Wilson v. Stewart

Docket Number14 C 10521
Decision Date16 August 2022
PartiesDr. Robert Lance WILSON, D.O., Plaintiff, v. Jay STEWART, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

F. Dean Armstrong, Armstrong Law Firm, Frankfort, IL, for Plaintiff.

Sarah Hughes Newman, Michael T. Dierkes, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, United States District Judge

In 1998, the Illinois Division of Professional Regulation (DPR) initiated proceedings to suspend Dr. Robert Lance Wilson's medical license because of a controversial treatment decision he made at a Chicago-area hospital. Dr. Wilson insists that this discipline was unjustified, and he has been in conflict with the agency ever since. Over several years, as the DPR attempted to finalize the suspension of his license, Dr. Wilson obtained four favorable state-court decisions—each one reversing the agency's latest suspension order. In the final decision of that series, the state court determined that although there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Dr. Wilson had breached the applicable standard of care in 1998, the DPR had violated his state law rights during the lengthy proceedings. The apparent expectation was that Dr. Wilson would undergo some retraining and then be able to return to practice.

After that last court decision, in 2014, Dr. Wilson filed this lawsuit alleging various constitutional and state-law violations by a slew of named and unnamed state officials. This court has already dismissed large portions of the operative complaint.1 Dr. Wilson's only remaining claim is that Jay Stewart, the Director of the DPR between 2011 and 2016, violated his constitutional due process rights by failing to promptly conclude the administrative proceedings. Because the court finds that Stewart is immune from damages liability, it grants his motion for summary judgment [132].

BACKGROUND2
I. The Parties

Plaintiff Robert Lance Wilson is a doctor of osteopathy who specializes in cardiology. (DSOF ¶ 1.) He was first licensed to practice in Illinois in 1988. (PSOAF ¶ 1.) As a practicing physician, Dr. Wilson was regulated by the DPR, an Illinois state agency.3 (See DSOF ¶ 5.)

As of 1998 (the inception of the parties' dispute), the agency was known as the "Department of Professional Regulation." (Id.) In 2004, it was renamed the "Division of Professional Regulation" when it was absorbed by a new, larger agency called the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR). (Id.) IDFPR is led by a "Secretary," while each division is led by a "Director." (Id. ¶ 6.)

Defendant Jay Stewart was the Director of the DPR from April 2011 to August 2016. (Id. ¶ 2.) As the Director, Stewart oversaw the agency's discipline of physicians, which included "signing the final orders," "setting general policies and goals and objectives," and "trying to make sure . . . staffing and budget issues were addressed to help support the operations."4 (See id. ¶ 7; PSOAF ¶ 20; Dep. of Jay E. Stewart, Ex. 3 to DSOF [134-3] (hereinafter "Stewart Dep.") at 47:5-10.)

In his oversight role, Stewart was not involved in the day-to-day management of the DPR's individual cases. (See DSOF ¶ 66.) There was a multistep chain of command: Cases brought against physicians like Dr. Wilson were managed by prosecutors in the agency's Medical Prosecutions Unit, who reported to the Chief of Prosecutions, who reported to the Deputy Director of Statewide Enforcement, who in turn reported to Stewart. (Id. ¶ 7.) And Stewart exercised no control over the agency's Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). As members of the Formal Hearings Unit, ALJs reported directly to the General Counsel of the IDFPR (the DPR's parent agency), who in turn reported to the IDFPR's Secretary. (Id. ¶ 8; Stewart Dep. 104:17-21 ("[T]he director has no control over the administrative law judges. They don't report to the director. They're not subject to the director's control . . . . That's the office of the secretary.").)5

The DPR tracked its disciplinary cases using a computer database called the Illinois Licensing and Enforcement System (ILES). (PSOAF ¶ 26.) ILES contained a record for every individual licensed by the agency. (Decl. of Mark Thompson, Ex. 24 to DSOF [152-1] (hereinafter "Thompson Decl.") ¶ 2.) Each ILES record would note, among other things, whether any disciplinary actions had been brought against the individual. (Id. ¶ 3.) If such an action had been brought, the record would note each filing in the case, such as pleadings, motions, orders, and complaints for administrative review. (Id.)6

Although Stewart did not become the DPR's Director until 2011, the parties have provided a factual chronology that begins in 1998, when Dr. Wilson's dispute with the agency first erupted. In his reply, Stewart insists that many of these earlier facts are irrelevant now that Dr. Wilson has waived his wrongful-continuation claim and proceeds solely on his delay-related claim.7 (See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [145] (hereinafter "Pl.'s Resp.") at 1-2 (waiving wrongful-continuation claim); Def.'s Reply in Supp. of His Mot. for Summ. J. [150] (hereinafter "Def.'s Reply") at 1 (arguing that "much of Plaintiff's factual discussion . . . [is] irrelevant" to the delay claim).) Dr. Wilson has nevertheless addressed facts from the beginning to the end of the long-running dispute, and in the interest of putting this case to bed, the court covers the full timeline as well.

II. Death of Henry Taylor

In September 1998, at a hospital in south suburban Chicago, a 69-year-old patient named Henry Taylor was suffering from end-stage renal disease and superior vena cava syndrome. (DSOF ¶ 9; PSOAF ¶ 2.) Blood was not properly draining away from Mr. Taylor's upper body, which caused severe swelling and threatened his ability to breathe.8 (DSOF ¶ 9.) The condition was serious, and he signed two "Do Not Resuscitate" orders (DNRs).9 (PSOAF ¶ 2.)

By the morning of September 30, Mr. Taylor's condition had worsened to the point where he was effectively suffocating to death in his hospital bed. (DSOF ¶ 10; PSOAF ¶ 3.) Dr. Wilson, who had staff privileges at the hospital, was called in to treat him. (PSOAF ¶¶ 2-3.) Dr. Wilson began by injecting Mr. Taylor with morphine, but Mr. Taylor continued to flail and gasp for breath. (DSOF ¶ 11; PSOAF ¶¶ 3, 5.) Dr. Wilson then made the decision that soon attracted the DPR's attention: He injected Mr. Taylor with 40 milliequivalents of undiluted potassium chloride. (DSOF ¶ 11; PSOAF ¶¶ 6-7.)

Mr. Taylor was pronounced dead less than one minute later—or about 15 minutes after Dr. Wilson had arrived to treat him. (DSOF ¶ 11; PSOAF ¶ 7.) More than two decades later, Dr. Wilson still maintains that Mr. Taylor's death was inevitable and that, as a doctor, he was professionally obligated to ease Mr. Taylor's suffering.10 (See PSOAF ¶¶ 3-7.) To that end, Dr. Wilson says, the injection of potassium chloride was a proper palliative measure intended to render Mr. Taylor unconscious and reduce his pain. (DSOF ¶¶ 11-12; PSOAF ¶¶ 3-7.) Dr. Wilson also contends that the potassium chloride itself could not have killed Mr. Taylor, who died too quickly for the chemical to have circulated through his body. (DSOF ¶ 12; PSOAF ¶ 7.)

At this stage, the truth of these assertions is immaterial. It is enough to say that several DPR officials disagreed with Dr. Wilson about the prudence of his treatment decision.

III. Commencement of Administrative Proceedings Against Dr. Wilson

At Dr. Wilson's request, Mr. Taylor's body was transported to Cook County Medical Center for an autopsy.11 (DSOF ¶ 13; PSOAF ¶¶ 8-9.) The examiner initially reported that the cause of Mr. Taylor's death was indeterminate, but she soon changed her conclusion, identifying the cause of death as homicide by potassium chloride intoxication.12 (DSOF ¶ 13; PSOAF ¶ 10.) The examiner's conclusion prompted a homicide investigation by the Cook County State's Attorney; that office eventually announced that it would not file charges. (DSOF ¶¶ 14, 18; PSOAF ¶ 12; Press Release, Ill. State's Att'y, No Charges in Death of Patient at Olympia Fields Osteopathic Hospital (Sept. 28, 1999), Pl.'s Ex. 28 [145-2].)

In the meantime, the DPR had opened its own investigation into Mr. Taylor's medical treatment. On October 9, 1998, nine days after Mr. Taylor's death (and after Dr. Wilson had announced his plan to take a voluntary leave), the DPR's Medical Director and Chief of Medical Prosecutions (Andrew Gorchynsky and Thomas Glasgow, respectively) filed an ex parte petition for the temporary suspension of Dr. Wilson's license.13 (DSOF ¶ 16; PSOAF ¶ 11.) On the basis of that petition, which was supported by Gorchynsky's affidavit, the DPR's then-Director, Nikki Zollar, entered an order summarily suspending Dr. Wilson's license (the "October 1998 Summary Suspension Order"). (DSOF ¶¶ 16-17; PSOAF ¶ 11.)

On the same day the October 1998 Summary Suspension Order was issued, the DPR also filed a formal administrative complaint seeking the suspension or revocation of Dr. Wilson's license. (DSOF ¶ 15; PSOAF ¶ 11.) In an amended complaint, dated November 17, 1998, the DPR's Chief of Medical Prosecutions, Thomas Glasgow, alleged that by injecting Mr. Taylor with potassium chloride, Dr. Wilson had been grossly negligent and breached the standard of care. (DSOF ¶ 19; see also First Am. Compl., Dep't of Pro. Regul. v. Wilson, No. 1998-16588 (Ill. Dep't of Pro. Regul. Nov. 17, 1998), Ex. 6 to DSOF [134-6] (alleging that Dr. Wilson had acted with gross negligence (Count I) and engaged in "dishonorable, unethical, and unprofessional conduct" (Count II)).)

IV. November 1999 Hearing and First Administrative Decision

A formal hearing took place over multiple days in November 1999, a little over one year after Mr. Taylor's death.14 (DSOF ¶¶ 20-40; see also Hr'g Tr., Dep't of Pro. Regul. v. Wilson, No. 1998-16588 (Ill. Dep't of P...

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