Wilson v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 04 February 1888
• Citation: 13 A. 102,16 R.I. 122
• Parties: WILSON v. WILSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

13 A. 102

16 R.I. 122

WILSON

v. WILSON.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 4, 1888.

Petition for divorce by Florine N. Wilson against Levi Wilson.

Rollin Mathewson, Ziba O. Slocum, and Charles A. Wilson, for petitioner. Walter B. Vincent and George J. West, for respondent.

DURFEE, C. J. We think the charge of extreme cruelty is abundantly proved. The petitioner married the respondent October 2, 1882. She filed her petition for divorce January 20, 1886; and the evidence shows that during the intervening period she suffered from him in greater or less degree four different kinds of cruel treatment, to-wit: Vulgar, profane, and abusive language, often used to or concerning her, in her presence, when she was in very feeble health; blows and other physical injuries inflicted upon her; the communication to her of a vile disease; and the forcing her, by threats and importunities, to surrender to or for him her money, her jewels, and her household furniture, so that, making all due allowance for exaggeration and misconception, we are entirely satisfied that she is entitled to a divorce, unless she has lost her right to it by condonation. There are cases which hold that, where the charge is extreme cruelty, the defense of condonation is unavailable; but these cases are at variance with the main current of decision, and are in our opinion erroneous. Doubtless, however, the defense is more easily avoided when set up to such a charge than when set up to the charge of adultery. It is a virtue for a wife who is maltreated by her husband to bear with him so long as any hope remains that her patience may be rewarded by his amendment; and therefore her bearing with him has as much the character of probation as of condonation, and, regarded as condonation, it is just that the condonation may be easily forfeited by the husband by conduct showing that he still continued incorrigible; for it is well settled that a condonation is always subject to the condition that the offending party shall not repeat the offense, and also settled, when the offense is cruelty, that treatment much less cruel than would be necessary to be a good ground for divorce will suffice to avoid the defense of the condonation. The petitioner was living in her father's house when her petition was filed. She had been living there for several weeks; her husband living with her up to the morning of the day when it was filed. The acts of cruelty which she chiefly relies upon for divorce were committed while she was living with him elsewhere. The evidence shows, however, that, 10 days before the filing of the petition, he gave way, without any real provocation, to a fit of violence towards her, and intemperate abuse of her, which, in our opinion, would have amounted to a forfeiture on his part of any previous condonation, if she had then refused any longer to cohabit with him, as, being in her father's house, she might have done. She lived with him, receiving him as her husband, 10 days longer, and, so far as appears, without receiving any further maltreatment from him. Ordinarily, such conduct would be regarded as a condonation, and it must be so regarded here, unless she can show...