Wilson v. State, CR-19-0469

• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
• Citation: 329 So.3d 71
• Docket Number: CR-19-0469
• Parties: Salathia Rodriquez WILSON v. STATE of Alabama
• Decision Date: 16 December 2020

329 So.3d 71

Salathia Rodriquez WILSON

v.STATE of Alabama

CR-19-0469

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 16, 2020

Aylia McKee, chief public defender, and Glenn A. Langner II, asst. public defender, Office of the Public Defender for the 15th Judicial Circuit, Montgomery, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and William D. Dill, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

McCOOL, Judge.

Salathia Rodriquez Wilson appeals his guilty-plea convictions and resulting sentences for third-degree burglary, a violation of § 13A-7-7, Ala. Code 1975; first-degree theft of property, a violation of § 13A-8-3, Ala. Code 1975; and first-degree robbery, a violation of § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975.

Facts and Procedural History

On December 9, 2011, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Wilson for third-degree burglary and first-degree theft of property in case no. CC-11-1624. (Supp. C. 144-46.) Wilson was arrested for those charges on December 21, 2011, and was released on bond pending a trial scheduled for February 13, 2012. However, Wilson did not appear for trial, and a capias warrant authorizing Wilson's arrest was issued three days later. (Supp. C. 151.) On February 21, 2012, Wilson was arrested by a Montgomery police officer following a traffic stop and was taken to the Montgomery Police Department. (Supp. C. 165.) At the time of the traffic stop, Wilson "had a lot of dry blood on his clothing, and ... there was some dry blood on the microwave in the backseat of the vehicle." (R. 22.) There were also various articles of mail in the backseat "addressed to a Morris Dixon who lived in" Macon County (R. 22), and law enforcement officers in Macon County found Dixon dead in his home later that day. (R. 22.) It appears, however, that Wilson "was not booked in [the Montgomery County] jail" (Supp. C. 166) but, according to the State, was "re-released by accident." (R. 9.) Thus, the following day a new warrant was issued authorizing Wilson's arrest for the burglary and theft charges in case no. CC-11-1624. Before that warrant could be executed, however, Wilson was arrested on February 23, 2012, for the murder of Dixon and was taken to the Macon County jail. (C. 60.)

The investigation into Dixon's murder revealed that Wilson was a suspect in a robbery that occurred in Montgomery County in September 2010. Thus, on March 8, 2012, a warrant was issued authorizing Wilson's arrest for the alleged robbery. (C. 12.) On June 15, 2012, while Wilson remained incarcerated in the Macon County jail, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Wilson for first-degree robbery in case no. CC-19-515 (C. 13-14), and on June 18, 2012, another warrant was issued authorizing Wilson's arrest for that charge. (C. 15.)

On February 11, 2013, a Macon County grand jury indicted Wilson for capital murder ("the Macon County case"). (C. 62-63.) Wilson, who had remained incarcerated since his arrest on February 23, 2012, subsequently entered into an agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder in the Macon County case and to be sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, which sentence would be split for Wilson to serve 5 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 24 months’ supervised probation. (C. 67, 71-72.) In February 2017, Wilson was released from incarceration after serving the split portion of his sentence, but he was arrested on May 9, 2018, for violating his probation. (C. 76.) On June 11, 2018, the Macon Circuit Court ordered Wilson to serve a 45-day "dunk" in the Alabama Department of Corrections under § 15-22-54(e)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and Wilson returned to supervised probation following the "dunk." (C. 78-79.)

On May 8, 2019, law enforcement officers executed the 2012 warrants authorizing Wilson's arrest for the burglary and theft charges in case no. CC-11-1624 and the robbery charge in case no. CC-19-515. (C. 15; Supp. C. 167.) In June 2019 and July 2019, respectively, Wilson filed separate motions seeking to dismiss the indictments in case no. CC-11-1624 and case no. CC-19-515 for want of a speedy trial. Following an evidentiary hearing at which the circuit court heard the testimony of one witness for the State, the circuit court entered an order denying Wilson's motions without stating its reasons. (Supp. C. 226.)

On January 13, 2020, after reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, Wilson pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in case no. CC-19-515 and to third-degree burglary and first-degree theft of property in case no. CC-11-1624.¹ On January 16, 2020, the circuit court sentenced Wilson for his convictions. In case no. CC-19-515, the circuit court sentenced Wilson to 20 years’ imprisonment but split the sentence and ordered Wilson to serve 36 months’ imprisonment, followed by one day of unsupervised probation. (C. 131.) However, it does not appear that Wilson served the split portion of his sentence because, on the same day the circuit court sentenced Wilson, the court also entered an order releasing Wilson from the Montgomery County jail (C. 132), at which point Wilson presumably served his one day of unsupervised probation. It appears that the reason Wilson did not serve the split portion of his sentence was either because the circuit court suspended the split portion of Wilson's sentence (C. 131) or because the parties agreed that Wilson would receive credit for "time served." (C. 121.). See Wilson's brief, at 20 ("In case no. CC-19-515 [Wilson] was ordered to serve 240 months split to serve 36 months suspended with credit for time served."). In case no. CC-11-1624, the circuit court sentenced Wilson to concurrent sentences of 24 months’ imprisonment and split the sentences and ordered Wilson to serve six months’ imprisonment, followed by one day of unsupervised probation. (Supp. C. 257.) As noted, however, Wilson was released from the Montgomery County jail the same day he was sentenced. Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal.

Analysis

On appeal, Wilson reasserts his claim that the trial court should have granted his motions to dismiss case no. CC-11-1624 and case no. CC-19-515 for want of a speedy trial. Because this issue involves a question of law and the application of the law to undisputed facts, we review the trial court's ruling de novo.

Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 262 (Ala. 2005).

"In determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we apply the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972), in which the following four factors are considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.

"In Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 263 (Ala. 2005), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

" ‘ "A single factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a ‘balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed.’ " Ex parte Clopton, 656 So. 2d [1243] at 1245 [(Ala.1995)] (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ). We examine each factor in turn [as it applies to each of Wilson's cases].’ "

State v. Jones, 35 So. 3d 644, 646 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).

I. Case no. CC-11-1624

A. Length of the Delay

"In Doggett v. United States, the United States Supreme Court explained that the first factor -- length of delay -- ‘is actually a double enquiry.’ 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed. 2d 520 (1992). The first inquiry under this factor is whether the length of the delay is ‘ "presumptively prejudicial." ’ 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31, 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). A finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial ‘triggers’ an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (‘[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, "presumptive prejudice" does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’). See alsoRoberson v. State, 864 So. 2d 379, 394 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).

"In Alabama, ‘[t]he length of delay is measured from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an arrest warrant -- whichever is earlier -- to the date of the trial.’ Roberson, 864 So. 2d at 394."

Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 263–64.

In case no. CC-11-1624, the length of the delay is measured from December 9, 2011 -- the date of the indictment -- to January 13, 2020 -- the date Wilson pleaded guilty. See Ex parte Carrell, 565 So. 2d 104, 107 (Ala. 1990) ("Although the defendant was never tried, because he entered a plea of guilty ... we consider that he was ‘tried’ as of the date when he was convicted and sentenced on his plea of guilty."). Thus, the length of the delay in case no. CC-11-1624 was approximately 97 months, or 8 years and 1 month. The State concedes, as it did below, that such a delay is presumptively prejudicial (State's brief, at 7) -- a concession supported by Alabama caselaw. See Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 264 (collecting cases in which delays of 60, 42, 26, 19, and 16 months were held to be presumptively prejudicial). Accordingly, because the delay in case no. CC-11-1624 was presumptively prejudicial, that delay is sufficient to trigger an examination of the remaining Barker factors. Ex parte Walker, supra.

B. Reason for the Delay

"The State has the burden of justifying the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182 ; Steeley v. City of Gadsden, 533 So. 2d 671, 680 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Barker recognizes three categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay, and (3) justified delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182. Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is ‘weighted heavily’ against the State. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182.

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