Wimberly v. MacLaren
Decision Date | 13 September 2019 |
Docket Number | Civil Case No. 18-11953 |
Parties | WILLIE LEE WIMBERLY, Petitioner, v. DUNCAN MACLAREN, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Linda V. Parker
Willie Lee Wimberly ("Petitioner"), through attorney S. Allen Early, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his Michigan state court convictions for two counts of assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.83. For the following reasons, the Court is denying the petition.
Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan. The Court recites verbatim the relevant facts from the Michigan Court of Appeals' opinion:
People v. Wimberly, No. 321490, 2015 WL 6161545, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2015). These facts are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F. 3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009)
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Wimberly, 2015 WL 6161545. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Wimberly, 890 N.W. 2d 974 (Mich. 2017).
Petitioner asserts the following grounds in support of his request for federal habeas relief:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") govern this case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). AEDPA provides:
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
"[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governinglegal principle from Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [the] petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n.7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
Respondent urges the Court invoke the "concurrent sentence" doctrine and not review Petitioner's claims because Petitioner is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction he received in connection with Mr. Charles' death and for which another judge in this District already has denied him habeas relief. See Wimberly v. Warren, No. 2:18-11011, 2018 WL 6178999 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2018) (Borman, J.).
The concurrent sentence doctrine allows a federal court to "decline to hear a substantive challenge to a conviction when the sentence on the challenged conviction is being served concurrently with an equal or longer sentence on a valid conviction." Winn v. Renico, 175 F. App'x 728, 731 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1142 (1979)). The Sixth Circuit "has been ... hesitant to apply this doctrine[,]" and "has invoked it [only] when there is no possibility of adverse 'collateral consequences' if the convictions stand." Id. at 732; see also Groves v. Meko, 516 F. App'x. 507, 508 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930, 935 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1989)) ("The concurrent sentencing doctrine is a discretionary one, and courts 'are admittedly hesitant to apply [it].'").
Respondent fails to show the lack of collateral consequences attaching to Petitioner's first-degree murder conviction. See Pillette v. Berghuis, 408 F. App'x. 873, 886 n. 8 (6th Cir. 2010). Notably, although Petitioner's first-degree murder conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal and he has been denied habeas relief, he still has the ability to challenge that conviction in the state courts via a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment under Michigan Court Rule 6.500. For that reason, the Court declines to invoke the concurrent sentence doctrine.
In his first ground for relief, Petitioner argues that his right to counsel of choice was violated when the state court denied his motion to adjourn the trial and substitute counsel with his third retained attorney. Petitioner moved to substitute counsel and delay the proceedings three days before the first day of trial and, again, on the first day of trial.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim, reasoning:
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