Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 January 1901
• Citation: 29 So. 569,128 Ala. 17
• Parties: WILSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

29 So. 569

128 Ala. 17

WILSON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 15, 1901

Appeal from circuit court, Lowndes county; J. C. Richardson, Judge.

Robert Wilson was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The appellant, Robert Wilson, was tried under the following indictment: "The grand jury of said county charge that before the finding of this indictment, Robert Wilson, alias Duncan, unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Clarissa, alias Clara, King, alias Cain, by shooting her with a gun, against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama." The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. Upon the cause being called for trial, the defendant moved the court for a continuance, and objected to being put upon trial upon the following ground: "That no true copy of the indictment preferred against this defendant has been served upon this defendant as required by law." The facts shown upon the hearing of this motion are set forth in the opinion. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant duly excepted. The defendant moved to quash the indictment upon the following grounds: "(1) Said indictment fails to charge any offense against the laws of the state of Alabama. (2) The said indictment charges that the defendant, with malice aforethought, killed Clarissa alias Clara, King, alias Cain, by shooting her with a gun. (3) The said indictment fails to allege that the defendant with malice aforethought, killed Clarissa, alias Clara, King alias Cain, by shooting her with a gun." This motion was overruled, and the defendant duly excepted. Thereupon the defendant demurred to the indictment upon the following grounds: "(1) Said indictment fails to charge any offense against the laws of the state of Alabama. (2) Said indictment fails to allege that, with malice aforethought the defendant killed the deceased, Clarissa, alias Clara, King alias Cain. (3) Said indictment fails to allege that the defendant unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Clarissa, alias Clara, King, alias Cain, by shooting her with a gun. (4) Said indictment fails to charge any offense against the laws of the state of Alabama." This demurrer was overruled, and the defendant duly excepted. The tendencies of the evidence for the state and for the defendant are shown in the opinion. The state introduced as a witness Dr. N. G. James, who testified that he was called to see Clarissa King, the deceased, a short time after she was shot; that she died about a half hour after he saw her; and that her death was caused from a gunshot wound. This witness further testified that while he was tending the deceased, and while she was lying on the bed, he cut off that part of the dress worn by her that the shot passed through; and upon being shown the piece of cloth, with a round hole in it, the witness identified it as being the piece he had cut from the dress of the deceased, and further testified that it was in the same condition as at the time he cut it off the dress, and that it had remained continuously in his possession from that time to the time of the trial. Upon the solicitor offering a piece of the dress in evidence, the defendant objected on the ground that it was not shown that the said piece of cloth was in the same condition as at the time the deceased was shot, nor in whose possession it had been since the deceased was shot. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Upon the introduction of one W. F. Meadows, a witness for the state, he testified that a short time before Clarissa King was killed he had a conversation with the defendant, and that the defendant stated to him that he had a fuss with Clarissa King, and he was going to blow her brains out. Upon the witness remonstrating with him and telling him not to do so, and that it would get him into trouble, the defendant turned from him and said, "I am going to do it." The defendant moved to exclude this testimony as to the conversation of the witness with the defendant, upon the ground that no sufficient predicate, showing that the statement was voluntary, had been laid to authorize the introduction of this testimony. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant duly excepted. Upon the introduction of one Harry McCord as a witness for the defendant, he testified that he remembered the morning upon which the deceased was killed, and that he knew both the defendant and the deceased, and that he had a conversation with deceased the morning before she was shot. The defendant then asked the witness to "state the conversation he had with the deceased." The solicitor objected to this question, upon the ground that it was too indefinite, in that the conversation called for was not shown in any way to relate to the defendant or this case. The court sustained the objection, and the defendant duly excepted.

Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: "(a) The court charges the jury that although the facts and circumstances in this case may be strong enough to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every material link in the chain of evidence, save one, necessary to show the guilt of the defendant, yet if the jury have a reasonable doubt, issuing out of the evidence, as to the truth of this one link, you must acquit the defendant. (b) The court charges the jury that self-defense is the resistance of force, as seriously threatened force actually impending, by force sufficient to repel the danger." "(e) The court charges the jury that unless you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant killed the deceased with malice aforethought, and under a formed design, you cannot convict the defendant of murder in either degree. (f) The court charges the jury that, if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was done deliberately or whether it was done premeditately, then you cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree; and, if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was done in malice, then you cannot find the defendant guilty in either degree, but only of manslaughter in the first degree, at most; and, after considering all the evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of manslaughter, arising out of any part of the evidence, then you should find the defendant not guilty of any offense. (g) The court charges the jury that, if the defendant was the aggressor and the sole cause of the difficulty in which the deceased was killed, yet if you believe from the evidence that he retreated, or attempted to retreat, and was thereby apparently placed in such position as he was in danger of losing his life or of receiving grievous bodily harm, he had the right to use such force to repel this danger, even though he had to kill the deceased to do so."

The bill of exceptions contains the following recitals as to the rendering of the verdict by the jury: "After the jury had received all the instructions of the court, they retired to consider their verdict. The next day the jury came into open court, and, the defendant and his attorney being present, the presiding judge asked the jury if they had agreed upon a verdict, and one of the jury answered that they had. The presiding judge said: 'Receive and read the verdict, Mr. clerk.' The clerk read the...