Wiltgen v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 80-1108

• Citation: 634 F.2d 398
• Decision Date: 24 November 1980
• Docket Number: No. 80-1108,80-1108
• Parties: Albert WILTGEN, Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a/k/a Hartford Insurance Group, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 398

634 F.2d 398

Albert WILTGEN, Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a/k/a Hartford Insurance Group, Appellee.

No. 80-1108.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 19, 1980.

Decided Nov. 24, 1980.

Charles R. Wolle, Shull, Marshall & Marks, Sioux City, Iowa, for appellee.

Albert M. Wiltgen, pro se.

Before ROSS, HENLEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Albert Wiltgen, proceeding pro se, appeals from a district court ^* order granting the motion of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. (Hartford) to dismiss on the grounds that the action was settled by oral agreement of the parties through their respective counsel. We affirm.

Wiltgen was involved in two automobile accidents in 1972, on July 21 and December 18. At the time of the accidents he was covered by two policies of insurance issued by Hartford, an accident policy covering medical bills and certain types of disability and a sickness-disability policy covering certain medical expenses and disabilities not accident-related.

On August 17, 1977, Wiltgen filed a two-count complaint against Hartford. In Count I he sought recovery of $6,933.30 in benefits allegedly due for hospitalization, medical bills and payments due under his accident policy. In Count II he sought $25,000 in damages for the wrongful cancellation of his sickness-disability policy.

Hartford successfully obtained a summary judgment with respect to the wrongful cancellation claim. On January 16, 1979, counsel for Hartford by letter offered to pay Wiltgen $2,357.91 for a complete release and dismissal of the subject lawsuit. Counsel for Wiltgen accepted Hartford's offer of settlement verbally on January 24, 1979, and the court was informed that the case had been settled.

Hartford forwarded to Wiltgen for execution a document releasing Hartford from any and all claims and demands and from any and all causes of action arising out of the July and December, 1972 accidents. The document also provided that Wiltgen would indemnify and hold Hartford harmless from all claims and demands growing out of the accidents or policies and any matters which may have been involved in the lawsuit in the United States District Court.

Wiltgen refused to sign. Thereafter, Hartford's attorney informed Wiltgen's attorney that Hartford would settle for a dismissal with prejudice, and would forego the release. Wiltgen also refused this offer.

On September 14, 1979, Hartford filed a motion to dismiss for the reason that the parties had arrived at a settlement agreement. Wiltgen filed a brief in opposition to Hartford's motion to dismiss. He argued that he had told his attorney he would settle for $2,357.91 only if the settlement would not affect his claim for reinstatement of either or both policies, and would not jeopardize his claim "against Hartford's integrity." ¹ He argued that the release proposed by Hartford and the dismissal with prejudice subsequently proposed by Hartford would destroy one or both claims.

The court found that the attorneys for the parties had entered into an oral agreement to compromise and settle, and that Wiltgen was bound by that agreement. The court therefore entered an order enforcing the settlement and dismissing the complaint.

Wiltgen does not dispute the district court's finding that the attorneys for the parties entered into an agreement to settle. He concedes that he agreed to settle his claim against Hartford for medical costs and lost time benefits for $2,357.91. Finally, he does not dispute the district court's power to summarily enforce a contract to settle under the appropriate circumstances. That power was described by the court in Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1969) as follows:

The summary procedure (for enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts) is admirably suited to situations where, for example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is ill-suited to situations presenting complex factual issues related either to the formation or the consummation of the contract, which only testimonial exploration in a more plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily resolve. We commend the summary practice for use in connection with problems capable of precise resolution without attendant hazard to the interests of the parties. At the same time, it is evident that beyond that point the convenience of the summary procedure must yield to the exigencies of safeguarding all legally protected rights that are involved.

The question is whether Wiltgen's objections to enforcement of the settlement are "comparatively unsubstantial." In his brief on appeal, Wiltgen contends that he did not authorize his attorney to settle his claims for wrongful cancellation of his policies and for Hartford's refusal to return the release he signed in 1975 and that the entire settlement was therefore unenforceable. For the reasons expressed below, we find that Wiltgen's objections to the settlement enforced by the district court are unsubstantial, and that he suffers no prejudice by the enforcement of the settlement.

Wiltgen alleged in his complaint that by reason of his dispute with Hartford over coverage under the accident policy, Hartford wrongfully cancelled his sickness-disability policy. As set forth above, the district court granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment with respect to this claim.

We find that the district court properly granted summary judgment. Hartford did not cancel Wiltgen's sickness-disability policy. The policy expired on May 1, 1975, and was not renewed under that provision of the policy which provided:

Subject to the consent of the Company, this policy may be renewed for any specified term by the payment, prior to the expiration of the grace period as provided in Policy Provision 3, of the premium for such...