Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords

• Decision Date: 19 March 2009
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum-08-434.
• Citation: Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690, 2009 ME 29 (Me. 2009)
• Parties: WINDHAM LAND TRUST et al. v. Russell I. JEFFORDS et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

967 A.2d 690

2009 ME 29

WINDHAM LAND TRUST et al. v.Russell I. JEFFORDS et al.

Docket: Cum-08-434.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: January 15, 2009.

Decided: March 19, 2009.

Chris Neagle, Esq. (orally), Troubh Heisler, Portland, ME, for Russell L. Jeffords and Susan A. Poulin.

G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Amy B. Mills, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Linda J.

Conti, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, ME, for the State of Maine.

Marcia G. Corradini, Esq., Jensen Baird Gardner Henry, Portland, ME, for the Windham Land Trust.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1]Russell I. Jeffords and Susan A. Poulin(the Owners) appeal from a summary judgment entered in, and a permanent injunction issued by, the Superior Court(Cumberland County, Cole, J.) in favor of the Windham Land Trust and the State of Maine concerning land owned by the Owners over which the Trust holds a conservation easement.The Owners argue that the court erroneously: (1) allowed the State to intervene in the action; (2) denied their motions to dismiss the Trust's and State's complaints for failure to engage in contractually required mediation; (3) concluded that the Owners are prohibited under the terms of the conservation easement deed from using the land as they have proposed; and (4) granted a summary judgment, and issued a permanent injunction, because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.We affirm the summary judgment and the grant of the permanent injunction.

I.CASE HISTORY

[¶ 2] The Owners hold title to 100 acres of land in Gray known as the Freeman Farm.The Owners purchased the Freeman Farm in 2004 from a couple who had previously acquired the property from the Estate of George L. Freeman.There are no deed restrictions on the front fifteen acres of the Freeman Farm, which contain farm buildings and the Owners' residence.The rear eighty-five acres (the Protected Parcel) are subject to a conservation easement (Conservation Easement).

[¶ 3] The Conservation Easement covering the rear eighty-five acres of the property was created in 2003 when the Freeman Estate donated the Conservation Easement to the Windham Land Trust, an entity described in the Internal Revenue Code,26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3)(2009).The Conservation Easement deed placed restrictions on the purposes for which the grantor, and its transferees, assignees, and successors-in-interest, could use the Protected Parcel.The deed states that the "dominant purpose" of the Conservation Easement is:

[T]o preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural, open space, scenic, aesthetic and ecological features and values of the Property while not limiting the Grantor's power to utilize the property for residential recreational purposes.In so doing, it is the purpose of this Easement to foster responsible conservation practices while permitting Grantor to engage in certain recreational uses on the Property.

Additionally, the deed provides:

Prior to commencing any court or administrative action regarding enforcement of this easement or any part thereof, as a precondition thereof, [the Trust] shall be required to engage in mediation in good faith with [the Owners], with a mutually acceptable mediator, or upon a failure to agree with a mediator appointed by Cumberland County Superior Court.

The Owners expressly agreed to be bound by the Conservation Easement when they acquired the Freeman Farm.

[¶ 4] The Protected Parcel is woodland through which several logging roads or trails run.The Owners originally planned to hold country music festivals on the front fifteen acres, hoping to attract 1000 attendees, and to allow these attendees to camp on the Protected Parcel.The Owners also planned to operate a campground on the Protected Parcel for which they obtained a State permit for thirty-six tent and trailer campsites.The Owners assert that they no longer plan to operate a campground, admitting that such a use is prohibited by the Conservation Easement.¹The Owners now plan to use the logging roads for wagon rides and horse-drawn sleigh rides, hiking, snowshoeing, and Nordic skiing, and to use a pond on the Protected Parcel for fishing and ice skating, all made available to "their paying guests."The Owners have stated that, if they cannot use the Protected Parcel for these commercial purposes, "they will not be able to generate income needed to maintain the trails and pond from these activities, either as separate charitable events or as part of larger events on the unprotected 15 acres such as weddings."

[¶ 5] The Owners claim that, in late 2005 and mid-2006, when they were formulating their planned uses of the Protected Parcel, the Trust's attorney told them that the Conservation Easement deed does not prohibit earning money from activities permitted under the deed and that the then-proposed campsites would not violate the deed.The Owners contend that they relied to their detriment upon the statements by the Trust's attorney in preparing their 2007 financial plan.The Owners also contend that the Freeman family intended the Protected Parcel to be used for horseback riding and horseback riding lessons, as evidenced by a "letter to the editor" written by a member of the Freeman family.

[¶ 6] Before filing this action, the Trust sent written notice to the Owners concerning the Owners' potential violation of the Conservation Easement deed.On November 1, 2006, the Trust contacted the Owners, asking them to choose one of two identified mediators by November 15 so that the parties could engage in the pre-litigation mediation required by the easement deed.The Trust advised the Owners that the Trust would consider an enforcement action in court if the parties could not successfully mediate the dispute.

[¶ 7] By a letter dated November 3, 2006, the Owners refused to engage in mediation, indicating that they did not, within the timeframe proposed by the Trust, "see if we need, or can have a mediator at this time."The Owners claim that they subsequently suggested mediation in February 2007, but that the Trust did not engage in mediation prior to filing its court action.

[¶ 8] The Trust filed a three-count complaint against the Owners on March 23, 2007, alleging that the Owners' use of the Protected Parcel for commercial purposes interfered with the Trust's Conservation Easement and seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Owners.The Owners filed a two-count counterclaim.

[¶ 9] The Trust filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the court(Humphrey, C.J.) granted on June 29, 2007, after a hearing.On November 30, 2007, the State moved to intervene on behalf of the Trust, although it did not accompany its motion with a complaint.On December 18, 2007, and January 3, 2008, the parties, including the State, engaged, unsuccessfully, in mediation pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 16B.On January 2, 2008, the court(Cole, J.) granted the State's motion to intervene.The State filed its complaint against the Owners on April 14, 2008.

[¶ 10] The Owners then filed a motion to dismiss the Trust's and the State's respective complaints and to vacate the court's prior orders in the case, arguing for the first time that the court lacked jurisdiction because the parties had not engaged in pre-litigation mediation as required by the Conservation Easement deed.The Trust and the State filed a joint motion for summary judgment on May 20, 2008.After a hearing on the motions, the court denied the Owners' motions to dismiss and vacate.The court granted the Trust and State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Conservation Easement does not permit commercial use of the Protected Parcel as intended by the Owners.The court also permanently enjoined the Owners from "any collateral use of the Easement Parcel, recreation or otherwise by patrons or attendees of permitted commercial activities on the Front Parcel."The Owners filed this appeal.

II.LEGAL ANALYSIS

A.The State's Intervention

[¶ 11] The Owners contend that the court erred in granting the State's motion to intervene in this action, arguing that, contrary to the State's (and Trust's) contention, 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D)(2008)and5 M.R.S. § 194(2008) do not authorize the State's intervention.The Owners also argue that, because 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D) was enacted in 2007, four years after the Conservation Easement was created, it does not apply and that its application in this case is fundamentally unfair and alters the rights of the parties to the Conservation Easement in violation of the Contract Clauses in the Maine and United States Constitutions.

[¶ 12]"We review statutory interpretation de novo as a question of law."Costain v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A.,2008 ME 142, ¶ 5, 954 A.2d 1051, 1052.We do not look to legislative history or other extraneous aids to interpret a statute when the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, seeLiberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner,2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94, 99, and we interpret a statute to "avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results,"Costain,2008 ME 142, ¶ 5, 954 A.2d at 1053(quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 13] M.R. Civ. P. 24(a) permits a party to intervene as of right when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene.The State moved to intervene pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 478and5 M.R.S. § 194.

[¶ 14]Title 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D) provides:

1.Action or intervention.An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought or intervened in by:

....

D.The Attorney General; except that the Attorney General may initiate action seeking enforcement of a conservation easement only when the parties designated as having the right to do so under the terms of the conservation easement:

(1) Are no longer in legal existence;

(2) Are bankrupt or insolvent;

(3) Cannot be contacted after reasonable diligence to do so; or

(4) After 90...