Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 12 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. CR74--170,CR74--170
• Citation: 258 Ark. 110,522 S.W.2d 413
• Parties: Travis L. B. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 413

522 S.W.2d 413

258 Ark. 110

Travis L. B. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR74--170.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 12, 1975.

Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Boswell, P. A. Bryant, for appellant.

Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen. by Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

BROWN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder in which appellant received a life sentence. Appellant, Travis L. B. Wilson, lists six points of asserted error in the trial of his case. After a brief statement of background facts, we shall list those six points and discuss them separately. The evidence will be treated more particularly under the points for reversal. Suffice it to say that the body of Jewel McKown was found in close proximity to a trailer court where she lived, apparently slashed to death. Her body was discovered on the morning of July 5, 1974, near the mobile home which she rented, and which had been the scene of a gathering of two couples including Jewel and appellant, beginning late in the afternoon of July 4. Some intoxicants were consumed. It is apparent that around midnight one of the couples left while Miss McKown and Wilson remained inside the trailer. Appellant is said to have gone to the home of his parents in Redfield during the early morning hours and confided to his parents that he was in trouble and wanted to go to California. The parents took him to the bus station in Little Rock. The local officers called ahead and appellant was found at the bus station in Amarillo, Texas. He waived extradition and was returned to Grant County and charged with murder in the first degree.

Point I. The trial court erred in refusing to comply with the McNabb-Mallory rule. We are again urged to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule as it exists in federal practice, holding that failure to promptly arraign an accused will render a confession made by him during a confinement inadmissible. We decline to adopt the rule and recently so held in Mitchell v. Bishop, 248 Ark. 427, 452 S.W.2d 340 (1970), holding Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43--601 (Repl.1964) to be directory only.

Point II. The purported confession does not meet the test of voluntariness. Appellant insisted that he was under the influence of intoxicants to a heavy degree on the night in question. When appellant was apprehended in Amerillo, the arresting officer testified that he went over the Miranda warnings with appellant, explaining them in considerably more detail than the form language, and that appellant signed the waiver. Three statements were given to the officer--first, without recordation, just oral; second, oral only again because the tape recording machine was not properly operated; and, third, on a tape recorder and transcribed. The appellant signed the transcribed statement. Appellant said he understood the Miranda rights save an idea of his own about the time for appointment for an attorney. The appellant testified to the voluntariness and to the cooperativeness of the arresting officer. Appellant's main attack on the statement is his alleged intoxication, lack of sleep and food, and because of his lack of intelligence. We point out that the issue of intoxication was presented by conflicting testimony. David Smith and Melba Stone testified that in their opinion he was not drunk on the night of the alleged offense. The appellant's brother testified that when the appellant sobered up, he remembered the events that transpired while he was drunk.

Appellant also makes much of a lack of intellectual capacity chiefly through the introduction of letters written while in the State Hospital. The appellant, however, had a tenth grade education, and his writing and spelling prowess do not comport with his insistence on being intellectually backward.

Appellant also alludes to the nature of the custodial investigation as extremely lengthy, however, the interrogating officer testified that the total time of the interrogation was a maximum of one and one-half hours and that it was of such length only because the tape recorder was not in operating condition the second time the statement was taken. Also, appellant testified to the cooperative nature of the interrogating officer. In short, the trial court's finding of voluntariness was proper when viewed in the total circumstances and the confession was therefore properly admitted in evidence.

Point III. The verdict is not supported by substantial evidence as regards the elements of murder in the first degree. The elements of malice the premeditation are very much in evidence and are certainly sufficient to support the verdict. Malice can be implied from the circumstances of the killing. Malice is certainly in evidence in this case by the use of a barbecue fork or other similar object used to stab the deceased repeatedly in the chest and neck areas, even to the point of puncturing the heart eight or nine times, and by the use of a butcher knife to slash the throat of the deceased. The nature of the wounds and the weapons used are certainly sufficient to show the manifestation of 'an abandoned and wicked disposition' on the part of assailant, and concurrently is evidence of a 'deliberate intention of mind unlawfully to take away the life of a human being'. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41--2203, 2204 (Repl.1964). Appellant states that the requisite element of first degree murder, premeditation, cannot be presumed but must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course we have...