Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Citation | 601 F. Supp. 1446 |
| Decision Date | 01 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | C82-1067,Civ. No. C84-1175,C81-2303 and C81-2319. |
| Parties | Dennis WILSON v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. Hubert C. CRANFORD v. LEADER NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert A. SNEED. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert A. SNEED, Jr. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Timothy A. Siler, Siler & Jonap, Decatur, Ga., for Wilson.
Douglas E. Cobb, Oxedine & Assoc., Norcross, Ga., for Cranford.
Allen Gordon, Walbert & Hermann, Atlanta, Ga., for Sneeds.
Jerry Blackstock, James D. Meadows, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., for State Farm.
Roger Mills, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Atlanta, Ga., for Leader National.
Each of the above-captioned Jones cases1 is currently before the court on motions for summary judgment filed by the insurer.2 Although each involves entirely different facts, all present a common issue, namely, how to treat — substantively and procedurally — the issue of the insured's allegedly false signature on the insurance application. Is the matter of the allegedly false signature an element of the insured's case? Or must the insurance company prove the validity of the insured's signature? Where the insured is claiming that the signature is not his, but does not claim that he made no knowing rejection of optional coverages, can he collect based on Jones theory?
The relevant facts in each case before the court are now outlined.
In his complaint filed May 3, 1984, Mr. Wilson alleges that he was injured in an accident in August 1982 and that he then was insured under State Farm Policy No. 686 0282-C21-11A. The complaint further alleges that State Farm did not offer Mr. Wilson optional PIP coverage "in the manner required by Ga.Code Annotated Section 33-34-5." Complaint, ¶ 8. The complaint states that on January 24, 1984, Plaintiff elected to accept the maximum PIP coverage of $50,000, through the vehicle of a letter from his attorney Timothy A. Siler.
After Defendant answered the complaint, it filed a motion for summary judgment. Appended to the motion is a copy of Mr. Wilson's insurance application on Policy No. 686 0282-C21-11A. The insurance application reflects "X" marks in the "reject" boxes for the $10,000, $25,000 and $50,000 levels of personal injury protection. Immediately under that, following the statement "I made the acceptance/rejection of coverage" is the signature "Dennis Wilson." Separate sections of the application dealt with collision, loss of use and comprehensive insurance, each section having its own "accept" and "reject" blocks with separate signature spaces. Each of these sections shows "X's" in certain blocks and a signature "Dennis Wilson." State Farm argues that this format complies with the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in Flewellen, supra at 711, 300 S.E.2d 673. Additionally, the motion for summary judgment appends an affidavit of State Farm's resident claims superintendent, who states that at the time of Mr. Wilson's accident, State Farm paid his claim up to $5,000 and that therefore his benefits have been exhausted.
In his response to the motion for summary judgment Plaintiff makes no argument that the aforesaid application fails to comply with Flewellen. Instead, Plaintiff has tendered his affidavit, stating "The signatures shown on the insurance application are not my signature."
In his complaint filed April 14, 1982, Mr. Cranford alleges that he was injured in June 1980 in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, he was covered under a fleet policy issued to Superb Maintenance Service, Inc. by Defendant Leader National. Plaintiff Hubert Cranford is the president of Superb Maintenance Service, Inc.
The complaint further alleges that at no time prior to the accident did Leader National make optional coverage above the $5,000 minimum coverage available to Superb in accordance with the requirements of Ga.Code Ann. § 56-3403b. When Plaintiff made his claim in 1980 following the accident, it was paid in the sum of $5,000 only.
The complaint alleges that on October 12, 1981, February 11, 1982, and March 16, 1982, letters were sent to Defendant Leader National electing additional post-risk coverage of $45,000.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on May 29, 1984. Defendant contends the insurance application, rejecting optional no-fault coverage, is in substantial compliance with the requirements of Ga.Code Ann. § 56-3404b(b). It argues that no further benefits are owing, per the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Nixon, 252 Ga. 469, 314 S.E.2d 215 (1984) ().
Responding to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not dispute Leader's argument that the format of the application complies with the Georgia no-fault act.3 Instead, Hubert Cranford argues for the first time that the signature of his brother Harold Cranford on the insurance application is not his brother's signature, and that Harold never authorized anyone to sign his name.4 Harold Cranford is the vice-president of Superb Maintenance.
These cases began when Plaintiff State Farm filed complaints for a declaratory judgment in each case in December, 1981. In C81-2303A (hereinafter the "Sneed, Sr." case) State Farm alleged that Sneed, Sr. had held a policy with State Farm for a number of years prior to 1975. The complaint does not allege what amount of coverage Sneed, Sr. had either before or after the no-fault act went into effect. However, it alleged that on or about October 6, 1978, Sneed, Sr. requested that his no-fault coverage be cut back to the statutory minimum of $5,000 and that this was done as requested. The complaint alleges that on or about September 11, 1979, Robert A. Sneed, Jr. was involved in an automobile accident. The complaint does not specifically allege, but appears to concede, that he was covered under the aforesaid Sneed, Sr. policy.
The complaint refers to and appends a copy of a November 11, 1981 letter on the letterhead of Robert A. Sneed Associates, PC, Attorneys at Law, addressed to a State Farm claims agent. The letter states that Sneed, Sr. desires to accept State Farm's continuing offer of $50,000 maximum benefits. The letter states that Sneed, Jr.'s accident-related expenses are "far in excess of the `PIP' coverage of $5,000 in force at the time of the 9/11/79 accident."
State Farm's complaint in C81-2319A (hereinafter the "Sneed, Jr." case) is similar in format to that of the other case, but concerns a different policy and a different automobile accident which also happened to involve Sneed, Jr. This complaint alleges that in July 1976, Sneed, Jr. applied to State Farm for no-fault coverage. The complaint is silent as to what level of coverage Sneed, Jr. selected, but alleges that on or about October 4, 1978, Sneed, Jr. requested in writing that his coverage be reduced to the $5,000 minimum and that this reduction was effected in compliance with Sneed, Jr.'s request. Sneed, Jr. then was involved in an automobile accident on March 26, 1979 in which he sustained injuries. The complaint refers to and appends a copy of a letter dated November 11, 1981, from Robert A. Sneed, Sr., stating that his office had been retained by Sneed, Jr. to represent him, and that he on behalf of Sneed, Jr. accepts the continuing offer of maximum optional personal injury protection benefits of $50,000.
In both the Sneed, Jr. and the Sneed, Sr. cases, State Farm asks the court to declare and adjudge that each Defendant is not entitled to any coverage in excess of the $5,000 statutory minimum.
In response to the complaints for declaratory relief, Sneed, Sr. and Sneed, Jr. each filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. These were denied early in 1982. At that point, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in each case. These motions for summary judgment were supported by an affidavit of the service superintendent for one of State Farm's divisions. These affidavits affirmed the essential averments of State Farm's complaint in each case to the effect that the policies had been issued as alleged and that the relevant coverage amounts for each policy had been reduced to $5,000 by request of Sneed, Jr. or Sneed, Sr., as applicable. The Sneed filed no affidavits contesting these statements. However, their respective answers to the complaints (also filed in the spring of 1982) denied the averments that the insured had requested that coverage be reduced to the statutory minimum of $5,000.
On June 25, 1982, the court granted summary judgment to State Farm in both the Sneed, Jr. and the Sneed, Sr. case. The stated reason for granting summary judgment in the Sneed, Jr. case was this court's decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sweat, 547 F.Supp. 233 (N.D.Ga. 1982) (). Judgment was granted to State Farm in the Sneed, Sr. case based on the court's reasoning in Heflin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 547 F.Supp. 247 (N.D.Ga.1982) (). The judgments were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. After the appeals were taken, the Georgia appellate courts decided a number of important cases in the no-fault area. These decisions caused State Farm to ask that both cases be remanded to this court by the Eleventh Circuit. The remand in each case occurred on January 18, 1984. 723 F.2d 1518.
After the remand, the court entered an order setting a period of time for discovery and a deadline for...
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