Wines v. Woods

• Decision Date: 26 January 1887
• Docket Number: 11,973
• Citation: Wines v. Woods, 109 Ind. 291, 10 N. E. 399 (Ind. 1887)
• Parties: Wines v. Woods, Executor
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

10 N.E. 399

109 Ind. 291

Wines v. Woods, Executor

No. 11,973

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 26, 1887

From the Kosciusko Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed.

C Clemans, for appellant.

W. S Marshall, H. S. Biggs and J. W. Cook, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, C. J.

The appellee's intestate, during life, executed to the appellant a warranty deed for land in the State of Wisconsin, and the action is based upon that deed. The deed as it appears in the record is perfect, except that no certificate of acknowledgment is annexed.

The failure of the officer to annex the certificate of acknowledgment did not vitiate the instrument, for a deed is good between the parties, although not entitled to record, without an acknowledgment before an officer of its execution. Bever v. North, 107 Ind. 544, 8 N.E. 576. A prima facie case is made by the plaintiff, in such an action as this, when the deed is introduced, and evidence is given showing that the grantor had no title to the land which he assumed to convey.

The contention of the appellee's counsel is, that although it should be conceded that some errors occurred on the trial, still, there can be no reversal, because these errors did not affect the merits of the case. The ground upon which this argument is placed is, as we understand counsel, that the party in possession of the land and claiming to own it has no title, because he knew before his purchase that his grantor had no title, and with this knowledge accepted a quitclaim deed. The evidence upon this point is, that a man named Ringle wrote the appellee's intestate, Daniel Shoup, enquiring about the land, and in answer Shoup wrote him that he had sold all his land in Wisconsin. In answer to Shoup's letter Ringle wrote, in substance, as follows: "There is no deed on record from you conveying the land, you can have no trouble in giving a quitclaim deed of the land. I want the receipt for the tax of 1859. A quitclaim deed will do me no good unless I also have this receipt. There is no deed from you conveying the land on record, and I was of the opinion that the title was in you. I will, however, accept your title for what it is worth." We have no doubt that the counsel is right in assuming that Ringle bought the land with notice that Shoup had previously sold it, and that if Ringle's title depended solely on the conveyance received from Shoup, he would have no title as against the appellee. A notice to one who receives a quitclaim, that the land has been sold, is sufficient to deprive him of title as against a prior unrecorded deed held by a purchaser in good faith. But, while we thus far agree with appellee's counsel, we can not yield to the conclusion deduced, for that conclusion rests wholly upon the assumption that the only title asserted by Ringle rests on Shoup's quitclaim deed, and this assumption is unauthorized. We are, therefore, required to go further into the case.

The appellant gave in evidence an act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, passed in 1867, authorizing the county of Marathon, in which the land was situated that Shoup assumed to convey, to transfer land to the State in payment of the county's indebtedness. The introduction of this act was followed by the introduction of other statutory provisions in the laws of Wisconsin, and by an offer to introduce a certificate, or patent, issued under that law to Gustave Mueller on the 27th day of June, 1873. We incline to the opinion that the patent would have been admissible had the appellant proved that the land was owned by the county of Marathon, and was within the provisions of the statute, but we do not find any proof of these facts in the record; on the contrary, we find that the appellant himself introduced a deed from William C. Graves to Shoup, executed on the 16th day of April, 1858. The trial court could not, in the face of this deed, assume that the particular parcel of land was one which the county of Marathon had a right to convey under the provisions of the statute of Wisconsin. In...