Wilton v. St. Johns County

Decision Date13 June 1929
Citation98 Fla. 26,123 So. 527
PartiesWILTON et al. v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, St. Johns County; George William Jackson Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the County of St. Johns against George Wilton and others. Judgment of condemnation, and defendants bring error.

Reversed and remanded.

See also, 117 So. 321.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

County commissioners under statutes providing for establishment of public drainage systems have power of eminent domain to condemn lands reasonably necessary (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 2785 et seq.). Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 1734 et seq. (Comp. Gen Laws 1927, § 2785 et seq.), providing for establishment of public drainage systems, whether it be strictly speaking a county purpose or not, confers upon county commissioners power of eminent domain for condemnation of lands necessary for construction of any drainage ditch or canal authorized by board, and right to proceed in name of county as petitioner is necessarily implied.

County in establishing drainage system under petition containing necessary allegations could proceed under general condemnation statutes (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, §§ 2785 et seq 5084 et seq.). Board of county commissioners proceeding to establish drainage system under Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 1734 et seq. (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 2785 et seq.), alleging petitioner desired to construct system for a public purpose and use, necessity for taking land, description of property and names of occupants and owners, had authority to proceed under Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 3276 et seq. (Comp. Gen. St 1927, § 5084 et seq.), for condemnation of lands necessary for purpose.

Where answer was stricken, counsel were not authorized to refile pleading practically identical with one stricken. Where court granted motion to strike answer, regardless of whether court's action thereon was correct or not, counsel were not authorized to attempt to refile pleading which was practically identical with one stricken.

Defendant in condemnation proceeding can set up any defense showing cause why property should not be taken, such questions to be determined in limine (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, §§ 2281 et seq., 5084, 5087, 5089). Under Comp. Gen. Laws 1927,§§ 5084, 5087, 5089, general condemnation statutes, and section 2281 et seq., relating to condemnation for county purposes, defendant can by answer set up any valid defense he may have showing cause why his property should not be taken for purposes set forth in petition; such questions to be determined by court in limine.

Answer in condemnation proceeding denying essential allegations of petition required to be made, or otherwise showing defense, is answer contemplated (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 5084 et seq.). Where defendant in condemnation proceeding denies in answer essential allegations of petition which must be made under Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 5084 et seq., and which are in nature of jurisdictional conditions precedent to exercise of power of eminent domain, or otherwise shows good cause why petition should not be granted, answer is such as is contemplated and authorized.

Allegations, in answer in condemnation proceeding, consisting of categorical denials without alleging facts supporting conclusion, are insufficient. In condemnation proceeding, allegations in answer consisting of mere categorical denial that construction of drainage ditch was for public use, or mere allegation that it was not for public use in the nature of legal conclusion, without alleging facts supporting conclusion, were insufficient.

Statutes authorizing condemnation proceedings under power of eminent domain must be strictly construed and substantially complied with. Proceedings for condemnation of property under power of eminent domain are controlled by statutes authorizing them, which statutes must be strictly construed and substantially complied with in all proceedings instituted thereunder.

Board of county commissioners is an administrative and not judicial body. Board of county commissioners is an administrative and not a judicial body.

Decisions of county commissioners on discretionary matters are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed except for fraud, abuse of discretion, or lack of authority. Decisions of board of county commissioners as to matters committed by law to their discretion are entitled to great weight, and will be sustained unless fraud or abuse of discretion be clearly shown or borad acted without lawful authority.

Action of county board on judicial questions does not preclude persons agrieved from resorting to courts to protect constitutional or legal rights. Action of administrative body, such as board of county commissioners, upon purely judicial questions, cannot ordinarily preclude injured or aggrieved persons from resorting to courts for protection of their constitutional or legal rights.

Legislative determination of public use is not final, question whether use is public being judicial question. Legislative determination in the first instance as to whether use for which property is to be condemned is public use, though entitled to great weight, is not final, since whether particular use is public or not is judicial question.

Legislature cannot under power of eminent domain condemn private property for private use, even though compensation be paid (Const. U.S. Amend. 14). Legislature cannot under guise of exercising sovereign power of eminent domain, which can only be exerted for public purpose, take citizen's property without consent and give it to another for mere private use, even though compensation be paid, since to do so would be a deprivation of property without due process of law, contrary to Const. U.S. Amend. 14.

Advantages of contemplated improvement, to constitute public use, need not extend as effectually to community outside district as to those within. In order that drainage shall constitute public use, it is not necessary that advantages derived from contemplated improvement shall extend as effectually to community outside district as to those within it and need not extend to whole public nor to any large portion of it.

Drainage statutes held not to authorize establishment of drain and exercise of eminent domain thereunder for private benefit (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 2785 et seq.). Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 2785 et seq., providing for the establishment of drainage systems, held not to show intention that drain should be established and power of eminent domain exercised thereunder for private benefit of lands of single individual but only for public purpose.

Question of necessity for exercise of power of eminent domain to acquire property for public use is generally legislative question. While question of public use vel non is ultimately judicial question, yet, if purpose be public one, question of whether it is necessary to exercise power of eminent domain to acquire property for accomplishment of purpose is generally legislative question, especially so in instances where Legislature itself takes direct action.

Legislature delegating power of eminent domain to administrative agency or public corporation for public purpose may also delegate power to determine necessity for improvement. Where Legislature delegates right to exercise power of eminent domain to public or quasi public corporation or administrative agency of government for public purpose, it may, in absence of constitutional restriction, also delegate power to determine necessity for making particular improvement for such public purpose.

Determination by grantee of power of eminent domain as to necessity for improvement will not be disturbed in absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. Generally, determination by grantee of power of eminent domain as to necessity for improvement will not be disturbed by courts in absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, and rule usually applies also to the route, line, or location of proposed work or improvement.

Necessity for making particular improvement or of taking property for particular purpose must be ascertained as required by law. Generally, when Constitution or statute require necessity for making particular improvement or of taking property for particular purpose to be passed upon in particular manner or by particular body or tribunal, it is imperative that necessity shall be ascertained as required by law.

Private property may be taken for public use only when it is reasonably necessary for such use. Where law says that private property may be taken for public use only when it is necessary for such use, it means a reasonable, not an absolute, necessity.

Whether any necessity exists for taking particular property under power of eminent domain is ultimately judicial question. Where statute conferring authority to take property under power of eminent domain limits taking to such property as may be necessary for purpose in question, whether any necessity exists for taking particular property for particular purpose is ultimately a judicial question upon which owner is entitled to be heard.

Discretionary power of grantee to determine necessity for condemnation will not be interfered with, if exercised in good faith and not capricious, wantonly injurious, or beyond statute. Grantee of power to determine necessity for exercise of power of eminent domain is vested with considerable discretionary power in determining what property and how much is necessary, and such determination will not be interfered with by courts if it is made in good faith and is not capricious or wantonly injurious or in some respect beyond privilege accorded by statute.

Landowner whose land is condemned cannot object merely because...

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