Winchester v. McCue

• Decision Date: 04 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 25293.,25293.
• Citation: 91 Conn.App. 721,882 A.2d 143
• Parties: Renee WINCHESTER v. Robert McCUE.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

882 A.2d 143

91 Conn.App. 721

Renee WINCHESTER v. Robert McCUE.

No. 25293.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 2, 2005.

Decided October 4, 2005.

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Kevin Hadfield, certified legal intern, and, on the brief, C. Michael Budlong and Michael Suppappola, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

Judith A. Ravel, with whom was Margot Kenefick Burkle, Guilford, for the appellee (defendant).

BISHOP, McLACHLAN and HARPER, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.

The plaintiff, Renee Winchester, appeals from the judgment of the trial court enforcing a prenuptial agreement executed at her request. The plaintiff argues that the court improperly enforced the prenuptial agreement where (1) the agreement did not constitute a valid contract, (2) the agreement was unconscionable because the financial situation of the defendant, Robert McCue, at the time of marital dissolution was beyond the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was executed and (3) she is entitled to rescind the agreement because the defendant failed to comply with certain of its terms. The plaintiff also claims that the court made incorrect factual findings so numerous and egregious as to warrant reversal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff and the defendant commenced their relationship in February, 1985. At that time, both parties had been widowed and, from their previous marriages, the plaintiff had a minor daughter, then approximately four years old, and the defendant had three older children.

Both parties testified that the issue of a prenuptial agreement originated with the defendant in the summer prior to the marriage, but that the plaintiff at first did not think one was necessary. The plaintiff testified, however, that in the weeks leading to the wedding, her estate planning attorney urged her to reconsider the matter out of a concern for her daughter, who was then seven years old.

An initial draft of the agreement was generated by the plaintiff's attorney approximately one week before the wedding and, upon receiving a copy, the defendant retained his own attorney. Neither party was satisfied with the first draft and, in the days leading to their wedding, the parties and their respective attorneys intensely negotiated the terms of seven subsequent drafts before executing the final draft just hours before the wedding ceremony, which took place on October 7, 1988, in Madison.

The agreement provided, inter alia, that both parties would waive any right to the other's earned or unearned income, as well as alimony and property in the event of a dissolution. Appended to the agreement were financial statements completed by each party. The plaintiff's statement listed assets totaling $1,223,000, consisting of cash accounts, real property, personal property and an individual retirement account. The defendant's statement disclosed assets totaling $576,000, comprised of cash, marketable securities, real property, personal property, retirement accounts and an interest in an estimated $150,000 inheritance from his mother's estate. Neither statement listed the parties' respective incomes, although both were receiving income. The plaintiff, who possesses a bachelor's degree in journalism a master's degree in corporate communications and a juris doctor degree, was not employed at the time but received social security and rental income from commercial property she owned in Madison and a vacation home in St. John in the United States Virgin Islands.

During the parties' marriage, the defendant enjoyed a successful corporate career. At the time the parties began their relationship in 1985, the defendant was employed in a management position at Chloride Lighting (Chloride), a company located in North Haven. He remained at Chloride until March, 1990, when he accepted a position as president of Magna Tech. After only nine months at Magna Tech, the defendant commenced a position as general manager of Black & Decker, where he remained employed until November, 1997. Upon his retirement from Black & Decker, the defendant started his own consulting business, where he continued to work until the time of dissolution.

After fifteen years of marriage, the plaintiff, in November, 2002, brought a dissolution action, claiming that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. She requested an equitable distribution of the parties' assets and an award of periodic alimony. In December, 2002, the defendant filed a cross complaint requesting, inter alia, enforcement of the prenuptial agreement.

The matter was tried before the court over four days in September and November, 2003. During trial, the plaintiff argued that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable and requested that the court fashion its financial orders in accordance with General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82. The plaintiff argued in particular that the agreement was unenforceable because it did not satisfy the requirements set forth in McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482, 485-86, 436 A.2d 8 (1980).¹ In McHugh, our Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test by which courts determine the validity of a prenuptial agreement: "The validity of an antenuptial contract depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. . . . Antenuptial agreements relating to the property of the parties, and more specifically, to the rights of the parties to that property upon the dissolution of the marriage, are generally enforceable where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the contract was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not violate statute or public policy; and (3) the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice." (Citation omitted.) Id.

The plaintiff argued that (1) the agreement was not validly entered into because she was not made fully aware of the defendant's income and assets prior to executing the agreement and (2) enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable because the defendant's financial situation at the time of dissolution was beyond the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was executed. The plaintiff raised, after the close of evidence in a posttrial brief, the additional argument that the agreement was invalid because the defendant failed to comply with one of its terms, thereby entitling her to rescind the agreement.

On February 26, 2004, the court issued a memorandum of decision regarding the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement. Finding that the three prongs of McHugh had been satisfied, the court concluded that the agreement was enforceable. With regard to the plaintiff's claim that the contract had been rescinded, the court explained in an articulation of its decision that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the defendant had violated the terms of the agreement. From these determinations the plaintiff has appealed.

I

We first address the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly enforced the prenuptial agreement and fashioned its financial orders in accordance with its terms. We address in turn each of the plaintiff's three supporting arguments.

A

We begin by addressing the plaintiff's argument that the agreement was not validly entered into because neither party disclosed his or her income prior to executing the agreement. We disagree.

As the plaintiff asserts that the facts found were insufficient to support the court's legal conclusion, this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact to which we apply plenary review. Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287 (2002). We must therefore decide whether the court's conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. See Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 750, 878 A.2d 384 (2005).

This claim implicates the first prong of McHugh, which our Supreme Court explained as follows: "To determine whether an antenuptial agreement relating to property was valid when made, courts will inquire whether any waiver of statutory or common-law rights, or the right to a judicial determination in any matter, was voluntary and knowing." McHugh v. McHugh, supra, 181 Conn. at 486, 436 A.2d 8. The court further explained: "A party must, of course, be aware of any right that he possesses prior to a proper waiver of it. . . . The duty of each party to disclose the amount, character, and value of individually owned property, absent the other's independent knowledge of the same, is an essential prerequisite to a valid antenuptial agreement containing a waiver of property rights. . . . The burden is not on either party to inquire, but on each to inform, for it is only by requiring full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of the parties' respective assets that courts can ensure intelligent waiver of the statutory rights involved." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 486-87, 436 A.2d 8.

In the present case, the court found, and the record supports, that the plaintiff was sufficiently aware of the defendant's financial circumstances at the time the agreement was executed so as to intelligently waive her right to any income, real or personal property and any claim to alimony. The court explained: "Testimony revealed . . . that the parties dated for several years before they were married. Neither party disputes that during their courtship, the parties shared expenses and became knowledgeable of the other's standard of living and spending habits. As noted in McHugh, failure to disclose financial information in the prenuptial agreement is not fatal so long as the other party has independent knowledge of the same." The court observed in its decision that although neither party had expressly disclosed their respective incomes on the financial statements annexed to the agreement, the agreement was nevertheless valid because the parties had "independent...