Wilson v. State

Decision Date16 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 49S00-0008-CR-468.,49S00-0008-CR-468.
Citation765 N.E.2d 1265
PartiesMalcolm WILSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Timothy J. Miller, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Malcolm Wilson, was convicted of murder1 for the 1998 killing of sixteen-year old Shanna Sheese in Indianapolis.2 His appeal presents four issues, which we will address in the following order: (1) sufficiency of evidence, (2) admission of evidence regarding other bad acts, (3) refusal to give tendered jury instruction, and (4) admission of photographs of the deceased victim's body. We affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of murder. In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, and determine therefrom whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 863 (Ind.2000).

Applying this standard, the evidence shows that Shanna Sheese, age 16, was killed by blunt force trauma to the left side of her head. In a conversation with his jail cellmate, a crack cocaine user charged with burglary and theft, the defendant disclosed that he was accused of killing a sixteen-year-old girl; that he dealt drugs and had received several calls to come to what he thought was the scene of "some big money, a big buy," Record at 536; that he found there the girl, who was apparently dead; that he and a companion put her body in his truck to take it to "the drop spot," Record at 535; and that when he arrived at the spot, he then found that she was alive, moving and moaning. The defendant explained to his cellmate, "She know me.... She wasn't dead.... So, you know, hey, we had to take her out of it." Record at 536. The cellmate further stated that the defendant told him, "The bitch wasn't dead.... We had to take her out of it. I had to have my business. You know that." Record at 547. The defendant told his cellmate that his business was "cocaine and beauty salons, hair styling." Record at 546. Another witness testified by deposition that two days or less after the victim's death, he overheard the defendant admitting that he "beat the shit out of her" and then removed her clothes to make it look like a "John or prostitute type of beating." Supp. Record at 13, 15; Record at 490. A few days before learning that the victim was missing, one female witness, one of the defendant's cocaine customers, observed the defendant, his girlfriend, and others in the defendant's pick-up truck behind a crack house. When the witness noticed a pair of tennis shoes, pointing upwards as if on a person's feet, protruding from under a tarp on the back of the defendant's truck, the defendant's girlfriend quickly pulled the tarp over the shoes and said, "She saw." Record at 335. The defendant responded, "If she did see, she ain't going to say nothing, because if she does then we know where it came from." Id. When a police officer sought to speak with the defendant during his investigation, the defendant responded, "You've been listening to those lying bitches." Record at 506. The victim used crack cocaine and frequented crack houses. She was known to associate with the defendant and his girlfriend. About one week before the victim's death, she was seen buying crack cocaine from the defendant, and she still owed the defendant $350 or $375 for crack cocaine previously purchased. Supp. Record at 7, 9; Record at 490. Before her death, witnesses had seen her together with the defendant and his girlfriend, and the defendant had been in a heated argument with the victim a few days before she disappeared. The victim's naked body was found in a vacant lot on the near east side of Indianapolis.

The defendant bases his argument on an alleged inconsistency between the testimony of pathologist John Pless, M.D., and the testimony of the defendant's jail cellmate, Jackie Shockency. The defendant emphasizes Shockency's description of the defendant telling him that upon arrival at the scene of the expected drug buy, the girl was dead and had been hit in the head with a blunt instrument. He argues that Dr. Pless's testimony leads to the conclusion that a single blow killed the victim, but that the defendant's version, as presented by his cellmate, requires a beating severe enough to result in unconsciousness and the appearance of death, regaining consciousness, and a subsequent fatal blow. Urging that these versions are irreconcilable, the defendant argues that this "casts sufficient doubt that Shockency was telling the truth which renders the verdict sufficiently suspect to warrant reversal." Br. of Appellant at 19.

Dr. Pless testified that due to the extensive decomposition of the head, it was "very likely" that the victim was beaten on other parts of her head, and that it was possible that those other injuries could have caused temporary unconsciousness. Record at 456-57, 459, 465-67.

We find no significant differences in the two versions of the cause of death. Furthermore, the evidence that the defendant admitted that he and his companion killed the victim strongly supports the verdict. Considering the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Admitting Evidence of Other Bad Acts

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of evidence of the defendant's drug and prostitution business. He urges that the trial court permitted admission of extensive evidence of the defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts contrary to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), and that, even if admissible, its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in violation of Evidence Rule 403.

This issue was first raised by the defense with respect to the defendant's drug use and dealing in a pre-trial motion heard several months before trial. A transcript of the hearing is not included in the submitted Record, but the substance of the trial court's rulings was reviewed and discussed among the court and counsel immediately before the commencement of trial. The court ruled that, because the use, sale, and distribution of cocaine was a central issue in the events of this case, testimony regarding cocaine use and the defendant's providing cocaine to others would be permitted. The trial court ruled, however, that some testimony sought to be presented by the State and challenged by the defense would not be permitted. Furthermore, informing counsel of his concern regarding the number of witness talking about cocaine sale and use, Magistrate Renner invited, and counsel provided, further argument. The court's thoughtful consideration is demonstrated in his ruling, which stated in part:

I don't want the appellate court to look back in the future, if that becomes a necessity, and say, "Court, Mr. Renner, you ruled wrong. There was too much of this repetitiveness, and it did tip the balance of 403 against the State and prejudiced and biased the jury against the defendant." I'm sensitive to that. [The prosecutor] has provided me, and I think sufficiently provided me with other reasons why this testimony has to come in. I am happy to provide limiting instructions as best I can, and maybe it will never see the light of day with the appellate court. But I'm going to allow the testimony as we've discussed. Obviously over your objection. Please at the appropriate time object to preserve your record.

Record at 280-81. At this point, the State informed the court that it had just discovered that one of its witnesses had knowledge regarding the defendant's drug business using girls engaged in prostitution. The defense objected "because it's cumulative" and doesn't contribute "to establishing the relationship of prostitution with my client that the other witnesses can't establish." Record at 284. After further arguments of counsel, the trial court ruled that the State should not question this witness as to the defendant's involvement in prostitution because her information regarding the defendant's connection to prostitution was disclosed to the defense only shortly before trial. Compared with the considerable evidence presented regarding the defendant's involvement with drug dealing, there were few instances in which a witness's testimony tended to directly implicate the defendant as involved in prostitution.3

For the most part, defense counsel presented contemporaneous objections at trial raising both Rule 403 and Rule 404(b). Early in the trial, in response to the defendant's objection, the court stated:

Well, with respect to striking the testimony, I'm going to deny that request. However, ladies and gentlemen, I would advise you and instruct you that evidence of other acts or crimes which are not charged or covered by the information are not being offered to prove that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. In other words, they're not being offered to show that he is a bad person or that he is a criminal. There is the need at times to present evidence of other wrongs or bad acts to give the jury some context or some sense of the surrounding facts and circumstances. That is why this testimony is being offered regarding some alleged events in which you may find that the defendant was involved. They are not to be considered by you to prove that he was a bad person nor that he committed these acts. They are simply—the evidence is simply being offered to give you some background, some context in what we sometimes
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