Wiltz v. Moundbuilders Guidance Ctr.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:13-cv-00523 |
| Parties | CASSANDRA R. WILTZ, Plaintiff, v. MOUNDBUILDERS GUIDANCE CENTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who proceeds without the assistance of counsel, purports to assert numerous claims against twenty-one (21) named and four (4) "John Doe" Defendants arising from her former employment with Moundbuilders Guidance Center ("Moundbuilders"), now known as Behavioral Healthcare Partners, Inc. ("Behavioral Healthcare"). The Court previously granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees. (ECF No. 2.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's race-discrimination and First-Amendment claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e). In addition, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law discrimination claims.
Plaintiff alleges that she was hired to work for Moundbuilders, a facility that provides mental-health services and allegedly receives public funding, sometime in 2008. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 29, 30, ECF No. 3.) Shortly after her employment began, Plaintiff purportedly discovered that Moundbuilders was engaged in unlawful accounting and financial practices. Id. at ¶ 31. According to the Complaint, officials at Moundbuilders sought Plaintiff's cooperation and assistance in continuing the unlawful practices. Id. Plaintiff represents that she refused to participate in the activity, and that she complained to her supervisors and to Moundbuilders' board of directors about the unlawful practices. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff also alleges that officials at Moundbuilders treated her differently than other staff members, "which [she] believed was due to her race." Id. at ¶ 31. She indicates that she also complained to her supervisors and Moundbuilders' board of directors concerning the mistreatment. Id. at ¶ 32.
Plaintiff alleges that when she complained about the unlawful activity, officials at Moundbuilders acknowledged their unlawful conduct, but indicated that they wanted to terminate Plaintiff's employment rather than cease the unlawful practices. According to Plaintiff, officials at Moundbuilders worried that she would take action under Ohio's Whistleblower Statute if they terminated her. Consequently, Plaintiff represents that they threatened that if she refused to resign or if she revealed their unlawful financial and discriminatory practices to anyone, they would create and circulate false information to damage her reputation and ensure she would be unable to secure other employment. Id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff contends that officials at Moundbuilders also warned that they would enlist the help of others to damage her reputation, and that they would ensure that no court or investigative agency wouldaccept a complaint from her or allow her to pursue a lawsuit against them. (Compl. ¶ 34, ECF No. 3.) On the other hand, according to Plaintiff, if she resigned and agreed not to sue Moundbuilders, they promised to provide her favorable employment references. Id.
According to Plaintiff, she refused to resign or agree to not sue Moundbuilders. Plaintiff maintains that, as a result, Moundbuilders' board of directors terminated her in August 2008. Id. at ¶ 35. Plaintiff contends that members of the board of directors told her that they fired her because of her complaints and their need to continue the unlawful financial practices.
In 2009, Plaintiff allegedly filed lawsuits and complaints with various investigative agencies concerning Moundbuilders' purported unlawful financial and discriminatory practices, which provoked Defendants to make good on their threats. Id. at ¶ 37. According to Plaintiff, Moundbuilders' board of directors, "and others who had assisted [Mounbuilders] with [its] unlawful activities," provided negative employment references to prospective employers and circulated false information to damage her reputation. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 38. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that members of the board of directors "asked Courts not to allow [her] to litigate lawsuits against them, [and] asked investigative agencies not to investigate a complaint from [her] and/or to allow [her] to make a complaint." (Compl. ¶ 40, ECF No. 3.) As a result of Defendants' conduct, according to Plaintiff, at least two prospective employers refused to hire her and neither the courts nor investigative agencies, such as the Accountancy Board of Ohio, will accept a complaint or lawsuit from her. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40, 45. In addition, the Accountancy Board of Ohio allegedly refuses to approve Plaintiff's application to transfer her Certified Public Accountant ("CPA") license to Ohio because of the false information Defendants circulated about her, leaving her unable to practice as a CPA in Ohio. Id. at ¶ 48.
In addition to Moundbuilders' board of directors, Plaintiff alleges that the variousindividual Defendants assisted in circulating false information about her and convincing courts and investigative agencies to reject lawsuits or complaints that she might file. Specifically, she asserts that Defendants Michael Whitehead; Jeff Forman; Ole Bay; John Kozak; Kent Pummel; Joseph Patrick; Roy Lydic; Bradley Tobe; and John Does 1 through 4 assisted Moundbuilders in retaliating against her. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 41, 42. The firms of Clark, Schaefer, Hackett and Company ("Clark, Schaefer & Co.") and Schneider, Downs and Company ("Schneider, Downs & Co.") allegedly assisted as well. Id.
In addition to asserting discrimination and retaliation claims under federal law, Plaintiff purports to assert discrimination claims under Ohio law. Id. at ¶ 55. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 3.)
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to "lower judicial access barriers to the indigent." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so "Congress recognized that 'a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.'" Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, Section 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon a court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard does not require "'detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, a complaint will not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. TotalBenefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, the Court holds pro se complaints "'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
Two independent reasons compel dismissal of Plaintiff's claim arising from Defendants' alleged mistreatment of her on the basis of her race. First, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a) with respect to this...
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