy are several. Removal is capable of working an extreme dislocation in the administration of criminal justice. It is expensive and generally inconvenient, and it has excellent potential as a dilatory tactic. Further, it amounts to an admission that justice cannot be done in the forum in which the motion is made, which is a severe blow to people who pride themselves in their ability to be fair to their fellows. Finally, removal runs counter to the tradition that the administration of criminal law is primarily the concern of the community in which the crime is committed."

Note, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 Notre Dame Law. 925, 941-942 (1967). These reasons for judicial reluctance to change venue, however, are outweighed by an individual's right to due process of law via a fair trial by an impartial jury. This is because fundamental fairness is the very heart of our jurisprudence; without fundamental fairness, the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights to all persons are effectively eviscerated. One of the duties of the judiciary is to protect constitutional rights; "unfairness anywhere, in small cases as well as in large, is abhorred, is to be ferreted out, and is to be eliminated." Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 514, 91 S.Ct. 490, 495, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

One of the rights our forefathers fought and suffered for is the United States Constitution's guarantee to all criminal defendants of the right to a trial "by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Thus, if an impartial jury, selected from the district wherein the crime was committed, cannot be impaneled, then to refuse the request for a change of venue is a denial of due process of law. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963). See also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 91 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971). The Constitution of Alabama of 1901 echoes this requirement. See Ala. Const. art. I § 6.

The Alabama Legislature has established a procedure whereby a defendant charged with an indictable offense can meet his burden of proving that he cannot receive a fair trial in the county in which the offense was alleged to have been committed. See Ala. Code § 15-2-20 et seq. Whether to grant a change of venue is generally left to the discretion of the trial court. Mathis v. State, 280 Ala. 16, 189 So.2d 564 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 963, 17 L.Ed.2d 807 (1967); State v. Ware, 10 Ala. 814 (1846); Anderson v. State, 443 So.2d 1364 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Robinson v. State, 430 So.2d 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Lokos v. State, 434 So.2d 818 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), aff'd, 434 So.2d 831 (Ala.1983). Notwithstanding such discretion, on appeal, the appellate court's "review of the trial court ruling is to be de novo, without any presumption in favor of that ruling." Gilliland v. State, 291 Ala. 89, 277 So.2d 901, 903 (1973). See also Malloy v. State, 209 Ala. 219, 96 So. 57 (1923); Monroe v. State, 50 Ala.App. 302, 278 So.2d 751 (1973); Ala. Code § 15-2-20 (1975). We find the following to be the facts presented by the appellant to the trial court in support of his motion for change of venue.

The deceased had worked for the appellant at the latter's business, Wilson Ford automobile dealership, in Tuskegee, Alabama, for about six years. Shortly after the deceased's body was discovered on Wednesday, July 21, 1982, it was rumored that the appellant had committed the murder, and that it was racially motivated. These rumors quickly caused a fervor to spread throughout the county, with the local newspaper receiving complaints from citizens complaining that the appellant was not being expeditiously arrested. A demonstration was planned for Monday, July 26, 1982, and a parade permit was obtained authorizing the demonstration to occur in downtown Tuskegee. The objective of the demonstration and parade was to cause the authorities to arrest Wilson for the murder. The city's mayor publicly supported the planned demonstration, and also asserted that the demonstration should not be directed toward the city. The sheriff was successful in persuading the organizer of the planned demonstration to forego marching. The local paper also reported that there was an unsuccessful attempt to organize another march for the following day.

A controversy ensued between the county sheriff, who was seeking re-election at the time, his political opponents, and the mayor of Tuskegee, over the manner in which the sheriff was managing the homicide investigation, i.e., that the appellant had not yet been arrested. The mayor acknowledged that the city did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the offense had occurred outside of the city limits, and, therefore, the failure of the county sheriff to arrest the appellant was not his fault. The mayor further stated that he would...