Windett v. Ruggles

• Decision Date: 19 June 1894
• Parties: WINDETT v. RUGGLES et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

151 Ill. 184

37 N.E. 1021

WINDETT

v.RUGGLES et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county; Philip Stein, Judge.

This was a consolidation of two suits,-one by the Sawyer-Goodman Company against Arthur W. Windett, Anna M. Ruggles, and others, and the other by Arthur W. Windett against Anna M. Ruggles and others. Both suits were brought to set aside a certain trustee's sale. The bills were dismissed at the hearing. Arthur W. Windett appeals. Affirmed.

Arthur W. Windett, in pro. per.

C. H. Willett and W. T. Burgess, for appellees.

BAILEY, J.

This cause was before this court at a former term on an appeal by Burgess from a decree rendered upon the original and supplemental bills filed by the Sawyer-Goodman Company against Windett, Carter, Hurlbut, Anna M. Ruggles, and others; the supplemental bill of the Sawyer-Goodman Company and Burgess, and the supplemental bill of Burgess, against the same defendants; the cross bill of Windett against Burgess, the Sawyer-Goodman Company, Carter, Hurlbut, Anna M. Ruggles, and others; the cross bill of Eliza D. Windett and another against the same; and the consolidated case of Windett against Hurlbut, Carter, and Anna M. Ruggles. The primary scope and purpose of these several bills, supplemental bills, and cross bills were to open up the sale by the trustee under a deed of trust executed August 21, 1875, by Windett to Carter, as trustee, to secure Windett's note for $12,000 to Anna M. Ruggles, and to be permitted to redeem from the deed of trust. At the sale the premises seem to have been struck off and sold to Hurlbut; he acting in the matter, and taking title for Mrs. Ruggles. These various bills originally constituted two independent causes,-one commenced by Windett against Hurlbut, Carter, and Mrs. Ruggles, seeking in his own behalf to redeem; and the other by the Sawyer-Goodman Company, a judgment creditor of Windett, seeking to have the sale set aside, and to subject Windett's equity of redemption to the satisfaction of its judgments. Subsequently, Burgess, having acquired some interest in the judgments, filed a supplemental bill in the latter suit, at first jointly with the Sawyer-Goodman Company, and afterwards in his own name as sole complainant. The several supplemental bills, amended supplemental bills, cross bills, and amended cross bills to be found in the complicated record which was submitted to this court on the former appeal were all proceedings in one or the other of these two causes. By an order of the court, entered upon the suggestion of counsel that the two causes concerned the same property,-no one opposing its entry,-the two causes were consolidated; and it was provided that they should be heard together, with leave to the parties to file such additional and supplemental pleadings as they might desire. At the hearing of the causes thus consolidated, a decree was entered, allowing the parties complainant to redeem, within a time limited, by paying to Mrs. Ruggles a certain sum of money; and it was ordered that, upon such payment being made, Carter, Hurlbut, and Mrs. Ruggles join in the execution, to the party making redemption, of an instrument releasing the premises described in the deed of trust from all right, title, estate, or interest acquired or held by them, or any of them, under the deed of trust. But it was further provided in the decree that, if such redemption should not be made within the time limited, the amended and supplemental bills and cross bills filed by Windett, and the cross bill filed by Eliza D. Windett and another, in the Sawyer-Goodman Company case, and the bill of Windett against Hurlbut and others, consolidated therewith, be dismissed out of court for want of equity, so far as those proceedings related to the redemption of the premises covered by the the deed of trust. That decree was brought to this court on appeal by Burgess, and cross errors were also assigned by Carter, Hurlbut, and Mrs. Ruggles; and on that appeal a judgment was entered by this court holding that the right to redeem was barred, and that all the parties complainant were precluded from any relief in that respect, and the consolidated cause was remanded to the superior court, with directions to that court to dismiss all bills, amended bills, cross bills, and amended cross bills praying that relief, at the costs of the complainants therein. Burgess v. Ruggles, 146 Ill. 506, 34 N. E. 1036. The cause having been duly reinstated in the superior court, a decree was entered dismissing the supplemental bills of Burgess, at his costs, and dismissing the cross bill of Windett, and the cross bill of Eliza D. Windett, at their costs, and also dismissing the bill of Windett in the consolidated cause, at his costs; and it was further ordered that all bills and cross bills of every name and description, filed in the cause and consolidated cause, be dismissed, at the costs of the parties filing the same, without prejudice to any matter in controversy between Windett and Burgess; and it was further ordered and decreed that the premises in controversy were the property of Anna M. Ruggles, in fee simple, free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest, legal or equitable, of any of the parties to the cause, or of any of the parties to any of the bills or cross bills above mentioned. From this decree, Windett now appeals to this court.

The decree now complained of, so far as we can see, was entered in strict conformity with the opinion of this court delivered on the former appeal, and in strict accordance with the mandate of this court. It is a rule too well settled to require discussion, that when a decree is reversed, with specific directions, the action of the court below, pursuant thereto, cannot be assigned for error. Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315;Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294;Winchester v. Grosvenor, 48 Ill. 515;Hollowbush v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 203; People v. Gilmer, 5 Gilm. 242; Washburn, etc., Co. v. Chicago, etc., Co., 119 Ill. 30, 6 N. E. 191. Nor can errors be assigned for matters prior to the former decision, such matters being regarded as res judicata. Ogden v. Larrabee, 70 Ill. 510; Reed v. West, Id. 479; Kingsbury v. Buckner, Id. 514; Newberry v. Blatchford, 106 Ill. 590;Hook v. Richeson, 115 Ill. 431, 5 N. E. 98;Green v. City of Springfield, 130 Ill. 515, 22 N. E. 602;Smyth v. Neff, 123 Ill. 310, 17 N. E. 702;Miller v. Pence, 131 Ill. 122, ...