Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 19,19
• Citation: 370 Md. 191,803 A.2d 1034
• Parties: Garrett Eldred WILSON, v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

803 A.2d 1034

370 Md. 191

Garrett Eldred WILSON, v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 19, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

August 5, 2002.

John L. Kopolow, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Steven L. Holcomb, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ RAKER, Judge.

The primary question we address in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to use statistical data and a product rule computation to prove the improbability of two Sudden Infant Death Syndrome ("SIDS")¹ deaths in a single family. We shall hold that because the evidence did not satisfy the test we adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), which guides the admissibility of expert testimony in Maryland, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Garrett Eldred Wilson, petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of first degree premeditated murder of his infant son, Garrett Michael Wilson. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction. Wilson v. State, 136 Md.App. 27, 764 A.2d 284 (2000).

We granted Wilson's petition for writ of certiorari to consider the following questions:

"1. May the State use statistical data and a product rule computation to prove the improbability of two SIDS deaths in a family where such evidence lacks an adequate foundation and is highly susceptible to misuse by the jury?

2. Did the trial judge take inadequate corrective action when the State's Attorney argued to the jury that a statistical computation he performed accurately represented the 1 in 10 million probability of petitioner's innocence?

3. May State experts in forensic pathology tell the jury that they drew incriminatory inferences from the defendant's purchase of life insurance on his infant children and that they made credibility assessments of witnesses in the case?

4. Did the trial judge err in prohibiting the defense pathologist from explaining why, in his opinion, the defendant's purchase of life insurance on his children is irrelevant to an expert pathologist's opinion as to matter of death?

5. Did the trial judge err in admitting evidence of Appellant's alleged murder of his infant daughter six years before the alleged murder in this case?"

Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 662, 770 A.2d 169 (2001).

I.

On February 25, 1981, Deborah Oliver Fennell, then petitioner's wife, gave birth to a daughter, Brandi Jean Wilson. After Brandi's birth, petitioner purchased two life insurance policies, worth a total of $40,000, on Brandi's life. Petitioner was the primary beneficiary of these policies, Ms. Fennell the contingent beneficiary. On April 30, 1981, Brandi died. After an autopsy, her death was labeled as a SIDS death.

On March 22, 1987, Mary Anastasi, petitioner's wife as of March 1986, gave birth to a son, Garrett Michael Wilson. After Garrett's birth, petitioner purchased two life insurance policies, worth a total of $150,000, on his son's life. As with his daughter Brandi's insurance policies, petitioner was the primary beneficiary and his wife the contingent beneficiary. On August 13, 1987, Garrett died. After an autopsy, his death was also attributed to SIDS.

On May 28, 1998, the Grand Jury for Montgomery County indicted petitioner for the murder of Garrett Michael Wilson. Wilson proceeded to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

At trial, Ms. Fennell testified that the night Brandi died was the first and only night that petitioner took care of the child. Soon after Brandi's death, petitioner filed claims with the two insurance companies from which he had purchased the policies on Brandi's life, and he collected the insurance proceeds. Like Ms. Fennell, Ms. Anastasi testified that the night of Garrett's death was the first night that petitioner alone took care of their baby. Petitioner collected the money from insurance policies he had taken out on Garrett's life soon after the infant's death.

At trial, the State presented testimony from the doctors who performed autopsies on Brandi and Garrett. Dr. Ann Dixon performed the autopsy on Brandi. Dr. Dixon testified that she changed her opinion as to the cause of death in Brandi's case to "probable suffocation" and the manner of death to "undetermined" on the basis of information provided by the police, including witnesses' statements and information about the life insurance policies on the two children taken out by petitioner.

Dr. Charles Kokes performed the autopsy on Garrett. He testified that he changed his opinion as to the cause of death in Garrett's case to smothering and the manner of death to homicide. Dr. Kokes changed his opinion based on additional investigative information provided by the State, including the facts surrounding Brandi's death and interviews with Garrett's mother.

Dr. John Smialek, the chief medical examiner for the State of Maryland, reviewed the original autopsy reports on Brandi and Garrett. In addition, the State provided Dr. Smialek with statements by the children's parents, family friends, and information regarding the life insurance policies. Dr. Smialek changed his opinion as to the cause of death in Brandi's case to suffocation and the manner of death to undetermined. Focusing largely on swelling in Garrett's brain, Dr. Smialek changed his opinion in Garrett's case to suffocation and the manner of death to homicide.

Dr. Linda Norton did not conduct the autopsy on Brandi or Garrett. She was hired by the State to review the children's deaths. Dr. Norton concluded that the cause of death in Brandi's case should be changed to suffocation and the manner of death to homicide. She focused on the similarity between Brandi and Garrett's deaths and pictures that suggested Brandi's face was pushed into the mattress of her crib. Dr. Norton also concluded that the cause of death in Garrett's case was suffocation and that the manner of death was homicide. Her opinion was based on the fact that petitioner was caring for both children at the time they died, and that these occasions were the only times petitioner had cared for either child during the night. She also considered statements from Garrett's mother and the insurance policies taken out by petitioner.

Two of the experts, Dr. Kokes and Dr. Norton, also relied on statistics, utilizing the product rule,² as a basis for their opinion and in calculating the probability that Garrett had not died of SIDS. Dr. Kokes testified that "[t]he death rate from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome back in 1987 was somewhere between 1 to 2 deaths for every 1,000 live births."³ He also noted that Garret had cerebral swelling, a condition that effects less than one percent of children who die from SIDS. Employing the product rule, Dr. Kokes multiplied the probability of a child's dying of SIDS and the probability of a SIDS death involving cerebral swelling. He concluded that the "the mathematical possibility of having a SIDS death occurring with cerebral swelling would be 1 in 100,000 live births." Dr. Kokes then took into account the fact that Garrett was the second child in the family to die of SIDS. He multiplied the probability of Garrett's dying from SIDS, 1 in 100,000, by the probability of Brandi's dying of SIDS, 1 in 1,000. He concluded that the probability that Garrett died from SIDS was 1 in 100,000,000.

Dr. Norton also testified as to the probability that Garrett died of SIDS. Dr. Norton relied on different statistics that indicated that SIDS occurs in 1 infant out of every 2,000 live births.⁴ Dr. Norton employed the product rule and concluded that the probability of two SIDS deaths occurring in one family is 1 in 2,000 multiplied by 1 in 2,000, or 1 in 4,000,000.

Petitioner moved in limine to exclude the expert testimony regarding the probability that a single family would suffer two SIDS deaths as well as the evidence that he was involved in Brandi's death. The trial judge denied both motions.

During rebuttal closing argument, the State's Attorney referred to the statistics that the experts relied on in forming their opinion that Garrett's death was criminal homicide, and argued the probability of petitioner's innocence. The State's Attorney did not merely argue that there was a low probability that two SIDS deaths would occur in one family; he argued that there was a low probability that petitioner was innocent. He told the jury, "[i]f you multiply his numbers, instead of 1 in 4 million, you get 1 in 10 million that the man sitting here is innocent. That was what a doctor, their expert, told you." Defense counsel's motion for a mistrial was denied and, instead, the court gave a curative instruction.

II.

We turn first to petitioner's argument that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony that relied on the product rule to calculate the probability that petitioner's children died of SIDS. It is the general rule that the admissibility of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. In this regard, the trial judge has wide latitude in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible. See In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md. 634, 759 A.2d 755 (2000)

. Maryland Rule 5-702, addressing the admissibility of expert testimony, provides that such testimony is admissible "if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Testimony concerning an unreliable scientific process, technique or unreliable opinion is of little value to a jury.

In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391...