Wilson v. State
| Decision Date | 09 October 1956 |
| Parties | Raymond WILSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Robert J. Beaudry, Milwaukee, W. B. Rubin, Milwaukee, of counsel, for plaintiff in error.
Vernon W. Thomson, Atty. Gen., and William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., William J. McCauley, Dist. Atty., Milwaukee County, Hugh R. O'Connell, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., Milwaukee, for defendant in error.
Sec. 958.07, Stats. (new number) provides that the writ of error coram nobis may be issued under certain circumstances. It is a writ of long standing. The leading Wisconsin cases concerning it are In re Ernst, 1923, 179 Wis. 646, 192 N.W. 65, 30 A.L.R. 681, and State v. Dingman, 1941, 239 Wis. 188, 300 N.W. 244. These cases and the texts make it clear that this writ is highly discretionary and the determination of the court to which the application was made will not be reversed unless it very clearly appears that discretion was abused. The writ will notilie if an appeal may be taken to correct the errors alleged by the petitioner. The writ may be granted when facts not of record are produced, by affidavit or testimony, which were not known to the trial court at the time it entered judgment and which if known would have prevented the entry of the judgment complained of.
Neither the petition nor the argument of counsel brought to the court any new facts whatever. They simply review those portions of the record in which they contend the trial court committed error. If the objections are well taken these matters were properly reviewable in an appeal from the judgment. No foundation has been laid upon which the writ of error coram nobis could be granted and, accordingly, the denial of the writ was not an abuse of the discretion of the trial court. Its order denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis is affirmed.
In support of the motion for a new trial the plaintiff in error submits that he was convicted without due process of law, particularly in that the finding respecting his sanity at the time his case was heard was based upon obsolete and incompetent opinions, the plea of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense was never tried nor heard, that no competent evidence was had that Mrs. Wilson was alive at the time of the alleged killing and that the plea of guilty was involuntary.
The medical experts who pronounced Wilson sane at the time of hearing testified, among other things, that he could distinguish between right and wrong and knew the nature and quality of his acts. This is the time honored 'McNaughten rule' for the determination of sanity. In this state we have defined legal insanity as "such a perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render the person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong." Oehler v. State, 1930, 202 Wis. 530, 535, 232 N.W. 866, 868, citing Jessner v. State, 1930, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634, 71 A.L.R. 1005. Sec. 357.13(1), Stats., [now sec. 957.13(1)], provides:
'If the court is reliably advised before or at his trial or after conviction and before commitment that the defendant is probably insane or feeble-minded, the court shall in a summary manner make inquiry thereof.'
Subsection (2) thereof provides:
'If the court finds that the defendant is insane or feeble-minded, his trial or sentence or commitment shall be postponed indefinitely * * *.'
Counsel for the defendant submit that the McNaughten rule is obsolete and call upon us to adopt some other, unspecified, test. The state contends that the defendant's appreciation of the distinction between right and wrong is immaterial at this stage of proceedings and what is really important is his capacity to confer with his counsel and assist in his own defense. We agree with the state that trial should be indefinitely postponed if the defendant's mental condition renders him incapable of conferring with his attorneys in his own behalf but do not adopt the theory that defendant's ability to distinguish...
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