Wilson v. Washington County
Decision Date | 08 December 1922 |
Docket Number | No. 22833.,22833. |
Citation | 247 S.W. 185 |
Parties | WILSON et al. v. WASHINGTON COUNTY |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Washington County; E. M. Dearing, Judge.
Action by J. S. Wilson and others against the County of Washington and others to restrain the issuance of bonds on behalf of a township. Judgment for defendants when demurrer to the petition was sustained, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
R. A. Frazier, of Hillsboro, and J. G. Berkeley, of De Soto, for appellants.
Chas. Richeson, of Potosi, and Benjamin. Marbury, of Farmington, for respondents.
Statement.
Injunction. Appellants, as qualified electors and property owners in Belgrade township, Washington county, Mo., filed their petition in the circuit court of Washington county to restrain said Washington county and the judges of the county court thereof from issuing bonds in the amount of $25,000 on behalf of said Belgrade township.
Their claim for equitable relief was based upon alleged fraud in the election and upon the asserted unconstitutionality of the statutes under which the proceedings for the bond issue were had.
A general and specific demurrer to the petition was filed and, upon a hearing, was sustained by the court, and from this action of the trial court the appeal was taken.
The petition was in the usual form. It alleged that in conformity to statutory requirements more than 20 legal voters of Belgrade township filed with the clerk of the county court their petition in writing, asking that bonds for road purposes be issued for and on behalf of Belgrade township, and that such proposition be submitted to the electors in said township; that there was a full compliance with said statute in the matter of notices, etc.; and that upon an election the proposition carried by 137 affirmative votes as against 68 votes in the negative, thus prima facie giving such proposition a two-thirds majority. Petitioners charged that several of the votes cast for the affirmative of said proposition were illegal votes and were cast by persons who were not qualified electors, and they specified in their petition wherein such voters were not qualified. They said, moreover, that the statutes providing for such a proceeding were unconstitutional, and that for the above-specified reasons petitioners were entitled to the relief prayed for, and the county court should be permanently enjoined from the issuance of such bonds. Other pertinent facts will be discussed in the course of the opinion.
Opinion.1. Sections 10747, 10748, 10749, and 10750, R. S. 1919 provide for the issuance of bonds by the county courts of the several counties on behalf of any township in their respective counties for road purposes. Upon a petition in writing of 20 legal voters of any such township, "it shall be the duty of the court to order an election to be held in such township upon the question of issuing bonds." It is admitted that there was a full compliance with the provisions of the statutes in the matter of the bond issue, save only the question of fraudulent votes.
2. The petitioners challenged the Constitutionality of the above sections because, as they say, such sections are in conflict with section 3, art. 10, of the Constitution of Missouri, which is as follows:
At the threshold of our investigation we find that section 12 of said article 10 of the Constitution provides that with the assent of two-thirds of the voters of the "county, city, town, township, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the state," indebtedness within certain limits may be incurred, conditioned that such county, city, town, township, etc., "provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof, within twenty years from the time of contracting the same." Moreover, section 22 of said article 10 of the Constitution specifically provides for the collection of a special tax for road and bridge purposes and lodges the authority to levy and collect such tax in "the county court in the several counties of this state not under township organization."
The foregoing provisions of the Constitution undoubtedly contemplate the agency of the county court on behalf of townships, where there is no township organization.
The provisions of the statutes, under review, are not obnoxious to section 3, art. 10, of the Constitution in the matter of uniformity. "It is well settled that a law which includes all persons who are in or who may come into like situations and circumstances is not special legislation." Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237, loc. cit. 257, 258, 72 S. W. 700, 706. In the case at bar the burden was uniformly placed upon the inhabitants of Belgrade township.
It is intimated by appellants that said section 3, art. 10, of the Constitution requires that the uniformity of such tax shall extend to all "subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." We see no conflict with such provision in this case. The statutes in question provide that a township may, by a vote of its qualified electors, incur an indebtedness for road purposes, limited by the Constitution to 5 per cent. on the value of taxable property therein. The authority for levying the tax is limited to such township. The voters clothe the county court with authority to levy such a tax only in the township voting therefor, and the constitutional provision, if applicable, only requires that there be uniformity. Appellants say in their brief that "the county court judges arc ministerial officers in this matter, acting * * * for the township of Belgrade." The Constitution, therefore, is not Infringed, nor are the rules of uniformity and equality violated.
3. Aside from the fact that the Constitution expressly provides, by section 12, art. 10, for the very thing that was done in this case, the courts have been most liberal in the application of the doctrine that special assessments for local improvements are not taxes for public purposes within the purview of the constitutional provision invoked. It has been said:
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