Wilson v. the Ohio
| Decision Date | 30 June 1872 |
| Citation | 64 Ill. 542,16 Am.Rep. 565,1872 WL 8362 |
| Parties | JOHN M. WILSONv.THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILWAY COMPANY. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Richland county.
The 38th section of the act to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations, approved November 6, 1849, was as follows:
“A bell of at least thirty pounds weight, or a steam whistle, shall be placed on each locomotive engine, and shall be rung or whistled at the distance of at least eighty rods from the place where the said road shall cross any other road or street, and be kept ringing or whistling until it shall have crossed said road or street, under a penalty of $50 for every neglect, to be paid by the corporation owning the railroad, one-half thereof to go to the informer, and the other half thereof to the State, and also be liable for all damages which shall be sustained by any person by reason of such neglect.” Sess. Laws 1849, p. 31.
At the June term, 1868, of the Richland circuit court, this action was brought for penalties alleged to have been incurred under the above act, the declaration containing eleven hundred and fifteen counts, and claiming the penalty of $50 in each count.
While this suit was pending, an act was passed and went into force February 27, 1869, entitled “An act to amend the railroad law,” the first section of which is as follows:
“That section 38 of an act entitled ‘An act to provide for a general system of railroad corporations,’ approved November 5th, 1849, and any similar provision in any special railroad charter heretofore passed, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows, viz: ‘A bell of at least thirty pounds weight, or a steam whistle, shall be placed on each locomotive engine, which shall be rung or whistled by the engineer or fireman at the distance of at least eighty rods from the place where the railroad crosses any public street or highway, and be kept ringing or whistling until such street or highway is reached, under a penalty of not exceeding $100 for each neglect, one-half of which penalty to go to the prosecuting witness, and the other half to go to the State; and the corporation owning the railroad shall be liable to any party injured for all damages sustained by reason of such neglect: Provided, that such penalty shall be sued for within three months from the time the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.’
Sec. 2. This act shall not apply to suits now pending under the section hereby amended, except that the penalty recoverable in such suits shall be not exceeding $100, instead of $50, as therein provided.”
By plea puis darrein continuance, the last mentioned statute was set up as a defense to the action. The plaintiff demurred to the plea. The court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff brings the case to this court by writ of error, and assigns for error the decision of the court below upon the demurrer. Mr. M. SCHÆFFER, and Mr. B. B. SMITH, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. H. P. BUXTON, for the defendant in error.
This action was brought to recover divers penalties alleged to have been incurred under the 38th section of the act entitled “An act to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations,” approved November 5. 1849.
Pending the action, and before trial, another act was passed upon the same subject, which went into force February 27, 1869.
Two questions are presented by this record for consideration: 1. Was the former of these statutes repealed by the latter? 2. If so, what was the effect of such repeal upon this action pending at the time?
First, then, as to the repeal. The statute of 1849 affixes to each violation the absolute and imperative penalty of $50, while that of 1869 allows a latitude of discretion. The language is, “under a penalty of not exceeding $100.””” And by this latitude of discretion the penalty under the latter may be double that under the former.
It is a familiar rule, that every statute is, by implication, a repeal of all prior statutes, so far as it is contrary and repugnant thereto, and that without any repealing clause.
In Rex v. Cator, 4 Burrows, 2026, the defendant was convicted for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
The Lake Shore v. Berlink
...which accrue under a statute and are not concluded by judgment, are lost by its repeal: Van Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31; Wilson v. O. & M. R'y Co. 64 Ill. 542. Statutes will be interpreted so as to best promote the object intended: R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Heflin, 65 Ill. 366; Deck......
-
State v. Rooney
... ... it is not what will, but what may, be inflicted, that ... determines the increase of punishment. Wilson v. O. & M ... R. R. Co., 16 Am. Rep. 565 ... It ... cannot be that imprisonment of one under a death sentence is ... a mere ... ...
-
Monaco v. Matarrese (In re Monaco)
...Michigan Canal v. City of Chicago, 14 Ill. 334); and it carries with it all prosecutions pending thereunder (Wilson v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co., 64 Ill. 542, 16 Am.Rep. 565); and, except for the purpose of such suits as are begun, prosecuted, and concluded while it is an existing law,......
-
State v. Patnovic, 16
...in People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349, 230 N.W. 202; Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 Allen 581, 95 Mass. 581; Wilson v. Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co., 64 Ill. 542, 16 Am.Rep. 565; Lindzey v. State, 65 Miss. 542, 5 So. 99, 7 Am.St.Rep. 674; see, generally, 31 Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 527,......