Winburn v. Bologna

• Decision Date: 12 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 2:95-CV-0044.,2:95-CV-0044.
• Citation: 979 F.Supp. 531
• Parties: Robert WINBURN, Plaintiff, v. Cheryl BOLOGNA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

979 F.Supp. 531

Robert WINBURN, Plaintiff, v. Cheryl BOLOGNA, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:95-CV-0044.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

June 12, 1997.

Robert Winburn, Ionia, MI, pro se.

Christine M. Campbell, Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

QUIST, District Judge.

This is a pro se prisoner's civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. At the time of the events in question, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (CCF) in Kincheloe, Michigan. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Defendants moved for summary judgment. In a Report and Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge Joseph G. Scoville recommended that Defendants' motion be granted, and that the claims for injunctive relief be dismissed as moot. The Report and Recommendation also noted that the Plaintiff's complaint misspelled Defendant Belonga's name as Bologna. Now before the Court are Plaintiff's objections. The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation filed by the United States Magistrate Judge in this action on March 27, 1997. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the court has made de novo consideration of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection was made.

Facts

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On December 9, 1994 and December 14, 1994, Plaintiff received packages containing books or pamphlets. Defendant Belonga reviewed these materials and found them to be racist literature violative of MDOC policy directives. On both occasions, Plaintiff received a rejection notice prepared by Defendant Belonga. Plaintiff requested a hearing regarding the rejection of these materials. On December 16, 1994, Defendant Sabin conducted an administrative hearing. He determined that the materials were prohibited under policy directive 05.03.118. Paragraph N(4) of policy directive 05.03.118 provides that "materials advocating racial supremacy or ethnic purity or attacking a racial or ethnic group are prohibited because such materials are considered to be a threat to the order and security of an institution or to the rehabilitation of prisoners." Plaintiff was advised that he had the option of mailing the materials out of CCF at his expense, sending them from the facility with a visitor, or destroying the materials. Normal procedure after the hearing would have been to forward copies of the rejected materials to the Deputy Director of Correctional Facilities for review and possible addition to the MDOC's restricted publications list. However, the envelopes and the materials at issue are now lost. Defendant Belonga claims the materials were either accidentally sent to Plaintiff inside the facility or were mailed to his home. The Court is somewhat confused by Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff has filed with the Court copies of the very materials he claims should not have been rejected.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The rule requires that the disputed facts be material. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over trivial facts which are not necessary in order to apply the substantive law does not prevent the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The rule also requires the dispute to be genuine. A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. This standard requires the non-moving party to present more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the motion. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citing Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)). The summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The only difference between the two is procedural. Id. Summary judgment is made based on documentary evidence before trial, and directed verdict is made based on evidence submitted at trial. Id.

A moving party who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly support a motion for summary judgment by showing the court that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the motion is so supported, the party opposing the motion must then demonstrate with "concrete evidence" that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Frank v. D'Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1384 (6th Cir.1993). The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Dismissals of complaints filed under civil rights statutes are scrutinized with special care. Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.1985). Also, pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Liberally construing the complaint filed by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's briefs in reply to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is any material factual issue in dispute. Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory, and must be dismissed.

In order to prevail in a Section 1983 action, the plaintiff must prove that some conduct by a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or other federal laws. Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir.1988). Plaintiff contends that rejection of the Aryan material violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and his statutory RFRA rights.

When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). In determining reasonableness, relevant factors include (a) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and a legitimate and neutral governmental interest put forward to justify it, which connection cannot be so remote as to render the regulation arbitrary or irrational; (b) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to inmates, which alternatives, if they exist, will require a measure of judicial deference to the corrections officials' expertise; (c) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, on inmates' liberty, and on the allocation of limited prison resources, which impact, if substantial, will require particular deference to corrections officials; and (d) whether the regulation represents an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns, the existence of a ready alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis costs to valid penological interests being evidence of unreasonableness. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.

The MDOC mail policy application in this case is reasonable and facially valid under Turner. The mail regulation is logically related to legitimate security concerns of prison officials, who are worried that such material promotes violence and racial supremacy. The mail policy does not deprive prisoners of all means of expression of religion, but simply bars material that promotes racial supremacy and violence. There is no easy alternative to barring such potential violence causing materials, since allowing such material into the prison population would cause more than a de minimis cost in terms of increasing security measures. The mail regulation is not an "exaggerated response" to security concerns with racially offensive material.

In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) the Supreme Court emphasized the First Amendment's protection of incoming prison mail, and yet recognized that prison administrators are afforded considerable deference in regulating "relations between prisoners and the outside world." Id. at 408, 109 S.Ct. at 1879. In addition, the Supreme Court stated that it would not substitute its judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration for determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running prisons. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). The MDOC's restrictions against materials that advocate violence or are so racially inflammatory as to be reasonably likely to cause violence within the prison were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and were, therefore, valid. Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corr., 814 F.2d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.1987).

Under RFRA, the government is prohibited from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless doing so furthers a compelling government interest and it is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir.1995). Under the RFRA, the inmate must make a threshold showing that government action imposes a "substantial burden" on his exercise of religion. Stefanow v....