In deciding the petition, the Court must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). It is Wilson's burden to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Id. On post-conviction review, the Indiana Court of Appeals set forth the facts underlying Wilson's convictions as follows:
Shortly after midnight on the morning of May 27, 1994, forty-five-year-old Wilson drove to the Keg Liquor Lounge in Clarksville. His wife, Judith Bowles Wilson (Judy), from whom a divorce was pending, was employed at the Keg and working that night. Wilson was aware his wife was seeing someone. While standing outside the Keg, Wilson engaged in a brief conversation with Charles Wise, an employee at the liquor store next to the Keg. Wise recalled Wilson saying "looks like lover is here tonight." Wise testified that he knew Wilson was referring to Antonio Rodriguez, Judy's boyfriend, and that Rodriguez was inside the bar.
Following that conversation, Wilson walked into the Keg carrying a Ruger .357 Magnum handgun. Wilson observed his estranged wife speaking to Rodriguez, and twice demanded to see her outside. After seeing Rodriguez make some sudden movements, Wilson shot at Rodriguez at least once, striking him in the left forearm. As Rodriguez fell to the ground and crawled behind the bar, Judy, who was alreadybehind the bar, ran towards the kitchen. Wilson then turned and fired two shots in Judy's direction.
Another patron who was in the bar at the time, Jack Bierly, later told police he believed Wilson actually fired two shots at Rodriguez. Bierly also observed Wilson raise and aim his gun in the direction of Judy. At that point, Bierly got up and ran out the front door of the bar. He heard more shots fired inside the bar as he ran. Wilson followed Bierly outside. Bierly heard Wilson yelling at him to stop running. Bierly testified that he then turned and saw Wilson pointing the .357 Magnum at him. Bierly drew his own revolver and shot at Wilson five times. Wilson fired twice in the direction of Bierly, though Wilson contends that the discharges were accidental. Bierly was not hit by these shots. Wilson sustained multiple gunshot wounds from Bierly's shots before he fled to the car he had driven, parked in an adjacent lot.
Police found Wilson collapsed next to a car in a lot adjoining the Keg. He had been shot in the stomach, chest, and right pinky finger. Inside the lounge, they found Judy Bowles Wilson dead from a gunshot wound to the head. A bullet had entered her left temple and exited the back of her skull. Police also found the injured Rodriguez.
The police searched the car next to which Wilson had been found. The car belonged to an employee of the company where Wilson was a manager. Inside the car, they found one of Wilson's business cards. They also found a box of .357 caliber ammunition, a shotgun, and a box of shotgun shells. None of these items belonged to the owner of the car, nor had he given permission for Wilson to borrow the car or put the guns and ammunition in it.
Wilson was transported from the scene to the hospital and remained there for surgery and follow-up care. On June 3, police arrested Wilson and charged him with the murder of Judy Bowles Wilson, the attempted murder of Rodriguez and Bierly, and carrying a handgun without a license.
In August 1995, Wilson filed a notice of insanity defense. The court appointed two independent psychiatrists to examine Wilson. They both concluded he was not insane. Defense counsel contacted the Veteran's Hospital and the Veteran's Administration in search of an expert on post-traumatic stress disorder. Counsel was consistently recommended to use David Moore, a social worker who had treated hundreds of veterans for post-traumatic stress disorder over the previous four years. At the time of the trial, Moore was in private practice. Before that, he was associated with the V.A. Medical Center in Louisville. Moore was a licensed clinical social worker with two Master's Degrees, one in Social Work from the University of Louisville and one in Divinity from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville. Moore had also competed 300 hours of continuing education, had six certifications, and was published. In addition, he had a Ph.D. in Social Work fromthe External Degree Program at Pacific Western University in Hawaii, and had experience testifying as an expert at trial.
During preliminary questioning of Moore regarding his qualifications as an expert, defense counsel asked Moore if he got his Ph.D. from a "correspondence school." Moore acknowledged he was not in Hawaii when he got his degree and that Pacific Western University was a correspondence school. Following the preliminary questioning, the trial court qualified Moore as "an expert clinical social worker for . . . [the] evaluation and treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder."
Moore testified that he evaluated Wilson and reviewed past medical and administrative documents. Moore explained to the jury how Wilson's family and military history related to his symptoms to show how and why Wilson suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. He testified that Wilson suffered from severe post-traumatic stress disorder and that he was insane at the time he murdered his estranged wife and shot Bierly and Rodriguez.
Also at trial, the two court-appointed experts testified Wilson was not insane. Donald O'Brien, Judy's brother, testified Wilson told him if he ever caught Judy with Rodriguez, he (Wilson) would kill them. Samuel Dryden, Wilson's former employee, testified Wilson told him if he ever killed anyone, he would use "Vietnam flashback syndrome" as a defense. An August 1995 jury trial ended in a mistrial. In December 1995, Wilson was convicted of all charges in a second jury trial.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: 1) the impact on the victim's family; 2) the minimum sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; 3) Wilson's need for correctional rehabilitation; 4) Wilson wounded Rodriguez and shot at Bierly; 5) the murder was premeditated; and 6) Wilson lacked remorse. The trial court found no mitigating factors and sentenced Wilson to sixty years for murder, forty years for each count of attempted murder, and one year for carrying a handgun without a license, all sentences to run concurrently.
Wilson v. State, No. 10A04-1001-PC-12, slip op at *1-2 (Ind. App. Ct. June 24, 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Wilson appealed, raising a double jeopardy claim and a number of errors in connection with the jury instructions. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Wilson, 697 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. 1998). Wilson did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court [ECF No. 1 at 2].
In November 1999, Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later withdrew, refiled, and then amended. Wilson, No. 10A04-1001-PC-12, slip op at *5. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Wilson's trial and appellate attorneys testified (and at which Wilson was represented by counsel), the court denied the petition. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied Wilson's petition to transfer [ECF No. 12-4].
Thereafter, Wilson filed this federal habeas petition raising the following claims: (1) his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to call a "more qualified" expert witness to testify in support of his insanity defense; (2) his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to certain comments by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the length of his sentence on direct appeal. [ECF No. 1 at 5-6.]
Wilson's petition is governed by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). AEDPA allows a district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Court can grant an application for habeas relief if it meets the stringent requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), set forth as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Under this deferential standard, a federal habeas court must "attend closely" to the decisions of state courts and "give them full effect when their findings and judgments are consistent with federal law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000). A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court or reaches an opposite result in a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from relevant Supreme Court precedent. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal...
