Wilson v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 27 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-0927 |
| Parties | GERALD B. WILSON, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice -- Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
State inmate Gerald B. Wilson (TDCJ #377028) has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state court conviction for failure to comply with a civil commitment order. The respondent has answered with a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Wilson is not entitled to relief. [Doc. # 8]. Wilson has filed a reply. [Doc. # 9]. After reviewing all of the pleadings, the state court records, and the applicable law, the Court grants the respondent's motion and dismisses this case for reasons set forth below.
The state court records reflect that Wilson has a lengthy criminal record, including multiple felony convictions for aggravated sexual assault from Montgomery County, see State v. Wilson, Crim. Nos. 17252 and 17253 (June 5, 1984), and Travis County, see State v. Wilson, Crim. Nos. 74-074, 74-075, and 74-150 (May 14, 1984). Wilson received a forty-year prison sentence in each of these cases. Wilson does not challenge any of those convictions here.
After Wilson was scheduled for release on parole in 2007, the State of Texas convened acivil commitment proceeding against him. On November 7, 2007, a jury in the 359th District Court of Montgomery County found that Wilson was a "sexually violent predator" as defined in § 841.003(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code.1 In re: Commitment of Gerald Wilson, No. 07-02-02127-CV (359th Dist. Ct. Montgomery County — Nov. 7, 2007). Consistent with that verdict, the trial court entered a civil commitment order that required Wilson to comply with numerous statutory conditions. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.082. One of those conditions required Wilson to complete an outpatient treatment program specifically designed for sexually violent predators by the Texas Council on Sex Offender Treatment.
On November 9, 2010, Wilson was terminated or discharged from his assigned outpatient treatment program for failing to abide by the rules. A discharge summary prepared by the Texas Council on Sex Offender Treatment shows that Wilson violated a "zero tolerance program" by failing to take medication as prescribed. Wilson was subject to the zero tolerance program because he had committed several previous violations of the supervision requirements regarding prescription medication. Wilson also failed to follow a "pre-approved daily activity schedule" and interfered with or failed to wear his "miniature tracking device" on more than one occasion as required by the treatment program and the civil commitment order.
Wilson's termination from the outpatient treatment program resulted in a warrant for his arrest and a grand jury indictment in Harris County cause number 1285445 for violating the terms of the civil commitment order. The State enhanced that indictment for purposes of punishment with allegations that Wilson was habitual felon, meaning that Wilson faced a potential sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment if found guilty at trial.
The State initially offered to recommend a minimum sentence of 25 years in prison in exchange for Wilson's guilty plea. Wilson eventually agreed to enter a guilty plea to the charges against him, without a recommendation from the State as to punishment, and he admitted that the enhancement allegations were true. On February 8, 2011, the 209th District Court of Harris County, Texas, found Wilson guilty as charged in cause number 1285445 and sentenced him to 5 years' imprisonment.
Wilson did not pursue a direct appeal. He did, however, file an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In that application, Wilson argued that he was entitled to relief from his conviction in cause number 1285445 because: (1) he had a constitutional right to refuse medication and, therefore, the charges were invalid; and (2) his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate the case and file motions to dismiss the charges. After considering an affidavit from Wilson's defense counsel, the state habeas corpus court, which also presided over the guilty plea, entered findings and recommended that the application be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and denied relief, without a written order, based on the trial court's findings. See Ex parte Wilson, No. 44,983-09 (Dec. 14, 2011).
Wilson now seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his conviction for failure to comply with a civil commitment order in cause number 1285445. According to the petition and supporting memorandum, Wilson raises similar grounds for relief that were adjudicated in state court. The respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims are without merit and that relief is not warranted. The parties' contentions are addressed below under the governing federal habeas corpus standard of review.
Motions for summary judgment typically are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that petitioner's claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, however, the respondent's summary-judgment motion must be determined in compliance with the federal habeas corpus statutes. See Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). For claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court's decision to deny a claim "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2
A state court's decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established precedent if it identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An unreasonable application is more than merely incorrect or erroneous; rather, the state court's application of clearly established law must be "objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
The deferential standard found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) was designed to "modif[y] afederal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (quotation omitted). In that respect, this standard "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings." Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). "As a condition for obtaining [a writ of] habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id., 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. This deferential standard of review applies even where the state court fails to cite applicable Supreme Court precedent or fails to explain its decision. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 ().
In addition, a state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct on federal habeas review, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court as well. See Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Where pure questions of fact are concerned, a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court's decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 2008).
The respondent correctly notes that review of Wilson's claims is constrained by his valid guilty plea. The respondent observes that Wilson does not allege or show that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly made. The respondent maintains, therefore, that Wilson waived review of his claims.
It is well established that "[a] guilty plea will be upheld on habeas review if entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2000). In that respect, "[a] voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). A guilty plea may not be set aside merely because the defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005). Rather, a guilty plea may be challenged only on the grounds that it was made on the constitutionally defective advice of counsel or that the defendant could not have understood the terms of his plea bargain. See id. (citations omitted).
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