Winchester & S. R Co v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 December 1906
• Citation: 55 S.E. 692,106 Va. 264
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: WINCHESTER & S. R CO. et al. v. COMMONWEALTH.

55 S.E. 692

106 Va. 264

WINCHESTER & S. R CO. et al.

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Dec. 6, 1906.

1. Constitutional Law — Distribution or Governmental Powers—Corporation Commission.

Bill of Rights, § 5 [Va. Code 1904, p. ccix] provides that "except as hereinafter provided, " the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state shall be separate and distinct. Const, art. 12, §§ 155, 156 [Va. Code 1904, pp. ccl, ccli], and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, create a State Corporation Commission for the control of corporations, particularly public service corporations, clothing it with limited legislative, judicial, and executive powers, as necessary to meet the exigencies of the situation. Held, that the exercise of such functions by the Commission is not in violation of the Bill of Rights or any requirement of the federal Constitution.

[Ed. Note.—Por cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 10, Constitutional Law, § 100.]

2. Same—Equal Protection op Laws.

Const, art. 12, §§ 155, 156 [Va. Code 1904, pp. ccl, ccli], and laws passed in pursuance thereof, subjecting all transportation companies, in the matter of their public duties and charges, to a Corporation Commission, vested with limited legislative, judicial, and executive powers, is not a denial of the equal protection of law, though other persons and corporations have access to law courts without such extended powers, since no discrimination is exercised as to any one of the class mentioned.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 10, Constitutional Law, §§ 700, 701.]

3. Same—Due Process op Law.

Const, art. 12, §§ 155, 156 [Va. Code 1904, pp. ccl, ccli], creating a Corporation Commission, clothing it, as necessary to meet the exigencies of the situation, with limited legislative and executive powers, as well as judicial power, and to which transportation companies are subjected in the matter of their public duties and charges, requires that proceedings before such Commission shall be "by due process of law." The companies are notified and summoned to appear at a specified time and place before such tribunal to show cause why proposed action should not be given effect. They are permitted to be represented by counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses to produce evidence, and to be heard in their own behalf on all matters, and a right of appeal is given. Held not a deprivation of property without due process of law.

4. Railroads—Termini—Charters—Lessees.

A railroad company, having been granted a charter to build its line between certain towns, built only to a junction near one of them. After a lease of the road, with the consent of the company, and its lessee and practical owner, the charter was changed by releasing the company from its obligation to construct its line within the city, provided it should construct a depot at a certain place therein, to which trains should be run over a connecting line. Act Feb. 26, 1877, Acts 1876-77, p. 95, c. 110. The lessee accepted such compromise by building the depot, and for many years running trains there. Held, that even if the original company had not the financial ability to pay charges afterwards imposed by the connecting line, or construct a new line to the depot, its lessee and practical owner, which was abundantly able to perform the duty, was bound to do so.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 41. Railroads, §§ 423-429.]

5. Same.

That it would entail a financial loss to pay the charges imposed by the connecting line or to build a new line would not excuse a noncompliance with the duty of running trains to the terminus, imposed by the acceptance of the charter and its amendment.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 41, Railroads, §§ 105, 113, 114.]

6. Judgment—Conclusive Effect—Ground of Judgment—Nature of Proceedings.

Where a town applied for mandamus to compel a railroad to run its trains there, and the writ was refused on the ground that the company was in the hands of a receiver of the federal court, such refusal did not render the matter res adjudicata, so as to preclude action as to the same matter, after the discharge of the receiver, before the Corporation Commission.

7. Railroads — Corporation Commission — Terminals.

In proceedings before the Corporation Commission, it appeared that the railroad company was, by amendment of its charter (Act Feb. 26, 1877, Acts 1876-77, p. 95, c. 110), released from building its road to its terminal point, provided it should run its trains in over another line. Held, that the connecting line, not made a party to the proceedings by process or notice, was not subject to any order of the Commission as to the running of the trains over its line.

8. Same — Amendment of Charter — Choice of Methods.

A railroad company, having accepted a charter to build between two stated termini, and having failed to build to one of them, an amendment (Act Feb. 26, 1877, Acts 1876-77, p. 95, c. 110) was accepted, authorizing it to run its trains into a certain depot in the town over a connecting line. Held, that the company could fulfill its duty either by running to such depot over the other line or by constructing its own line thereto.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig. vol. 41, Railroads, §§ 105, 113, 114.]

Appeal from State Corporation Commission.

Proceedings before the Corporation Commission by the town of Strasburg to compel the Winchester & Strasburg Railroad Company and its lessee to run trains into Strasburg. Prom an order granting such relief, the companies appeal. Reversed and remanded.

John G. Wilson and Bumgardner & Bumgardner, for appellants.

The Attorney General, Barton & Boyd, A. C. Stickley, and A. C. Braxton, for the Commonwealth.

HARRISON, J. This proceeding was instituted by the town of Strasburg under the provisions of section 156 (b) and section 164 of the Constitution [Va. Code 1904, pp. ccli, eclxi], and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, to compel the Winchester & Strasburg Railroad Company and its lessee, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, to run their trains from Strasburg Junction, a distance of about one mile, into the town of Strasburg. From the order entered in the premises by the State Corporation Commission, this appeal has been taken by the two defendant railroad companies.

At the outset of our consideration of the questions raised by the petition for appeal, we are confronted with the proposition that sections 155 and 156, art. 12, of the Constitution of Virginia [Va. Code 1904, pp. ccl, ccli], and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereof, are unconstitutional and void; and that the State Corporation Commission, thereby established, is an illegitimate and invalid tribunal, without power to enter the order complained of. The ground urged in support of this contention is that the Constitution and laws mentioned concentrate in the body thereby created legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and require it to exercise the powers of all three of these departments of government, in contravention of section 5 of the Virginia Bill of Rights [Va. Code 1904, p. ccix], which provides "that the legislative, executive, and Judicial departments of the state should be separate and distinct;" and are also in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, for the reason that both the organic law and the legislative enactments operate to deny the equal protection of the laws to that class of companies and corporations over which the Commission is given jurisdiction, and to deprive those companies of their property without due process of law.

This court has recognized the validity of the State Corporation Commission as a legally constituted tribunal of the state, clothed with legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Atlantic Coast Line v. Commonwealth,

102 Va. 599, 46 S. E. 911; Norfolk, etc., Co. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 294, 49 S. E. 39.

In the last-named case, at page 296 of

103 Va., page 41 of 49 S. E., it is said: "The State Corporation Commission, created by constitutional authority, is the instrumentality through which the state exercises its governmental power for the regulation and control of public service corporations. For that purpose it has been clothed with legislative, judicial, and executive powers."

The concentration of these three powers of government in the Corporation Commission is not in contravention of the Bill of Rights. That declaration is part of the Constitution, which expressly provides that "except as hereinafter provided, the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, " thereby recognizing the well^accepted view that the administration of the government would be wholly Impracticable if that general maxim were strictly, literally, and unyieldingly applied in every possible situation.

The federal government, as well as the state governments, abounds with illustrations of the intermingling of such powers in one person or body. The British Constitution fully recognizes the wisdom of keeping separate these three great departments of the government, and yet it furnishes a most conspicuous illustration of the fact that it is impossible for any government to literally fulfill the terms of that maxim without any qualification—the House of Lords is a part of both the legislative and of the judicial branches of that government. It is undoubtedly true that a sound and wise policy should keep these great departments of the government as separate and distinct from each other as practicable. But it is equally true that experience has shown that no government could be administered where an absolute and unqualified adherence to that maxim was enforced. The universal construction of this maxim in practice has been that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments, but that either...