Winakor v. Savalle
| Decision Date | 28 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC 20516 |
| Citation | 343 Conn. 773,276 A.3d 407 |
| Parties | Lee WINAKOR v. Vincent SAVALLE |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Paul M. Geraghty, with whom was Jonathan E. Friedler, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Patrick J. Markey, with whom, were James H. Lee and, on the brief, Mary H. Patryn, for the appellee (defendant).
Robinson, C.J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
This appeal requires us to consider whether certain services provided by a contractor fall under the purview of the Home Improvement Act, General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. In this appeal, the plaintiff, Lee Winakor, claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the Home Improvement Act did not apply to work performed on his property by the defendant, Vincent Savalle. The defendant claims that the work falls under the new home exception of the Home Improvement Act and, therefore, that the Appellate Court's conclusion was correct. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. In 2005, the plaintiff purchased real property located at 217 Legend Wood Road in North Stonington. In 2012, the plaintiff executed a contract with Golden Hammer Builders, LLC (Golden Hammer), through its principal, Brian Mawdsley, in order to construct a single-family home on the property. The contract contemplated the construction of the home and all related site work for a price of $425,300. It also contained a provision permitting the plaintiff to subtract $55,000 from the total cost of the construction by independently contracting for the necessary site work with a separate contractor.
After meeting with the plaintiff, the defendant submitted a bid to complete that site work for under $50,000. The plaintiff accepted the defendant's bid and drafted a contract to memorialize their agreement. That contract specifically required the defendant to "[p]urchase and supply any/all supplies ... [c]lear [the] lot ... remove stumps, [d]ig [the] foundation hole ... and well trenches, [p]urchase and install [a] septic [tank] ... build a wall along [the] edge of [the] lakeside ... build two retaining walls ... [build] [t]wo driveways ... [reclaim] asphalt ... [for the] driveway ... [g]rade [the] driveway ... [at] 8 [percent] ... [i]nstall footing drains and backfill foundation, [f]inish [the] grade, [s]eed [the] ... lawn, [and conduct any] [b]lasting ...." The contract further specified that the defendant would complete the work within one year of the start date. After the contract was signed, the defendant also orally agreed to dig a trench for the propane system and to install a patio. Mawdsley then applied for, and secured, a new home building permit under his new home construction contractor's license.
The defendant began his work in September, 2012. The trial court found that "[h]e hammered out a ledge for the foundation, installed a septic tank, constructed retaining walls ... installed a propane tank and gas lines ... installed the well electrical line, and partially finished the driveway." In December, 2013, Golden Hammer completed construction of the house, and the plaintiff received a partial certificate of occupancy. A full certificate of occupancy was issued for the house in January, 2014.
At the time the certificate of occupancy was issued, however, the defendant had not yet completed the site work as contemplated by his contract with the plaintiff. The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of North Stonington issued a letter to the plaintiff indicating that the house substantially conformed to its zoning regulations and would be approved for zoning compliance on the condition that, among other things, "the final grading, landscaping, and soil stabilization be completed within [six] months," and the driveway be widened. The plaintiff and the defendant subsequently entered into a second contract requiring the defendant to complete the work that was set out in their first contract by April 1, 2014, for an additional $10,000.1
The plaintiff ultimately became dissatisfied with the quality of the defendant's work2 and the defendant's failure to complete the project according to the schedule set forth in either their first or second contract. The plaintiff terminated his relationship with the defendant in April, 2014, and subsequently hired another contractor, Charles Lindo, to finish the work that the defendant had failed to complete and to remedy any flaws in the work that the defendant had completed. Lindo completed the site work at additional cost to the plaintiff, and the town subsequently notified the plaintiff that his new residence fully complied with its zoning regulations.
The plaintiff then commenced the present action against the defendant. The operative amended complaint contained five separate counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violations of the New Home Construction Contractors Act (New Home Act), General Statutes § 20-417a et seq. ; (4) violations of the Home Improvement Act; and (5) violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., predicated on violations of the Home Improvement Act and the New Home Act. The case was subsequently tried to the court. In the memorandum of decision that followed, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on counts one, three, four, and five of the complaint. Specifically, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on count one, concluding that the defendant had breached his contract with the plaintiff by failing to complete the site work on schedule and by "using improper techniques and methods to [perform] the contract ... [causing] the plaintiff [to incur] additional expenses to repair and finish the work the defendant was contractually required to do."3 The court also ruled in favor of the plaintiff on counts three and four, concluding that the defendant violated the Home Improvement Act by failing to comply with certain statutory requirements regarding the form of the contract. The trial court's memorandum of decision characterized both counts three and four of the complaint as having alleged a violation of the Home Improvement Act.4 Finally, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on count five, concluding that the defendant's violation of the Home Improvement Act constituted a per se violation of CUTPA. The court awarded the plaintiff $100,173.32 in compensatory damages on these counts.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees under CUTPA. The court held a hearing on that motion and awarded the plaintiff $126,126.91 in attorney's fees and $2412.05 in costs. The defendant then appealed both the trial court's judgment and the award of attorney's fees to the Appellate Court.
Before the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that (1) there was insufficient evidence to show causation of damages on the breach of contract count, and (2) the trial court's award under CUTPA was misguided because it was based on an incorrect application of the Home Improvement Act. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to the breach of contract count but reversed with respect to the remaining claims, concluding that the Home Improvement Act did not apply to the defendant's work under the contracts. Winakor v. Savalle , 198 Conn. App. 792, 816, 234 A.3d 1122 (2020).
Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the work performed by the defendant fell within the new home exception of the Home Improvement Act; General Statutes § 20-419 (4) (A) ; and that, as a result, the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under both the Home Improvement Act and CUTPA. Winakor v. Savalle , supra, at 800–801, 234 A.3d 1122.
In the present appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court erred because the work performed by the defendant was distinct from the construction of the new home and, as such, fell within the scope of the Home Improvement Act and was not excluded by its new home exception. In response, the defendant argues that the work he performed was so interrelated to the construction of the new home that it must fall under the new home exception of the Home Improvement Act.
We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadows v. Higgins , 249 Conn. 155, 162, 733 A.2d 172 (1999). "The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. ...
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. , Inc., 286 Conn. 454, 464–65, 944 A.2d 315 (2008) ; see also Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso , 232 Conn. 666, 676, 657 A.2d 1087 ...
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