Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94CA18,94CA18
• Citation: 655 N.E.2d 1348,101 Ohio App.3d 487
• Parties: WILSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 487

101 Ohio App.3d 487

655 N.E.2d 1348

WILSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio et al., Appellees. ^*

No. 94CA18.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Fourth District, Hocking County.

Decided Feb. 27, 1995.

Pearly L. Wilson, Nelsonville, pro se.

Betty D. Montgomery, Atty. Gen., and Todd R. Marti, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, for appellees. ¹

STEPHENSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling the appellant's motions for default judgment and summary judgment and granting the appellees' motion to dismiss the appellant's declaratory judgment action. The appellant assigns the following error:

"The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it dismissed appellant's petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to defendants' motion to dismiss under Ohio R.Civ.Proc. 12(B) when defendants were in default twice, for failure to appear and failure to otherwise defend as to this action, as well as failure to even respond to the appellant's motion for summary judgment."

The appellant is an inmate at Southeastern Correctional Institution. He was apparently released on parole but later arrested for a violation of the conditions of his parole. He was not given an opportunity to seek release on bail pending the outcome of his parole revocation proceedings, because Ohio law makes no provision for bail in connection with parole revocation proceedings. See R.C. 2967.15.

The appellant filed the case below on October 4, 1993, seeking a declaratory judgment that the lack of an opportunity for bail in connection with parole revocation proceedings violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution's bail provision and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also contended that the lack of opportunity for bail violated the federal bill of attainder and ex post facto clause (Clause 3, Section 9, Article I) of the United States Constitution.

Appellees were served with copies of the complaints and summonses, and when appellees failed to answer, plead, or otherwise defend, the appellant moved for default judgment on November 19, 1993. The trial court issued an order directing the appellees to respond on or before May 2, 1994. On April 21, 1994, the appellees then filed a memorandum in opposition to the appellant's motion for default judgment, a motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss, and a motion to dismiss. The appellees claimed that though they had been served sometime at the end of October 1993, they had not acted upon the complaint because it had been inadvertently misfiled.

On June 16, 1994, the appellant filed his motion for summary judgment. The appellees failed to respond to this motion. On July 11, 1994, the appellant filed his second motion for default judgment. Finally, on August 31, 1994, the trial court denied all of the appellant's motions and granted the appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court stated that because the denial of bail for alleged parole violators is rational, parolees are not a suspect class, and freedom pending parole revocation is not a fundamental right, R.C. 2967.15 was constitutional. This appeal follows.

The appellant assigns only one error. However, it is clear from the appellant's brief that there are three issues presented in this single assignment of error. These issues are (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motions for default judgment, (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment, and (3) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

We will first consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, as this determination will affect the outcome of the other two issues. Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim presents a question of law, which we will decide independently of the trial court's determination. Steiner v. Steiner (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 513, 620 N.E.2d 152. A complaint is sufficient unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753.

We note first that an act of the General Assembly is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 38 O.O.2d 404, 224 N.E.2d 906. This presumption is rebuttable by proving constitutional infirmity beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59. Therefore, we must decide whether the appellant has proven the unconstitutionality of R.C. 2967.15 beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the appellant submits that parolees have a right to bail pending revocation proceedings under both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Many courts have held that the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail, does not require a right to bail pending revocation proceedings. E.g., In re Whitney (C.A.1, 1970), 421 F.2d 337; United States ex rel. Vitoratos v. Campbell (N.D.Ohio 1976), 410 F.Supp. 1208, 1211; and Faheem-El v. Klincar (C.A.7, 1988), 841 F.2d 712. We agree with the Klincar court that states have a compelling interest in upholding the effectiveness of their parole systems by denying bail to alleged parole offenders. Id. at 721. Persons such as the appellant have been previously convicted of a crime serious enough to have resulted in imprisonment, and there is probable cause to believe they have committed a new criminal act while released on parole. Ohio has apparently decided that there is serious doubt whether these individuals can function in society without committing antisocial acts, and, therefore, they must be detained pending their final revocation hearings. This compelling interest is more than sufficient to outweigh the appellant's conditional liberty granted to him by the state. Therefore, this court finds that there is no Eighth Amendment right to bail pending a parole revocation hearing. Further, because Ohio courts have generally held that the protection given by Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is coextensive with the protection given by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we find that no right to bail pending a parole revocation hearing exists under the Ohio Constitution. See, generally, State v. Douglas (1989), 66 Ohio App.3d 788, 792, 586 N.E.2d 1096, 1098-1099.

Next, the appellant submits that lack of bail violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has expressly dealt with what process is due parolees in revocation proceedings. See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. The court stated that a parolee could be detained pending the final decision of the parole board on revocation if it had been determined that there was probable cause to hold the parolee until this decision is made. Id. at 487, 92 S.Ct. at 2603, 33 L.Ed.2d at 498. The court never indicated that due process required an individualized bail hearing for parolees pending the final revocation hearing. Therefore, though the court has not decided the issue directly, Morrissey would seem to imply that such a hearing is not a requirement under the due process clause.

Several courts have held that due process does not require a bail hearing for parolees pending the final revocation hearing. E.g., Klincar, supra, and Smith v. Hickey (Mar. 1, 1976), Lucas App. No. L-76-037, unreported. In fact, the court in Hickey expressly held that the very statute which the appellant claims violates his due process rights in fact complies with due process requirements. Therefore, in view of the procedural safeguards already in place for parolees as set forth in Morrissey, the state's compelling interest in denying bail as discussed above, and the fact that parolees have only conditional liberty, we agree with the court in Hickey. Due process does not require that a parolee be granted a bail hearing pending the final revocation hearing.

Additionally, the appellant submits that by denying bail to alleged parolees pending their final revocation hearing but granting a bail hearing to alleged probation violators, the state had violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In general, states should treat similarly situated people in a similar manner. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985), 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313. However, legislative classifications will be upheld if the classification is rationally designed to further a legitimate state purpose. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. Only if a class of people is denied a fundamental right or is part of a suspect class will the state have to prove that it has a compelling interest in the legislation and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to meet this interest. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520.

First, courts have held that the right to bail pending parole revocation proceedings is not a fundamental right. People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill.2d 88, 11 Ill.Dec. 295, 368 N.E.2d 903. Also, courts have recognized that parolees are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes. Id. A class is suspect if there is a long history of oppressing individuals whose misfortune is to have been born in that class or if people in this class have...