Wilson v. Wal-Mart, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | C/A: 3:15-1157-JFA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Bobby Jane Wilson, Plaintiff, v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Defendant. |
This case arises from a slip and fall personal injury sustained by Plaintiff Bobby Jane Wilson ("Wilson") while she was a patron at a Sumter, South Carolina location of the Defendant Wal-Mart Inc. ("Wal-Mart"). Plaintiff alleged a sole cause of action of negligence against Defendant. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment per Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that Plaintiff's sole cause of action of negligence should be dismissed.
On May 11, 2013, Plaintiff entered a Wal-Mart store located at 1283 Broad Street, Sumter, South Carolina with a companion, John Taylor ("Taylor"). While Plaintiff was shopping in the store, she slipped and fell on a substance as she walked by the meat display case. Plaintiff testified that the substance that she slipped on was pinkish, covered approximately one inch of the floor, and was very close to the meat display case. Plaintiff further testified that she had no information to show that any Wal-Mart employees knew that the pinkish substance was on the floor prior to her incident.
On February 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant was negligent in (1) allowing a slippery substance to remain on the floor where customers were walking; (2) failing to warn Plaintiff that a slippery substance was on the floor; (3) failing to properly maintain the floor to prevent slippery substances from being on the floor, and (4) failing to inspect the area where Plaintiff fell. (ECF No. 1-1).
On April 21, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff timely filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion on May 4, 2016, and Defendant timely filed a reply to Plaintiff's response. (ECF No. 23; ECF No. 25). On June 1, 2016, oral argument was held before this Court. (ECF No. 28). Therefore, this matter is ripe for review by the Court.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists forthe trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden and a properly supported motion is before the court, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but he "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
There are 2 issues that must be decided by the Court:
According to South Carolina law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish a cause of action for negligence: (1) a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by some act or omission; and (3) that the plaintiffsuffered damages as a proximate result of the breach. Staples v. Duell, 329 S.C. 503, 506, 494 S.E.2d 639, 641 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). When considering a claim by an invitee against a merchant, it is well-established that a merchant owes its customers only a duty to use ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Garvin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 343 S.C. 625, 628, 541 S.E.2d 831, 832 (S.C. 2001); Cook v. Food Lion Inc., 328 S.C. 324, 327, 491 S.E.2d 690, 691 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). A merchant is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons and is not required to maintain the premises in such a condition that no accident could happen to a patron using the premises. Norris v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14771, *9 (D.S.C. 2014); see also Pennington v. Zayre Corp., 252 S.C. 176, 178, 165 S.E.2d 695, 696 (S.C. 1969); Denton v. Winn Dixie Greenville Inc., 312 S.C. 119, 120, 439 S.E.2d 292, 293 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
Both parties agree that Plaintiff was a business invitee at the time of the incident in this case. As such, in order for Plaintiff to recover for the injuries caused by the hazard on Defendant's premises, she must show either: (1) that the foreign substance was placed on the floor by Defendant; or (2) that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of its presence on the floor and failed to remove it. Massey v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100047, *6-8 (D.S.C. 2010); see also Garvin, 343 S.C. at 628, 541 S.E.2d at 832; Gillespie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 302 S.C. 90, 91, 394 S.E.2d 24, 24 (S.C. 1990); Wimberley v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 121, 165 S.E.2d 627, 629 (S.C. 1969). Constructive knowledge can be established by showing that thesubstance was on the floor for a sufficient amount of time that the merchant would or should have discovered and removed it had the merchant used ordinary care. Gillespie, 302 S.C. at 91, 394 S.E.2d at 24-25.
" " Young v. Meeting Street Piggly Wiggly, 288 S.C. 508, 511, 343 S.E.2d 636, 638 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 724, 158 N.E. 174, 175-76 (Ohio 1927)). In this case, Defendant argues that this Court should grant its motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant created the hazard on the floor or that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard on the floor. The Court agrees.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim of negligence should fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot establish that the foreign substance was placed on the floor by Defendant or it agents or that Defendant otherwise created the hazard. (ECF No. 21-1 p. 5). Plaintiff argues that her deposition testimony demonstrates that the equipment owned and controlled by Defendant created the hazard that caused the Plaintiff to fall. (ECF No. 23 p. 2). Further, Plaintiff broadly contends that her deposition testimony along with her "Customer Accident Report" indicates that there is a genuine issue of material factsuch that the issue of where the liquid came from should be determined by the jury. (ECF No. 23 p. 2-3).
In her deposition, Plaintiff initially testified that the liquid in question dripped from the meat cooler onto the floor. However, Plaintiff subsequently admitted that she did not have any evidence or proof as to the source of the slippery substance other than the fact that it was located close to the meat cooler on the floor. Plaintiff's theory that the substance leaked from the meat cooler solely because of its proximity to the meat cooler is based upon nothing more than assumptions and speculation.
Uncorroborated and self-serving testimony cannot give rise to a genuine factual dispute. Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 223 (D.S.C. 1996); see also Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (). Plaintiff has not presented any objective evidence to support her allegations regarding the source of the substance or the length of time that it was on the floor. None of the witness statements provided in connection with the incident refer to the source of the substance, and none of the surveillance video shows the source of the substance. Plaintiff's self-serving and conclusory statements suggesting that the substance leaked from Defendant's cooler are without any objective support and cannot defeat Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff's "Customer Accident Report," like her deposition testimony, does not provide a basis for denying summary judgment. The accident report in question only provides a short description of how the accident occurred. Specifically, the report states that Plaintiff "was walking on store by produce came around where drummettes were slidedown [sic]." (ECF No. 23-2 p. 2). Nothing in the "Customer Accident Report" provides evidence of the source of the substance or the length of time that it existed on the floor.
Standing alone or taken together, neither the deposition testimony nor the "Customer Accident Report" provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Plaintiff as to each of the elements of her negligence cause of action. See Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (); see also Anderson v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 257 S.C. 75, 184 S.E.2d 77 (S.C. 1971) (...
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