Wilson v. Williams
| Decision Date | 30 June 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 4051,4051 |
| Citation | 82 So.2d 71 |
| Parties | Charles William WILSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Dempsey D. WILLIAMS et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Huckabay, Seale, Kelton & Hayes, Baton Rouge, for appellants.
Durrett & Hardin, Baton Rouge, for appellees.
This damage suit arises from an intersectional collision on May 9, 1953, in the City of Baton Rouge. A Mercury car driven by a minor son of defendant Williams, and insured when operated at the time of the accident by his codefendant liability insurer, was involved in a collision with a Nash Station Wagon driven by Linda Wilson, a then-unemancipated minor, 20 years of age, daughter of plaintiff Charles W. Wilson herein, accompanied by her three younger sisters and brother: Mary, almost 17; Charles III, 12; and Rebecca, 5 1/2.
The present suit claims damages for Miss Linda Wilson's personal injuries and for Mr. Wilson's medical expenses on behalf of his children, and his destroyed automobile. The companion suit, 82 So.2d 77, was instituted by Mr. Wilson on behalf of the three younger children to recover for them damages for their personal injuries.
These two suits were consolidated for trial, and judgment in each case was rendered in favor of all plaintiffs. Defendants' appeals from said judgments were consolidated for argument before this court, and this opinion will treat of all issues relevant to both suits. A separate decree for the companion suit will be rendered hereinafter.
Immediately before the accident between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. after dark, defendants' Mercury was going west on Capitol Heights Avenue towards its intersection with Steele Boulevard, upon which plaintiffs' Nash Station Wagon was proceeding north toward the same intersection. Both streets were blacktopped, 16 feet wide. Capitol Heights Avenue had the right of way; a stop sign was erected facing traffic approaching the Avenue on Steele Boulevard. The statutory maximum speed limit in Baton Rouge at this site was 25 m.p.h.
There is a very wide difference in the versions of the accident as related by the occupants of the Wilson Nash and by Claude Williams, driver of defendants' Mercury.
Claude, 17 years of age, testified that he approached the intersection at a speed of 25 m.p.h. and when at a distance of 30-50 feet from the corner he observed the Willson Nash approaching on Steele Boulevard. He immediately applied his brakes, which caught 20' before the impact, but nevertheless the Wilson Nash's front struck his left fender, causing the wreck. According to young Williams, the Wilson Nash ran the stop sign facing it on Steele Boulevard at a speed of 25 m.p.h.
Most favorably construed to defendants, this testimony would absolve their driver of any negligence whatsoever contributing to the accident, since being on the superior street he was under no duty to expect the other car to neglect its statutory duty and his right of way and to proceed immediately into his path, McMorris v. Webb, La.App., 1 Cir., 67 So.2d 146; Trahan v. Lantier, La.App., 1 Cir., 33 So.2d 139. Thus the sole and proximate cause of the accident would be the failure of the driver entering the right of way street from the inferior one to come to a full stop and observe the oncoming driver on the preferred street and afford him his right of way, White v. Glass, La.App., 78 So.2d 57, Anderson v. Morgan City Canning Company, La.App., 73 So.2d 196.
The District Court, however, did not accept this version of the accident. It accepted instead the testimony of the driver of the Wilson Nash, Miss Linda Wilson, 20 years of age at the time of the accident, and an LSU student.
Miss Wilson testified she was driving the other Wilson children from their home one block away for some ice cream. She testified that she put her foot on the brake and slowed as she drove up to the stop sign, shifting into second gear. Observing no traffic coming from either direction on Capitol Heights Avenue, she shifted into first gear and started slowly across the Avenue. When past the middle of the Avenue, her Nash was struck. Her two sisters were badly hurt in the accident, and Miss Wilson herself was distraught and terribly upset; she was unable to recall what happened after the impact. Miss Wilson testified that while she did not come to a complete stop before entering the intersection, she had slowed so as to be barely moving (2-3 m.p.h.) and had barely started when she was struck.
Mary Scott Wilson, almost 17 years old at the time of the accident, corroborated her sister's story. She had been sitting in ther front seat, middle, next to her driver. She, however, had looked right just before the impact and had seen the defendants' Mercury approaching very fast just 25 feet away when their own Nash was out in the middle of the intersection. To the same effect was the testimony of her brother, Charles 'Bill' Wilson, 12 years old at the time of the accident, sitting in one of the back seats, who said the right front fender of their Nash was struck by the left front fender of the Mercury. He said the Nash was pushed down Capitol Heights Avenue and westward and was spun around 1 1/2 times by the impact.
Although the able District Court rendered no written reasons for judgment, it is apparent that it must have found the sole proximate cause of the accident so excessive a speed on the part of defendants' driver as not only to constitute primary negligence on his part; but as to entitle the plaintiffs' driver to enter the superior thoroughfare, since she was entitled to assume had she observed him at his distance that he was not proceeding at such an excessive speed as to arrive at the intersection much sooner than she would have reasonably anticipated based upon his approaching at the legal rate, Duke v. Malone, La.App., 1 Cir., 57 So.2d 711; Gauthier v. Fogleman, La.App., 1 Cir., 50 So.2d 321. Furthermore, her failure to see the oncoming traffic would not be a proximate cause of any accident, because even if she had seen it, under the circumstances she was entitled to proceed into the intersection, Duke v. Malone, La.App., 1 Cir., 57 So.2d 711; Boullion v. Bonin, La.App., 1 Cir., 2 So.2d 535.
It would appear that the Wilsons' recovery would be further justified on the ground that the Wilson vehicle had preempted the intersection, since is had entered it with the opportunity of clearing the same without obstruction by young Williams had he been proceeding at a reasonable speed. As was stated in McClenaghan v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., La.App., 79 So.2d 373, where recovery was allowed under very similar facts and circumstances:
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