Winders v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:17-cv-794-TCB
• Citation: 359 F.Supp.3d 1274
• Parties: Anthony WINDERS and Karen Winders, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

359 F.Supp.3d 1274

Anthony WINDERS and Karen Winders, Plaintiffs,

v.STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:17-cv-794-TCB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed September 18, 2018

Filed September 19, 2018

William Maxwell Compton, Morgan & Morgan, Savannah, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Matthew Jack Bowness, Thomas W. Curvin, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

Timothy C. Batten, Sr., United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion [14] for summary judgment on all counts and Plaintiffs' cross motion [17] for partial summary judgment on their breach of contract claim (Count I).

I. Background

This is a dispute about insurance coverage. The material facts set forth below are not in dispute.¹ See [17-1] at 1.²

Plaintiffs have an insurance policy with State Farm (Policy No. 11-NT-6136-5). The policy provides coverage for "accidental direct physical loss" to Plaintiffs' home, with certain exclusions. [14-1] ¶ 2. The pertinent exclusion states:

We do not insure for any loss to the property ... which consists of, or is directly and immediately caused by ... n. pressure from or presence of tree, shrub or plant roots.

[14-2] ¶ 3 (emphasis added) (quoting [14-1] at 41–42).

On November 11, 2015, water overflowed from a toilet on the main level of Plaintiffs' residence and caused extensive damage. A plant root had worked its way into the toilet piping and clogged it, causing an overflow. This incident resulted in the loss for which Plaintiffs seek coverage in this case.

Plaintiffs submitted a claim to State Farm the same day. Later, on December 22, State Farm denied the claim, citing the root exclusion. Plaintiffs then sued State Farm for breach of contract (Count I) and diminution of value (Count II) in state court, alleging that under the policy water, not roots, was the "direct and immediate cause" of the damage. State Farm timely removed the action to this Court, and both parties have moved for summary judgment. State Farm moves for summary judgment on Counts I and II. Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment on Count I. Each count is taken in turn.

II. Legal Standard

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is a "genuine" dispute as to a material fact if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). In making this determination, however, "a court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations of its own." Id. Instead, the court must "view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Id.

"The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). If the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, there are two ways for the moving party to satisfy this initial burden. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. , 941 F.2d 1428, 1437–38 (11th Cir. 1991). The first is to produce "affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Id. at 1438 (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). The second is to show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

If the moving party satisfies its burden by either method, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue remains for trial. Id. At this point, the nonmoving party must " ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc. , 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

B. Contract Interpretation

The parties do not dispute that the policy is governed by Georgia law. In Georgia, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law for the Court. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1.

"[T]he cardinal rule of contract construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties." Garrett v. S. Health Corp. of Ellijay, Inc. , 320 Ga.App. 176, 739 S.E.2d 661, 667 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Crisp Cty. v. City Comm'rs of Cordele , 315 Ga.App. 696, 727 S.E.2d 524, 527 (2012) ).

"Where the terms are clear and unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, the court is to look to the contract alone to ascertain the parties' intent." Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. , 269 Ga. 326, 498 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1998). "[N]o construction is required or even permitted when the language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Shepherd v. Greer, Klosic & Daugherty , 325 Ga.App. 188, 750 S.E.2d 463, 465 (2013) (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Homelife Cmtys. Grp. v. Rosebud Park, LLC , 280 Ga.App. 120, 633 S.E.2d 423, 425 (2006) ).

Courts interpreting insurance policies under Georgia law should also ascertain the parties' intention by examining the contract as a whole. Ryan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 261 Ga. 869, 413 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992). The terms of an insurance contract should be considered in light of their legal and ordinary meaning, id. , and the policy "should be read as a layman would read it," York Ins. Co. v. Williams Seafood of Albany, Inc. , 273 Ga. 710, 544 S.E.2d 156, 157 (2001). "[T]he plain meaning of [unambiguous] terms must be given full effect, regardless of whether they might be beneficial to the insurer or detrimental to the insured." Tripp v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 262 Ga.App. 93, 584 S.E.2d 692, 694 (2003) (quoting Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pat's Rentals , 269 Ga. 691, 505 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1998) ).

If the Court finds the language to be ambiguous, several well-worn rules must be kept in mind. "Any ambiguities in the contract are strictly construed against the insurer as drafter of the document; any exclusion from coverage sought to be invoked by the insurer is likewise strictly construed; and insurance contracts are to be read in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured where possible." Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gaster , 248 Ga.App. 198, 546 S.E.2d 30, 31 (2001) (citations omitted in original) (quoting Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co. , 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561, 563 (1983) ). If the ambiguity cannot be resolved by applying the canons of construction, "the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by the [fact finder]." Inland Atl. Old Nat'l Phase I, LLC v. 6425 Old Nat'l, LLC , 329 Ga.App. 671, 766 S.E.2d 86, 92 (2014).

III. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment—Breach of Contract (Count I)

"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being broken." SAWS at Seven Hills, LLC v. Forestar Realty, Inc. , 342 Ga.App. 780, 805 S.E.2d 270, 274 (2017)(quoting Dewrell Sacks, LLP v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. , 324 Ga.App. 219, 749 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2013) ). Elements one and two are in dispute. The Court begins with the issue of breach.

1. Element One—Breach

The question of whether State Farm breached the policy boils down to this: whether Plaintiffs' loss was "directly and immediately caused by ... pressure from or presence of tree, shrub, or plant roots ." [14-1] at 41–42 (emphasis added). If it was not, as Plaintiffs argue, then State Farm breached the contract by failing to provide coverage for the water damage.

State Farm contends that the damage to Plaintiffs' home, though resulting from water, was excluded from coverage because it was directly and immediately caused by roots blocking the flow of water. Plaintiffs contend otherwise, that the direct and immediate cause of the damage was not roots, but rather the backed-up water from a toilet. The roots were admittedly a remote cause of their loss, but not the direct and immediate cause as provided in the policy. Thus, the Court must define what a "direct and immediate cause" is.

To begin, the Court holds that the policy language in this respect is unambiguous. As this Court has put it before, when "examining the contract as a whole and affording the words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning, the contract is capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co. , 817 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (quoting Gen. Steel, Inc. v. Delta Bldg. Sys., Inc. , 297 Ga.App. 136, 676 S.E.2d 451, 453–54 (2009) ).

The dispute in this case is not about what "direct" or "immediate" or "cause" necessarily means. Or about what they mean when taken together. The meanings are plainly ascertainable. Instead, the issue is what results when the facts of this case are filtered through this contract language. In other words, the dispute here is the application of unambiguous language to the facts before the Court. Accordingly, the Court need not resort to canons of construction.³

It must still, however, define the terms with which it is dealing. When defining contract language—even unambiguous language—the Court looks to dictionaries "because they supply the plain, ordinary, and popular sense unless the words are terms of art." Lyons v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 996 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (qu...