Wilson v. Vannatta

• Decision Date: 30 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3:03-CV-0389 AS.,3:03-CV-0389 AS.
• Citation: Wilson v. Vannatta, 291 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003)
• Parties: Amos WILSON, Plaintiff, v. John R. VANNATTA, Tom Sherron, Chris Johnson, Linda Vannatta, Jo Mcneill, Howard Green, Sally Stevenson, Patty Lemning, James Ebey, Dana Hewitt, Donald Matthews, Dustin McCord, Donna Reed, David A. Bailey, William Schoettmer, William Liddell, Kemp Jones, Kelly Mendenhall, Ryan Riedean, Michael Valadez, Evelyn R. Turner, Michael Biddle, and Kathy Jacque, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

291 F.Supp.2d 811

Amos WILSON, Plaintiff, v. John R. VANNATTA, Tom Sherron, Chris Johnson, Linda Vannatta, Jo Mcneill, Howard Green, Sally Stevenson, Patty Lemning, James Ebey, Dana Hewitt, Donald Matthews, Dustin McCord, Donna Reed, David A. Bailey, William Schoettmer, William Liddell, Kemp Jones, Kelly Mendenhall, Ryan Riedean, Michael Valadez, Evelyn R. Turner, Michael Biddle, and Kathy Jacque, Defendants.

No. 3:03-CV-0389 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

October 30, 2003.

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Amos Wilson, Westville, IN, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

Amos Wilson, a prisoner confined in the Maximum Control Facility, submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Indiana Department of Correction officials violated of his federally protected rights while he was housed at the Miami Correctional Facility ("MCF"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915A(b). Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint. Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.2000).

A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court requires only two elements: First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. These elements may be put forth in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, no more is required from plaintiff's allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (citations, quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

Mr. Wilson seeks damages and injunctive relief. His injunctive relief claims, however, are moot because he has been transferred from the Miami Correctional Facility to the Maximum Control Facility. If a prisoner is transferred to another prison, "his request for injunctive relief against officials of the first prison is moot unless `he can demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.'" Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir.1996), quoting Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988).

Mr. Wilson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action to redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements; he must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and he must show a person acting under color of law committed the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

I. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE

In count III of his complaint, Mr. Wilson alleges that Correctional Officers William Liddell, David Bailey, William Schoettmer, Kelly Mendenhall, and Michael Valdez violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments by using excessive and unnecessary force against him or in failing to intervene to prevent the improper misuse of force. Mr. Wilson bases this claim on the factual allegations presented in paragraphs 38 through 45, paragraphs 69 through 72, and paragraphs 80 and 87 of his complaint. In paragraph 56, he also alleges that Correctional Sergeant Michael Biddle "would tell the defendant[s] Schoettmer and Riendeau to assault me."

A violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, and (2) subjectively, whether the prison official's actual state of mind was one of "deliberate indifference" to the deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Giving Mr. Wilson the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleadings stage, the court cannot say that he can prove no set of set of facts consistent with his excessive use of force claim against these defendants under the standards set forth in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

In count IV of his complaint, Mr. Wilson asserts that defendants Liddell, Bailey, Schoettmer, Mendenhall, and Valdez's excessive use of force constituted the tort of assault and battery under Indiana law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which codified the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, federal courts, unless otherwise provided by statute, "have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy." The court will permit Mr. Wilson to pursue his state law tort claims against these defendants to the extent that he meets the procedural prerequisites established by state statute to bring such claims against them.

II. SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

In Counts I and II of his complaint, Mr. Wilson alleges that John VanNatta Chris Johnson, Sally Stevenson, Patty Lemning, Dana Hewitt, Jo McNeill, Tom Sherron, Michael Biddle, Evelyn Turner and Kathy Jacque violated his federally protected rights by failing to properly train or supervise their subordinates who used excessive force on him. Mr. Wilson bases this claim on the factual allegations presented in paragraphs 34 through 37.

The doctrine of respondeat superior can not be used to hold a supervisor liable for conduct of a subordinate that violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Supervisory liability will be found, however, if the supervisor, with knowledge of the subordinate's conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it. That is, to be liable for the conduct of subordinates, a supervisor must be personally involved in that conduct. Supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates' misconduct are not liable. The supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.

Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Except for defendant Biddle, who the court addressed in Section I of this memorandum, Mr. Wilson does not allege that any of these defendants were personally involved in the excessive use of force against him.

III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Although not specifically addressed in any of his enumerated causes of action, Mr. Wilson alleges in the body of his complaint that several prison officials subjected him to conditions that amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. In factual paragraph 55, Mr. Wilson alleges that Dr. K. Brooks prescribed a pain reliever and muscle relaxer and physical therapy for his medical problems, but that defendant VanNatta canceled this treatment "saying they could not afford the cost."¹ In medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test described in Farmer v. Brennan, and Wilson v. Seiter is expressed in terms of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). A medical need is "serious" if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention, and if untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary pain, and that significantly affects the person's daily activities or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.1997).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes a system of notice pleading, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), and a complaint may not be dismissed at the pleadings stage "unless no relief could be granted `under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir.1998), quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Giving Mr. Wilson the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleadings stage, the court cannot say that he can prove no set of set of facts consistent with his claim against defendant VanNatta under the standards set forth in Estelle v. Gamble.

In paragraphs 62, 64, 65, 66, and 67 of his complaint, Mr. Wilson alleges that the lockup unit staff, including Officers Liddell, Smith,² and Bailey deprived him of food and recreation. According to Mr. Wilson, they gave him "rotten food," reduced his ration every day, and gave him trays with food missing. In paragraph 80, Mr. Wilson alleges that these defendants' actions caused him to lose twenty-five pounds and caused him "pain in my stomach, and headache[s]." Giving Mr. Wilson the...