Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 11 June 1888
• Citation: 84 Ala. 426,4 So. 383
• Parties: WILSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

4 So. 383

84 Ala. 426

WILSON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 11, 1888

Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson county; S.E. GREEN, Judge.

The appellant, Tom Wilson, was indicted for murder, the language of the indictment being as follows: "The grand jury charge *** George Williams, Nathan Collins, and Tom Wilson did unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, kill Cash Mosley, by striking him in the head with some hard substance unknown to the grand jury, or by choking him with a piece of fuse or cord; against," etc. The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that it alleged in the alternative the means by which the offense was committed. The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant excepted. The defendant objected to and excepted to the admission by the court in evidence of certain confessions, alleged to have been made by him, on the ground that they were not voluntarily made. The facts and circumstances accompanying these confessions are fully set out in the opinion.

R H. Fries, for appellant.

T N. McClellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLOPTON J.

The indictment is not defective because it avers in the alternative the means by which the offense was committed. "When the offense may be committed by different means or with different intents, such means or intents may be alleged in the alternative." Code 1886, § 4383.

We cannot regard the statements of the defendant, made to witness Moore, and during the progress of the preliminary investigation, as acknowledgments of facts not inculpatory in their nature,-admissions, as distinguished from confessions. They make direct allusions to the deceased, and are narratives of the facts and circumstances of his death which tend to implicate the defendant in the crime. Being in the nature of confessions, their admissibility in evidence should be determined on the same principles as direct confessions of guilt. It is within the province of the court to determine, in the first instance, whether or not a confession is voluntary. Being, prima facie, involuntary and inadmissible, the burden is on the prosecution to establish the competency by showing, on a preliminary inquiry, that the mind of the accused was free from influence of hope or fear applied by another when he made the confession. The court should take care that the confession proceeded from volition, and not as the result of any influence improperly exerted, and should not admit them unless they clearly appear to have been made in such manner as to constitute them competent evidence. What questions were propounded to the witness Moore, and his answers thereto, are not disclosed by the record, which only shows a statement by him as follows: "I don't think I made any promises gave any inducements, or made any threats," against the defendant, before or at the time of the confession. The guarded and cautious words of the witness implied doubt in his own mind, and are an admission that his recollection is not so clear but that he may be mistaken; or may be regarded as an admission that he had given promises, or made threats, but whether before or at the time of the confession, or subsequently, he does not recollect. While the character of the confession is ordinarily shown by answers...