Wilson v. Wexford Med.
| Decision Date | 04 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-00890 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | TAMMY SHERRELL WILSON, Plaintiff, v. WEXFORD MEDICAL and ADMINISTRATION/STAFF AT FAULT, (1990 through present); WARDEN LORI NOHE; J. D. SALLAZ; SUSAN BIRDSONG; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CHERYL SPENCER; NATHAN BALL; BETSY JIVIDEN; CANDY DAVIS; C. J. RIDER; and HEIDI BEEGLE, R.N., Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Tammy Sherrell Wilson (hereinafter also referred to as "Wilson"), proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the Lakin Correctional Center ("LCC") in West Columbia, West Virginia, seeks prospective relief and money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her civil rights. This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by standing order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for total pretrial management and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 3).
Pending before the Court are the following motions:
The parties have filed responses and replies to the pending motions; therefore, the issues have been fully briefed. After thoroughly considering the arguments and supporting materials, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge DENY the Summary Judgment Motion filed by Wilson, (ECF No. 198); GRANT the Summary Judgment Motions of Wexford, Beegle, and the DCR defendants, (ECF Nos. 201, 203, 205); GRANT the dismissal of defendant Candy Davis, who was never properly served with process; DISMISS the amended complaint, with prejudice; and REMOVE this case from the docket of the Court.
In 1991, Wilson was convicted of first degree murder in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia and was sentenced to life in prison. Wilson served her sentence at the Pruntytown Correctional Center ("Pruntytown") in Grafton, West Virginia, until January 2007, when she was transferred to LCC. All of Wilson's claims arise from her incarceration at LCC, a maximum security all-female correctional facility operated by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("DCR").
On May 3, 2018, Wilson filed the complaint herein, which she moved to amend on July 2, 2019. (ECF Nos. 3, 68). Wilson's motion was partially granted and partially denied.(ECF Nos. 83, 84, 97). Given the length of her initial pleading, Wilson was permitted to incorporate by reference her complaint into the amended complaint. (ECF No. 94). Therefore, the complaint, amended complaint, and supplemental support, (ECF Nos. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 26, 94), are read together (collectively referred to as the "amended complaint") when considering the pending motions for summary judgment. In the amended complaint, Wilson makes the following overarching claims: (1) she was denied adequate medical care and supplies; (2) she was denied access to the courts; (3) she was retaliated against, harassed, and subjected to discrimination; (4) the right to practice her religion was impeded; and (5) the DCR discriminated against her and fellow female inmates by providing better services to inmates at Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC"), the DCR's maximum security all-male correctional institution. Wilson also asserts a "liberty interest" and associated due process violation related to alleged oral "assurances" made by representatives of the DCR.
The parties have all filed motions seeking summary judgment in their favor. Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a disputed issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing "an absence of evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 322, n.3. The nonmoving party must do more than rely upon the allegations or the denial of allegations contained in his pleading to defeat a motion for summary judgment; instead, he must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Concrete evidence includes "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The court must not resolve disputed facts, nor weigh the evidence. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995). Instead, the court must accept as true the facts asserted by the nonmoving party and review the evidence "draw[ing] all justifiable inferences" in its favor. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991).
Even still, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the non-moving party will not prevent entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009), (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Thus, while any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, 475 U.S. at 587, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy to parties who are deprived of federally protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state "law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Congress enacted § 1983 "to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-172 (1961). In order to state a viable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a person deprived him or her of a federally protected civil right, privilege, or immunity and (2) that the person did so under color of State law. See American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-52 (1999). In this case, Wilson alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; violations of due process, equal protection, and liberty interests; retaliation; and infringement of religious freedoms.
Wilson's claims are subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("PRLA"). The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (); see, also, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) ( ) (citations andinternal quotation marks omitted)). However, administrative exhaustion is "not a jurisdictional requirement and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner." Hart v. Roderick, No. CV GLR-15-2054, 2016 WL 3940219, at *3 (D. Md. July 21, 2016) (citations omitted). Instead, exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that a prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") has repeatedly held that courts may not read futility or other exceptions into the PLRA that are not part of its textual mandate. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016) () Nevertheless, the Supreme Court pointed out that the PLRA does contain one explicit exception; an inmate need not exhaust "unavailable" remedies. Id. at 1858. The Court identified "three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief." Id. at 1859. First, "an...
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