Wilson v. Workman
Decision Date | 28 March 1961 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2068. |
Citation | 192 F. Supp. 852 |
Parties | Woodrow D. WILSON, Administrator of the Estate of Woodrow Wilson, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. WORKMAN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Thomas J. Healy, Jr., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
William Prickett, Jr., (of Prickett, Prickett & Tybout), Wilmington, Del., for defendant.
This opinion is explanatory of the Court's prior action in orally denying the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff's decedent was killed while riding in his own automobile when it was being operated by defendant at defendant's request and with decedent's consent on a social occasion. No monetary consideration was paid by either party to the other in connection with the transportation. Initially, decedent, accompanied by defendant, drove the car to a restaurant where they dined. After dinner defendant asked decedent for permission to drive and decedent acceded. While defendant was at the wheel the car skidded, struck a light standard and decedent was killed. Since decedent was single, the action was begun under Del. Code Ann.Tit. 10, § 3704(b) (1953).
The acts which gave rise to the litigation took place in Delaware, jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, and the rights of the parties are governed by Delaware law. The Delaware Code, Tit. 21, § 6101(a) (1953) provides:
Defendant contends that decedent was a non-paying guest of the defendant within the meaning of § 6101(a), that the proof fails to establish that the accident was intentionally caused by defendant or by his willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others, and hence the action should be dismissed.
Defendant's analysis of the proof is correct. Viewing it most favorably to plaintiff, it establishes only ordinary negligence on defendant's part. Consequently, the disposition of defendant's motion depends upon whether the decedent was a non-paying guest.
Defendant asserts that because decedent was not paying for his transportation, he must have been defendant's guest. To accept defendant's argument the statute would have to be interpreted as though it read "no person transported by the * * * operator of a motor vehicle * * * without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages", etc. The words of the statute "as his guest" would have to be treated as surplusage. Such a reading would do violence to the rule of statutory construction that all words of a statute be given effect if this can be done consistently with a plainly disclosed legislative intention. McDonald v. Thompson, 1938, 305 U.S. 263, 266, 59 S.Ct. 176, 83 L.Ed. 164. It is not to be supposed that in a statute designed to limit the claims of "guests", the words "as his guest" were a meaningless additive.
This view is confirmed by the history of the statute. Its forerunner is found in 36 Del.Laws, Ch. 270, § 1 (1929) which provides:
Gratuitous transportation alone brought this statute into operation. Whether or not the claimant was a guest was not material. The word "guest" was not mentioned. Because the statute provided an absolute rather than a qualified immunity from liability, it was held unconstitutional in Coleman v. Rhodes, Del.Super.1932, 5 W.W.Harr. 120, 159 A. 649. At the next term of the legislature the statute was amended to its present form insofar as automobile passengers are concerned. 38 Del.Laws, Ch. 26, §§ 1, 2 (1933).1 It now applies to a claimant if he is injured while being transported "as a guest without payment for such transportation". The inclusion of the words "as a guest" in the 1933 amendment cannot be deemed inadvertent, but must be viewed as imposing a new factor to the application of the statute—viz., that the plaintiff be a guest.
Even without this historical approach, Engle v. Poland, Del.Super.1952, 8 Terry 365, 91 A.2d 326, 328, emphasized that in order to bring the present statute into play two factors must appear in combination: first, claimant must be a guest of the owner or operator; and second, the owner or operator must not have received payment for the transportation. One circumstance without the other is not enough. Both must concur for the statute to apply.
Defendant next argues that if "guest" has separate content in determining the application of the statute, then decedent was a guest of defendant at the time of the accident.
The case law will not support this conclusion. For the most part the Courts have held, under guest statutes substantially similar to that in Delaware, that the owner of an automobile does not become the guest of another passenger simply because the owner is riding in the car and the other passenger is operating the car with the owner's permission when an accident occurs. Leonard v. Helms, 4 Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 48; Lorch v. Eglin, 1952, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841; Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 1936, 121 Conn. 102, ...
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...to invite others to drive his car if he is deprived of a cause of action in negligence against those others. 5 (See Wilson v. Workman (D.Del.1961) 192 F.Supp. 852, 855; Peterson v. Winn (1962), 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d 925, 927; Note, Problems of Recovery Under the Iowa Guest Statute (1962) 4......
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