Wilson v. Town of West Haven

Decision Date29 July 1955
Citation116 A.2d 420,142 Conn. 646
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesStephen E. WILSON et al. v. TOWN OF WEST HAVEN et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Alfonse C. Fasano, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Charles M. Lyman and John G. Cicala, with whom was John F. Carroll, New Haven, for appellees (defendants).

Before BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALLY, JJ., and PHILLIPS, Superior Court Judge.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs are James P. Cannon, Stephen E. Wilson, Custave L. Misbach and Joseph L. Fox. Prior to October 6, 1954, they were members of the West Haven police department, and on that date their ages were 68, 58, 61 and 55, respectively. Cannon had been a regular member of the department for over forty-nine years. He had served as patrolman until March 1, 1929; as captain until June 7, 1944; as assistant chief until May 6, 1948; and, thereafter, as chief. Wilson and Misbach had been on the force for almost twenty-eight years, and each had attained the rank of captain. Fox had been on the force for over twenty-eight years, had been appointed a sergeant on September 7, 1938, and was still occupying that position on October 6, 1954.

By a special act in 1923, the board of police commissioners of West Haven was to consist of three electors to be appointed by the selectmen. 19 Spec.Laws 23. The special act provided, among other things, that one of the commissioners should serve for one year from October 15, 1923, another for two years, and the third for three; that annually thereafter a commissioner should be appointed for a term of three years; that not more than a majority should belong to the same political party; and that the first selectman should be chairman, ex officio, of the board.

For some twenty years before the election of 1953, the local administration had been under the control of the Republican party. In 1953, however, candidates for the town offices on the Democratic ticket were elected, and they were sworn in on November 9, 1953. In the fall of 1954, the board of police commissioners was composed of two Republicans and one Democrat. Of the two Republicans, one was James A. Walsh, who had served on the board for seventeen years and whose term was to expire on October 15, 1954. Sometime before October 6, Walsh asked Cannon if he had thought about retiring on a pension. When Cannon replied that he had no such intention, Walsh remarked that Cannon would be out anyway when the Democrats became a majority on the board and directed its activities. Walsh also talked with Misbach, pointing out that, due to his length of service, he, Misbach, could be retired at any time. On Wednesday, October 6, 1954, the board held its regular monthly meeting in the town hall. The newly elected first selectman did not attend. The lone Democratic member of the board was seriously ill in a hospital at the time, and he was not consulted concerning the business to come before the meeting. When it was called to order, the commissioners in attendance were Walsh and his Republican colleague. At that meeting the board voted the retirement of each of the plaintiffs, effective two days later. The board then made a number of appointment, including that of Daniel E. Casman, aged fifty, as a patrolman. It also promoted several policemen then on the force.

None of the plaintiffs had applied for retirement. Each was retired against his wishes. Prior to this occasion, no member of the department had ever been retired involuntarily except for disability or cause. In voting as they did, the Republican commissioners took the position that they had the right to single out, as they chose, any member of the department who had served in that capacity for twenty-five years or more, and could order his retirement for no reason other than that they willed to do so. All of the plaintiffs were officers of ability and experience, and two of them, Wilson and Misbach, had been often commended by the board for outstanding and meritorious conduct. There were no charges preferred or pending against any of them, and no question of disability was involved in their retirement.

Although the plaintiffs advance various claims, their basic contention is that under the authority conferred by special acts of the General Assembly, the board of police commissioners lacked the power to retire them involuntarily, and that if the special acts could be construed to confer such power, they are void so far as they purport to give the board an uncontrolled and unregulated right to retire members of the police department. A discussion of this basic contention will be ample to dispose of the appeal.

In 1913, a board of police commissioners was created for the town of Orange. 16 Spec.Laws 976. After describing the personnel of the board, the manner of selecting its members, and their terms of service, the act required the board to appoint applicants for positions on the police force only after competitive examinations. Id., §§ 1, 3. It then provided that '[w]henever a person has been appointed a policeman under the provisions of this act, said person shall remain in office until removed for cause, which shall be only such cause as affects his efficiency as a police officer, and shall not be political or religious.' Id., § 3. In 1917, a police relief fund, designed to provide a reservoir of funds for the payment of pensions, was established for the town of Orange. 17 Spec.Laws 882. Under the provisions of the act, retirement with a pension was possible for a member of the police department when he had attained the age of sixty and after he had served not less than twenty-five years, and then only in the event that he was found to be totally incapacitated; he was also allowed to retire, regardless of his age and length of service, if, without fault or misconduct on his part, he was rendered totally incapacitated in the regular performance of police duty. Id., § 4.

In 1921, the General Assembly divided the town of Orange and used one of the divisions as the territory of the newly incorporated town of West Haven. 18 Spec.Laws 1067. The latter town was endowed with all the powers, authority and privileges, and was subjected to all the obligations and duties, theretofore granted to and imposed upon the town of Orange. Id., § 1. In 1925, the police relief fund act of 1917 was amended to authorize retirement for partial, as well as total, incapacity. 19 Spec.Laws 832. No particular attention need be given this amendment since it was repealed by the 1937 act to which we refer in the next paragraph and hence does not intimately enter into the problem before us except as it indicated the concern which the legislature was manifesting towards the men on the police force.

In 1937 the act was again amended. 22 Spec.Laws 645. Both voluntary and involuntary retirement now became possible. The former was available to any member of the department desiring it; the latter was available against any member who, upon examination by three reputable physicians and certification by two of them, was found to be permanently disabled for service. But whether the retirement was voluntary or involuntary, it could not be ordered unless the member in question had served at least twenty-five years on the force and had been contributing to the fund 2 per cent of his annual salary. The final amendment to the act was passed in 1941; 23 Sepc.Laws 954; and is quoted in full in the footnote. 1 It is this amendment upon which the board relies as its warrant for retiring the plaintiffs against their wishes.

The board of police commissioners of West Haven is an administrative agency. Comley ex rel. Brown v. Lawlor, 119 Conn. 155, 161, 174 A. 415. It is a creature of the General Assembly, having neither any inherent nor any common-law power. Whatever functions it may perform are restricted to those which the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication conferred. It can legally act only within the sphere of its authority, and the exercise of its powers is subject to such limitations as are found in the legislative act which brought it into existence or in other acts devoted to the regulation of those powers. The plaintiffs, to be sure, had no vested rights to the positions they held in the police department. Butler v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 417, 51 U.S. 402, 417, 13 L.Ed. 472; State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 507, 83 N.E.2d 393; 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) p. 421; notes, 4 A.L.R. 205, 172 A.L.R. 1366. On the other hand, the plaintiffs are entitled to insist that their removal from active service on the police force be carried out in a lawful manner.

We are confronted with the necessity of construing a legislative enactment. This type of problem is frequently perplexing and, one might add, it has proved so here. The basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the law-making body. Bridgeman v. City of Derby, 104 Conn. 1, 8, 132 A. 25, 45 A.L.R. 728; Hazzard v. Gallucci, 89 Conn. 196, 198, 93 A. 230. If the enactment is unambiguous, there is no occasion to construe it. Watrous v. Connelly, 141 Conn. 257, 263, 105 A.2d 654; Swits v. Swits, 81 Conn. 598, 599, 71 A. 782. It speaks for itslef. But where the language used in the act makes uncertain, as it does in the case at bar, just what was in the legislative mind, the court should, among other things, look to the history of the act, the objective it was designed to meet, and the policy underlying it. State ex rel. McNamara v. Civil Service Commission, 128 Conn. 585, 588, 24 A.2d 846; Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 626, 169 A. 912. The circumstances surrounding its enactment may be considered. Cassidy v. Tait, 140 Conn. 156, 160, 98 A.2d 808; Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 221, 27 A.2d 166. The presumption is that the legislature, in adopting an act, does so in view of existing relevant enactments and with the...

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