Wilson v. Yaklich

• Decision Date: 27 July 1998
• Docket Number: 96-4323,Nos. 96-3023,s. 96-3023
• Citation: 148 F.3d 596
• Parties: Kenneth Jay WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lewis YAKLICH, et al., Defendants-Appellees, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee. Kenneth Jay WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary SANFORD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 596

148 F.3d 596

Kenneth Jay WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lewis YAKLICH, et al., Defendants-Appellees, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee.

Kenneth Jay WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary SANFORD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 96-3023, 96-4323.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 9, 1997.

Decided June 8, 1998.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied July 27, 1998.

John M. Thomas (briefed), Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, MI, Kenneth Jay Wilson (briefed), Lebanon, OH, Robert T. Biskup (argued and briefed), Office of General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, MI, Jose L. Patino (argued and briefed), Office of Lead Counsel, Ford Pro Bono Volunteers, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant in No. 96-3023.

Todd R. Marti (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, Jeffrey Clair (argued and briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, for Appellees in No. 96-3023.

Kenneth Jay Wilson (briefed), Lebanon, OH, Robert T. Biskup (argued), Office of General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant in No. 96-4323.

Todd R. Marti (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section, Carol Hamilton O'Brien (briefed), Attorney General of Ohio, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellee in No. 96-4323.

Before: GUY, NELSON, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.

These two § 1983 cases were consolidated for argument, and counsel was appointed to represent the plaintiff, Kenneth Jay Wilson, an inmate of the Ohio correctional system who had originally filed the actions pro se. One of the cases, Wilson v. Yaklich, we now review on the merits, affirming the district court's determination that the claim is frivolous. The other, Wilson v. Sanford, we dismiss under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which precludes the filing of in forma pauperis (IFP) civil actions by a prisoner who has had similar petitions dismissed as frivolous on three or more prior occasions. In so doing, we reject the plaintiff's argument that the PLRA is unconstitutional, both as applied to him and on its face.

Wilson is a frequent litigator in the federal courts. At the time the briefs were filed in these two cases, the Ohio Attorney General estimated that Wilson had filed a combined total of over 70 cases--seven of them in the Southern District of Ohio and 50 in the Northern District, as well as 17 appeals in this court. Moreover, files kept by the Attorney General indicate that although Wilson has been litigious, he has not been particularly successful--at least eight of his complaints were dismissed as frivolous prior to the enactment of the PLRA, and an additional six have been dismissed since the Act took effect.

I. Wilson v. Yaklich (No. 96-3023)

In this case, Wilson appeals from the dismissal of his IFP civil rights action that alleged deliberate indifference by prison officials to threats against Wilson's safety. Specifically, he claims that the defendants, who are employees of the Ohio Department of Correction, "failed to protect [him] from the possible physical harm that he would have been subjected to had he not done what 'they' said." Although it is difficult to discern on the face of the complaint, it appears that the gist of Wilson's contention is that on two occasions, he received threats from the "Aryan Brotherhood" prison gang and that prison officials failed to take action to protect him. There is no allegation that he actually suffered any harm because of the defendants' conduct or that he is currently threatened with such harm. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the factual allegations presented in this matter prevent the plaintiff from making an Eighth Amendment claim with even an arguable basis in law. We therefore concur in the conclusion that Wilson's claim is frivolous, and we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint.

Congress first enacted an IFP statute in 1892 "to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342-43, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948)). Recognizing, however, the potential abuses that could result when filing fees and court costs are paid by the public, Congress also enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), providing that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious." See also Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir.1985).

Subsequent court decisions have established "that not all unsuccessful claims are frivolous." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329, 109 S.Ct. 1827. Rather, the provisions of the IFP statute should be used to dismiss an action only when the claim is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory," or where a complaint's "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827. Stated differently, we have held that "an in forma pauperis, pro se complaint may only be dismissed as frivolous ... when the petitioner cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in law or in fact." Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir.1988), aff'd by Neitzke ).

The plaintiff asserts that his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment has been implicated by the defendants' failure to act in this case. Without question, prison officials have an affirmative duty to protect inmates from violence perpetrated by other prisoners. As the Supreme Court noted in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), "[h]aving incarcerated persons with demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Nevertheless, not all injuries suffered by an inmate at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional liability for prison officials under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, the deprivation alleged "must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' " id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)), and, in prison condition cases such as the one presently before the court, the prison officials must exhibit deliberate indifference to the health or safety of the inmate. Id. Implicit in this standard is the recognition that the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or is threatened with suffering actual harm as a result of the defendants' acts or omissions before he can make any claim with an arguable basis in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Wilson has completely failed to do so in this case.

The plaintiff primarily requests monetary relief from the defendants in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. Requests for damages, however, seek to compensate plaintiffs for past injuries. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). In this case, Wilson advances no allegation that the Aryan Brotherhood actually injured him physically. Nor does he even hint that he has suffered any emotional or psychological injury from the alleged threats. Even if he had claimed a non-physical injury such as fear of assault at the hands of the prison gang, however, monetary damages for such alleged harm would not have been appropriate in this Eighth Amendment context. The Supreme Court itself has noted that "extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim," Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (emphasis added), as opposed to an excessive force claim. No such egregious failures on the part of prison officials have been established here. Also, as the Seventh Circuit recently concluded in Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th Cir.1996):

However legitimate [the plaintiff's] fears may have been, we nevertheless believe that it is the reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment. [A] claim of psychological injury does not reflect the deprivation of "the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities," Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 ... (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 ... (1981), that is the touchstone of a conditions-of-confinement case. Simply put, [the plaintiff] alleges, not a "failure to prevent harm," Farmer, 511 U.S. [at 834], 114 S.Ct. 1970 ..., but a failure to prevent exposure to risk of harm. This does not entitle [the plaintiff] to monetary compensation. See Carey, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 ("In order to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question--just as the common-law rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected in the various branches of tort law.").

Clearly, injunctive relief may be ordered by the courts when necessary to remedy prison conditions fostering unconstitutional threats of harm to inmates. Wilson's complaint, however, cannot be read to allege an ongoing constitutional violation by these defendants because Wilson is no longer...