Wilt v. Beal

• Decision Date: 26 August 1976
• Citation: 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 298,363 A.2d 876
• Parties: W. William WILT, Plaintiff, v. Frank S. BEAL, Secretary of Public Welfare, and Grace M. Sloan, Treasurer, Defendants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 876

363 A.2d 876

26 Pa.Cmwlth. 298

W. William WILT, Plaintiff, v. Frank S. BEAL, Secretary of Public Welfare, and Grace M.

Sloan, Treasurer, Defendants.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 9, 1976.

Decided Aug. 26, 1976.

Edward C. Hussie, Chief Counsel to the House Minority Leader, Harrisburg, for appellant.

J. Justin Blewitt, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH, Jr., WILKINSON, MENCER and BLATT, JJ.

MENCER, Judge.

Plaintiff, W. William Wilt, is a member of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who seeks to enjoin Frank S. Beal, the Secretary of Public Welfare, and Grace M. Sloan, the State Treasurer, (defendants) from taking steps to use and operate the recently completed but as yet unused Altoona Geriatric Center (Center) as a mental-health-care facility. Wilt has also requested that defendant Beal be required to reimburse the treasury for any monies expended in the allegedly improper operation of the Center.

In his original complaint, Wilt alleged only his standing to sue as a taxpayer of the Commonwealth. Wilt's counsel was at that time, and remains, the chief counsel to the House minority leader. Defendants responded with a motion for disqualification of plaintiff's counsel, on the ground that it was improper for counsel on the payroll of the legislature to represent an individual taxpayer. Defendants also filed preliminary objections, including a demurrer and challenges to Wilt's standing to sue and to the jurisdiction of this Court.

After a hearing before Judge Wilkinson, Wilt was granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting, in addition to his status as a taxpayer, his standing as a legislator. The preliminary objections were stayed pending that amendment. Wilt having duly amended his complaint, the preliminary objections and the outstanding motion to disqualify counsel are now properly before us. Since the propriety of Wilt's being represented by counsel to the House minority leader is so closely related to his standing to sue in his legislative capacity, we must first address ourselves to that difficult issue.

Scholars and judges alike have been troubled by this complicated and illusive concept of standing. Certain well-defined beneral principles have, however, emerged. The earlier strict requirements of pecuniary interest or a special and direct injury ¹ have been greatly eased. Thus, a taxpayer's standing to challenge a wrongful expenditure of tax monies has been assumed. Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963). A taxpayer's challenge to the removal of property from the tax rolls has also been allowed on the ground that this was equivalent to an expenditure. Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966). However, the cases do not dispense with the necessity to establish some nexus between the complainants in a given case and the challenged expenditure. Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa. 273, 227 A.2d 619 (1967).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 169, 346 A.2d 269 (1975), recently held that standing requires a direct, substantial interest in the claim advanced. The requirement of a direct interest means that the person claiming to be aggrieved must show causation of harm to this interest by the matter of which he complains. While the requirement of a 'substantial' interest 'simply means that the individual's interest must have substance--there must be some discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply with the law.' 464 Pa. at 195, 346 A.2d at 282.

The application of these general principles of standing to the case of a legislator seeking to vindicate an interest peculiar to his status as a member of the legislature creates, we believe, a case of first impression in the Commonwealth. In two previous cases brought by members of the legislature in their official capacities, it was assumed without extended discussion that the plaintiffs had standing. These cases, Frame v. Sutherland, 459 Pa. 177, 327 A.2d 623 (1974), and Stroup v. Kapleau, 455 Pa. 171, 313 A.2d 237 (1973), challenged, by actions in quo warranto, ² gubernatorial appointments allegedly made in violation of ARTICLE IV, SECTION 8, OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION³.

The basis for the Court's granting standing to the legislators in Frame and Stroup rested on the nature of an action in quo warranto, which generally grants standing to a broad group to challenge the right of an officeholder to his office. ⁴ However, in the case at bar, plaintiff Wilt is not challenging the right of defendants to office. Instead, he seeks to enjoin actions proceedings from an administrative determination by the Secretary of Welfare. The Frame and Stroup cases therefore provide little guidance for us in this matter.

In recent years, the federal courts have had many occasions to consider the question of a legislator's standing to sue. While these cases are not binding on us, they can provide some help in this difficult area. We are mindful, however, of Professor Berger's Miltonic warning that '(c)onfusion twice-confounded reigns in the area of federal jurisdiction described as 'standing to sue ". ⁵

In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a taxpayer would a granted standing to challenge a governmental enactment. The Court stated:

'The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.' 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S.Ct. at 1954.

In announcing this test, the Court sought to insure that the litigants would have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. ⁶ A related standard was announced in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), for those seeking review of administrative actions. The Supreme Court reiterated the 'personal stake' requirement announced earlier and also required that the plaintiff be 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question'. 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830. Both standards have been considered to require the same degree of relationship among the plaintiff, the injury, and some protectible interest of the plaintiff. ⁷ Federal courts, considering legislators' standing, have applied the tests sometimes interchangeably. ⁸

In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), a leading case testing the limits of the federal concept of standing, the Supreme Court, in denying standing to an environmental group challenging an administrative action, announced the rationale for requiring adherence to the tests in Baker and Flast. Requiring standing, it said, will 'serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.' 405 U.S. at 740, 92 S.Ct. at 1369. The relaxation of the federal requirement of standing begun in Flast has not, however, dispensed with the requirement altogether. Indeed, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra note 8, the Court reaffirmed its position on standing:

'(W)e have more recently stressed that the broadening of Categories 'is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.' Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). And, in defining the nature of that injury, we have only recently stated flatly: 'Abstract injury is not enough.' O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).' 418 U.S. at 218--19, 94 S.Ct. at 2931 (emphasis in original).

The tests announced in these cases are, we believe, sound and in general agreement with the principles of standing as stated in the cases decided in this Commonwealth. ⁹ We therefore may look to the way in which these tests have been applied to the question of whether a legislator has standing to raise certain issues before the federal courts solely in his or her capacity as a legislator. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 S.Ct. 1385 (1939), the standing of state senators to challenge an illegal tie-breaking vote cast by the lieutenant governor was upheld. The Court ruled that the senators had a 'plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes'. 307 U.S. at 438, 59 S.Ct. at 975. Notwithstanding this broad language, it is clear that what was at stake was whether the senators' votes on the ratification of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution would be properly counted. A review of more recent cases shows that standing has been granted to U.S. Representatives to challenge the conduct of the war in Vietnam on the ground that if the war were declared illegal it would bear upon congressional duties to consider impeachment and to make appropriations with regard to the cessation of hostilities, ¹⁰ Mitchell v. Laird, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 488 F.2d 611 (1973), and to congressmen to challenge the firing of Archibald Cox as special prosecutor, using similar reasoning. Nader v. Bork, 366 F.Supp. 106 (D.D.C.1973).

In Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (1974), the court found that an individual senator had standing to challenge an allegedly illegal 'pocket veto' ¹¹ on the ground that he was being denied his right to vote for an attempted override of the veto. The Kennedy court found that ...