Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 January 1876
• Citation: 45 Tex. 76
• Parties: DICK WILSON v. THE STATE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

45 Tex. 76

DICK WILSON

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1876.

APPEAL from the Criminal District Court of the city of Dallas. Tried below before the Hon. Silas Hare.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

A. J. Peeler, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

REEVES, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

In this case there was no appearance for the appellant. The case was submitted for the State on the brief of the Assistant Attorney General.

There were two indictments pending in the Criminal Court of Dallas city against the appellant. In the first one, numbered on the docket of the Criminal Court 2398, the defendant was charged with theft of a gelding belonging to Granville Criner, charged in the indictment to have been taken from the possession of D. N. Harden, who, as averred, was holding the animal for the owner. The other indictment, numbered on the docket 2399, and found at the same term of the court, charged the defendant with theft of a saddle, bridle, and blanket, one pair of saddle-bags, one umbrella, three shirts, one pair pants, two pairs of drawers, belonging to D. N. Harden, and taken from his possession on the 10th day of July, 1874, being the same day the gelding was stolen from him.

It appears that the defendant was first put upon his trial on indictment No. 2399, charging him with stealing the saddle, bridle, and blanket, &c., on which charge he was convicted by the jury, and his punishment assessed at a fine of one hundred dollars and one year's confinement in the county jail; and by the judgment of the court he was remanded to the custody of the sheriff until the fine and costs were paid, and for the further term of one year, according to the verdict of the jury.

On his trial for stealing the gelding, as charged in indictment No. 2398, the defendant pleaded the former conviction on the indictment No. 2399 as a bar, and asked to be discharged from further prosecution, because the offense for which he had been tried and convicted was in fact and in law the same offense of which he then stood charged. Upon the motion of the District Attorney the plea was stricken out by the court. The case being submitted to a jury a verdict was returned assessing the punishment at fifteen years confinement in the penitentiary. The motion for a new trial being overruled, the defendant has appealed.

The court did not err in refusing to give the special charges asked by the defendant, being one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial.

The first charge asked by the defendant was to the effect that the State could only prove that Granville Criner, the owner, did not give his consent to defendant to take the gelding by Criner himself, or by the confession of the defendant. The court instructed the jury “that the want of the owner's consent could be established by the evidence of the party from whom the property was taken or the party who was the owner, or it may be established by facts and circumstances, provided such circumstances so proven are of such a nature as to exclude absolutely every reasonable presumption that the owner gave his consent to the taking.”

The appellant has no just ground to complain of this charge. (Lowrance v. The State, 4 Yerg., 145;Free v. The State, 13 Ind., 324.)

The second charge refused was given substantially in the general charge, and the court was not required to repeat it.

The fourth ground of the motion for a new trial presents the material question in the case, to wit: because the court erred in striking out defendant's plea of autrefois convict.

Wharton, in his work on American Criminal Law, (1 vol., sec. 570,) says: “Whenever the offenses charged in the two indictments are capable of being legally identified as the same offense by averments, it is a question of fact for a jury to determine whether the averments be supported and the offenses be the same. In such cases the replication ought to conclude to the country. But when the plea of autrefoisacquit, upon its face, shows that the offenses are legally distinct, and incapable of identification by averments, as they must be in all material points, the replication of nul tiel record may conclude with a verification. In the latter case, the court, without the intervention of a jury, may decide the issue.”

The same rules apply to the plea of autrefois convict.

“The plea,” says Bishop, “must set out the record of the former conviction or acquittal, including the caption and indictment, and allege that the two offenses are the same, and that the defendant in the former is the same person who is the defendant in the latter.” (1 Bishop's Cr. Pro., secs. 814, 816.)

“When there are special pleas upon which the jury are to find, they must say in their verdict that the matters alleged in such pleas are either true or untrue.” (Code Cr. Pro., art. 3091, Paschal's Dig.)

In the case of Davis v. The State, (42 Texas, 494,) the court said: “It would certainly be most in harmony with our general practice to submit both issues (the plea of not guilty and plea of former conviction) to the jury, with directions to first consider the special plea; and if they found that to be true, to proceed no further than to return their verdict upon it.”

The rule to be deduced from the authorities is, that where the offenses charged in different indictments are so diverse as not to admit of proof that they are the same, the court may decide the issue without submitting it to a jury.

In the case of Boggess v. The State, from McLennan county, decided at Austin, (43 Tex., 347,) the action of the court sustaining exceptions to the plea was held to be correct.

In the case at bar we are not able to say that it necessarily appears by the record that the offenses are incapable of identification. The plea alleges that they are the same, and that the defendant is the same person in both indictments. The theft as alleged in both indictments is charged to have been committed on the same day and from the same person. In one case he was the owner of the property, and in the other he was in possession, and holding the same for the owner, according to the allegations of the indictment.

If we look to the evidence on the trial for the theft of the gelding, as may be done in considering the motion for a new trial, it will be seen that D. N. Harden, from whose possession the property was taken, testified that a new saddle, a pair of saddle-bags filled with clothing, a blanket, and an umbrella strapped on the saddle, were on the horse at the time he was taken, being in part such articles as are described in the indictment. The saddle-bags may have contained the other articles mentioned in the indictment. The horse and the saddle and saddle-bags belonged to Granville Criner, leaving...