Wilson v. Wilson

Decision Date25 January 2022
Docket NumberWD 84191
Citation640 S.W.3d 136
Parties Ginger M. WILSON, Appellant, v. Gregory S. WILSON, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

David G. Brown, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Appellant.

Cassie J. Bugalski, Moberly, MO, Attorney for Respondent.

Before Division One: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja and Karen King Mitchell, Judges

Karen King Mitchell, Judge

Ginger Wilson (Wife) appeals the judgment finding Gregory Wilson (Husband) in contempt of court for failing to distribute half of Husband's American Funds retirement account (the account) to Wife as directed by the parties’ judgment of dissolution. Wife raises one point on appeal; she argues that the motion court abused its discretion when it determined that the phrase, "releases and quit-claims" as used in the dissolution judgment, is ambiguous and, therefore, the distribution method, but not the date, used by Husband was appropriate. Because the motion court misinterpreted the dissolution judgment as to distribution of the account, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

On December 20, 2018, the parties entered into a separation agreement that identified and divided their marital property. On December 26, 2018, the court approved the separation agreement and entered a judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the separation agreement by reference. The court determined that the separation agreement identified and divided all marital property and debt, and the court ordered the parties to perform the terms of the separation agreement. In relevant part, the separation agreement requires Husband to "release[ ] and quit-claim[ ] to Wife all his right, title and interest in and to ... [o]ne-half (1/2) plus an additional $20,000 from the American Funds Account #3450 as of the date of Judgment entry[.]" The agreement also requires Wife to "release[ ] and quit-claim[ ] to Husband all her right, title and interest in and to ... [o]ne-half (1/2) minus $20,000 from the American Funds Account #3450 as of the date of Judgment entry." The record indicates that the account was in Husband's name and that he controlled how the account was invested.

In April 2019, at Husband's direction, American Funds calculated the total market value of the shares in the account (the market-value approach) using December 20, 2018, the date of the separation agreement, as the benchmark date. On April 16, 2019, American Funds transferred to Wife a number of shares at their then-current market price that equaled the value of 50% of the shares on the benchmark date plus $20,000. Because the value of the shares had increased significantly during the nearly four months that had passed since the benchmark date, Wife received less than 50% of the shares on April 16, 2019. American Funds’ method of dividing the account had the effect of giving to Husband all of the appreciation in the monetary value of the account from the date of the dissolution judgment through the date of the account's division.

On October 31, 2019, Wife filed a motion for contempt to enforce the terms of the dissolution judgment. Wife argued that, under the judgment, she is entitled to one half of the shares in the account on December 26, 2018 (the division-of-shares approach), plus $20,000, not one half of the value of the shares on that date. A show-cause summons was issued to Husband, who moved to dismiss both Wife's application for a show-cause order and her motion for contempt. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on September 30, 2020.1

On November 3, 2020, the court issued its judgment, finding Husband in contempt "through no fault of his own." The court concluded that the separation agreement was ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to use the market-value approach or the division-of-shares approach when dividing the account. The court interpreted the agreement in favor of the non-drafting party (Husband) and awarded Wife $2,222.87, representing one half of the difference in the cash value of the shares on December 20, 2018 (the date of the separation agreement) and December 26, 2018 (the date the dissolution judgment was entered). Wife appeals.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Although both Wife and the motion court denominated Wife's motion as one for contempt, a legal document "is not judged by its title but by its substance and content." State ex rel. Ashby Rd. Partners, LLC v. State Tax Comm'n , 297 S.W.3d 80, 84 (Mo. banc 2009). Here, the court appropriately treated the motion as one to enforce the terms of the parties’ dissolution judgment rather than as a motion for contempt. The court described Wife as "seeking specific performance" of the dissolution judgment because, Wife argued, the account was not divided as required by that judgment. The court specifically concluded that no contumacious conduct had occurred, instead finding that Husband was "in contempt" "through no fault of his own."2 And, it appears the amount awarded to Wife was intended to make her whole under the dissolution judgment, as interpreted by the court, rather than to alter Husband's conduct. Typically, a fine imposed after a finding of contempt is a per diem fine intended to encourage performance and, thus, to purge the contempt. See Smith v. White , 67 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) ("The most typical form of sanction imposed in civil contempt proceedings is the per diem fine, where the contemnor is ordered to pay a given amount of money per day until such time as the contempt is purged."). A contempt fine may be the amount deemed necessary to compensate for a loss, Chemline Inc. v. Mauzy , 618 S.W.3d 701, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021), but nothing about the way the judgment is framed suggests that is what the court did here. Rather, the court describes the amount awarded to Wife as "[t]he difference in value of the shares in question," which sounds more like an attempt to enforce the dissolution judgment than one intended to purge contempt. For these reasons, we treat the judgment below as one entered to enforce the dissolution judgment.

We have an obligation, acting sua sponte if necessary, to determine our authority to hear the appeals that come before us. McConnell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. , 606 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). "The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." Id. (quoting Wilson v. City of St. Louis , 600 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 2020) ). Here, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under § 512.020(5),3 which provides, in pertinent part,

Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his or her appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any:
...
(5) Final judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment in the cause; but a failure to appeal from any action or decision of the court before final judgment shall not prejudice the right of the party so failing to have the action of the trial court reviewed on an appeal taken from the final judgment in the case.

§ 512.020(5).

"A special order after final judgment includes ‘orders in special proceedings attacking or aiding the enforcement of [a] judgment after it has become final in the action in which it was rendered.’ " McGathey v. Matthew K. Davis Tr. , 457 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting State ex rel. Koster v. Cain , 383 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) ). Orders enforcing the provisions of dissolution decrees are special orders within the meaning of § 512.020(5). See Roberts v. Roberts , 432 S.W.3d 789, 792 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) ("Rulings ... which seek to implement the property division ordered in an earlier dissolution decree[ ] are appealable ‘special order[s] after final judgment’ under § 512.020(5)."); Breihan v. Breihan , 269 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (holding that a family court judgment seeking to enforce the property distribution provisions of a dissolution decree was a special order appealable under § 512.020(5)); see also Worley v. Worley , 19 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Mo. banc 2000) (holding that an order denying wife's motion to quash purported service and set aside judgment on husband's motion to modify custody was appealable as a special order after a final judgment). Wife filed her motion for contempt to enforce a property distribution provision of the parties’ dissolution judgment, which is a final judgment.4 Thus, the contempt judgment in this case is a special order under § 512.020(5), and we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.5

"We review the trial court's judgment on a motion to enforce [a property distribution] agreement to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, whether it is against the weight of the evidence or whether it erroneously declares or applies the law." Nguyen v. Nguyen , 573 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

Analysis

Wife raises one point on appeal; she argues that the motion court erred when it determined that the phrase, "releases and quit-claims" as used in the dissolution judgment, is ambiguous and, therefore, the distribution method used by Husband was appropriate. Wife contends that the dissolution judgment is unambiguous and, under the judgment, she is entitled to beneficial ownership of half of the shares in the account as of December 26, 2018, rather than half of the value of the shares in the account on that date, plus $20,000. And she claims that the backward-looking, market-value approach used by Husband denied her the benefit of market increases that occurred after December 26, 2018, such that the value Wife received in April 2019 was lower than the value she would have received had the distribution been performed in accordance with the dissolution judgment.

"The general rules of construction...

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