Wimbrow v. Wimbrow

Decision Date08 September 1967
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesRuth Gort WIMBROW v. Vernon A. WIMBROW.

Henry M. Schwan, Norfolk, for appellant.

Daniel Hartnett, R. Norris, Bloxom, Accomac (C. Lester Drummond, Accomac, on brief), for appellee.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.

GORDON, Justice.

Ruth Gort Wimbrow brought this suit against her husband asking for a divorce from bed and board because of his cruelty and because of his constructive desertion on July 7, 1965. The husband, Vernon A. Wimbrow, filed a cross-bill asking for a divorce from bed and board because of her desertion on that day. After hearing the evidence in open court, the trial judge awarded the husband a divorce. The wife appeals.

The parties were married in 1939. Mr. Wimbrow said they 'got along all right' until 1942, when Mrs. Wimbrow accused him on two occasions of improper relations with his brother's widow. After those incidents, the domestic situation grew progressively worse. Mr. Wimbrow said that thereafter he had 'never loved * * * (his) wife', in fact 'had no respect for her'.

Mr. Wimbrow complains of Mrs. Wimbrow's jealousy and her accusations about his improper relations with other women. He admitted that 'except when she would make these accusations (about other women), I have no complaint of her as a wife and mother. She kept the house properly, but she is insanely jealous, and it was always something. If I got blood on my handkerchief from blowing my nose, she would insist it was lipstick'.

Mrs. Wimbrow's daughter by a previous marriage (Audrey Wiston) said that during her visit in the home from mid-June to July 4, 1965, Mr. Wimbrow rarely spoke to Mrs. Wimbrow, did not have meals with her, and habitually left home alone around 10:00 o'clock at night, returning around 5:00 the next morning. Mr. and Mrs. Wimbrow's daughter (Orchid Wimbrow) and Mrs. Wimbrow's granddaughter (Blossom Thompson) said that they had observed similar conduct when they were visiting in the home during the last several years before the separation. Mr. Wimbrow did not contradict the testimony of these witnesses about his conduct.

The events of the early morning of July 7, 1965 are crucial to our decision because they prompted Mrs. Wimbrow to leave home. Before describing those events, however, we will relate a previously unmentioned subject of controversy that Mr. Wimbrow pointed to as justifying his actions on July 7.

Mr. Wimbrow complained that his wife took his money. He said: 'If you put money down, she would pick it up. If you had two fifty dollar bills, she took one of them. You couldn't hide a pocketbook from her. I have left it in the safe at the office, and not carried it home. I would count the money in my wallet, and tell her, you took a hundred dollars out of my pocket.' He said further 'I had told her a few years ago that if she ever took money from me again, she would remember it for a long time'.

Mr. Wimbrow returned home in the early morning of July 7, 1965 and went to bed. Later he got up and went to the bathroom. Mrs. Wimbrow, who was in another bed in the same room, then got up and removed his wallet from its hiding-place under the mattress of his bed. She said '(w)hile I was looking at his wallet, he came in, crashed his fist in my face, threw me on the bed, and picked up a dressing table bench, and beat me unmercifully'.

Mr. Wimbrow testified that he slapped Mrs. Wimbrow. '(S)he had money in her hands, and the pocketbook, and I told her to leave it alone, and I slapped her, and told her to leave the room, and she wouldn't do it, and I slapped her several times. She dropped what money she had taken, and told me to leave.' He refused and 'went back to bed'.

Mr. Wimbrow's testimony that he only slapped his wife is incredible in view of the other uncontradicted evidence. A doctor saw Mrs. Wimbrow on July 9, 1965. He found 'hematomas and abrasions of the left upper arm * * * and the upper portion of the left thigh'. The hematomas were 'of substantial size'. When the doctor was asked 'would it require a hard blow on the areas of the arm and leg (to cause the injuries) you have described' he answered 'It would have to be a pretty good blow'.

A picture of Mrs. Wimbrow taken in mid-July 1965 shows severe bruises of the left arm and thigh. At the time of the trial, about five months after the breating, there was still 'a discolored mark on her (left) arm', about two inches wide and two inches long, and a discolored mark on her left thigh of undisclosed dimensions.

Both parties alleged that Mrs. Wimbrow left home on July 7, 1965. She said she left on July 7 because she was afraid, and would have left earlier in the day except for car trouble that required her to rent a car. Mr. Wimbrow said she left home the 'following morning', the '8th (of July)'. He was probably mistaken about the date, but in any event he is bound by his allegation that she left on July 7. Their testimony that they had been continuously separated through the trial of this case in December 1965 was corroborated.

The question raised by the events of July 7 is whether Mrs. Wimbrow was justified in leaving home on that day. Counsel for Mr. Wimbrow contends that she was not justified in leaving, even though she was beaten, because she provoked the beating.

'(O)ne spouse is not justified in leaving the other, unless the conduct of the other is sufficient to establish the foundation of judicial proceeding for a divorce.' Lawyer v. Lawyer, 207 Va. 260, 264, 148 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1966). We find that the actions of Mr. Wimbrow described above, culminating in the beating of Mrs. Wimbrow on July 7, 1965, constituted cruelty, a ground for divorce in Virginia. See Green v. Green, 199 Va. 927, 103 S.E.2d 202 (1958). Mrs. Wimbrow was therefore justified in leaving home and is entitled to a divorce unless Mr. Wimbrow can successfully defend on the ground that she provoked the beating on July 7, 1965 or that her actions before that day should bar the granting of a divorce to her.

'The general rule is that a divorce will not be granted on the ground of physical cruelty when the acts of cruelty complained of were provoked by the misconduct of the complaining spouse. However, that there was some provocation will not disentitle a spouse to relief if the retaliatory cruelty complained of was out of proportion to the provoking conduct.' Godwin v. Godwin, 245 S.C. 370, 376, 140 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1965).

Mr. Wimbrow testified that Mrs. Wimbrow had taken his money on occasions before July 7, 1965, and that he had warned her 'she would remember it for a long time' if she took money from him again. So we recognize that Mrs. Wimbrow knew or should have known that she would provoke action by Mr. Wimbrow if he should surprise her taking money from his wallet.

While admitting that Mrs. Wimbrow's taking money from her husband's wallet on July 7 was an act of provocation, we find that his retaliatory conduct, in beating her brutally, was out of proportion to her provoking act. We hold therefore that Mrs. Wimbrow's provoking act did not disentitle her to a divorce.

Counsel for Mr. Wimbrow relies upon toler v. Toler, 168 Va. 302, 191 S.E. 638 (1937) and Butler v. Butler, 145 Va. 85, 133 S.E. 756 (1926), to support his contentions that Mrs. Wimbrow's provoking act on July 7, 1965 disentitled her to relief. Those cases, however, do not control the decision of this case. Not only were the wives' provoking acts in those cases more aggravated, but the husbands' retaliatory acts were much less severe than Mr. Wimbrow's actions.

We conclude also that the brutal beating on July 7, 1965 gave Mrs. Wimbrow reason to fear further bodily harm if she continued to live in the home. This was not the first time Mr. Wimbrow had beaten or threatened Mrs. Wimbrow. Their daughter Orchid, who was twenty-five when she testified, said that when she was thirteen or fourteen: '* * * I saw him (Mr. Wimbrow) strike her (Mrs. Wimbrow). He pushed her on the bed and hit her with his left hand. He hit her several times...

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6 cases
  • Zinkhan v. Zinkhan
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 1986
    ...justify a willful separation or a continuance of it. Guy v. Guy, 210 Va. 536, 539, 172 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1970); Wimbrow v. Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 143, 156 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1967); Lawyer v. Lawyer, 207 Va. 260, 264, 148 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1966); Stolfi v. Stolfi, 203 Va. 696, 701, 126 S.E.2d 923......
  • Hoback v. Hoback
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1967
    ...unless the conduct of the other is sufficient to establish the foundation of judicial proceeding for a divorce.' Wimbrow v. Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 143, 156 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1967); Lawyer v. Lawyer, 207 Va. 260, 264, 148 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1966). We have recognized that evidence of violence or ......
  • Graham v. Graham
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 9, 1970
    ...parties experienced. However, the retaliatory acts of Mr. Graham were out of proportion to her provoking conduct. See Wimbrow v. Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 156 S.E.2d 598 (1967) quoting from Godwin v. Godwin, 245 S.C. 370, 376, 140 S.E.2d 593, 596 It is apparent there has been no collusion betwe......
  • Carneal v. Carneal
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 4, 1970
    ...of judicial proceeding for a divorce'. Hoback v. Hoback, Supra, 208 Va. at 435, 158 S.E.2d at 116, quoting from Wimbrow v. Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 143, 156 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1967). So we must conclude that Carolyn deserted James on November 2, 1966 entitling him to a divorce as prayed in his c......
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