Winfield v. O'Brien
| Decision Date | 08 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-11891-FDS |
| Parties | KEITH WINFIELD, Petitioner, v. STEVEN J. O'BRIEN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Keith Winfield was convicted in Middlesex Superior Court on November 15, 2007, of two counts of forcible rape of a child under the age of sixteen, one count of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and one count of assault and battery of a child causing serious bodily injury. He is currently serving a term of life imprisonment. After the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed his conviction, he filed a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Winfield sets forth two grounds for relief in his petition. First, he contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, he contends that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated when he was precluded from impeaching the victim's mother with evidence of her pending criminal charges. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will bedenied.
The facts surrounding the crime that led to petitioner's conviction are set out in the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court. See Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 716 (2010). Only the basic facts are set forth here.
The victim was born in 2003. She was Winfield's niece. On the morning of October 13, 2005, the victim's mother dropped her off at Winfield's home for babysitting. Prior to dropping her off, her mother had changed her diaper and noticed nothing about her genital or anal area. During the day, she made four calls to Winfield's home. Winfield answered the phone twice. The first time, he informed the mother that his wife had gone to get coffee and would return soon; the second time, he assured her that the victim was fine.
The victim's grandmother picked her up that afternoon. At the time, both Winfield and his wife were home and the victim was sleeping. After a short time, the victim woke up and ran to her grandmother. She cried the entire way home. Once inside the home, her grandmother changed her diaper and found that her vaginal area was red and puffy.
The victim's mother returned that evening and changed her diaper twice. During the first diaper change, the victim cried and appeared to be in pain. Her genital area was very red. During the second diaper change, the mother noticed that the victim's vaginal and anal areas were bleeding and her skin in the area was peeling.
The following morning, the mother took the victim to a doctor, who opined that the victim had been raped. At the doctor's suggestion, the mother took the victim to Children'sHospital. A team of physicians examined the victim and concluded that she had second and third degree burns on and inside her genitals and anus, as well as three tears, which collectively indicated impalement by a hot instrument. In addition, she had multiple bruises on her head, nipple, and back. A CAT scan revealed a large skull fracture on the back of her head and bleeding near her brain. She was transferred to Shriners Hospital for Children, where she remained for a month.
On October 15, 2005, Winfield met with an emergency response worker and a detective. He stated that he was home from October 11 to 13, while his wife was babysitting the victim. He confirmed that they were the only caretakers. He also claimed that he changed the victim's diaper once, found that her vaginal area was swollen, called his wife, and then concluded that it was a diaper rash.
On November 7, 2005, Winfield went to the police station where he was interviewed. He stated that he was home on October 13 and there were no visitors. He was alone with the victim and his own eight-month-old daughter for nearly an hour in the middle of the day. He admitted that he did not get along with the victim's mother and stated that he "would have never, ever, ever, ever wanted to take on another child."
On November 15, 2007, a state-court jury convicted Winfield of two counts of forcible rape of a child under the age of sixteen, one count of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and one count of assault and battery of a child causing serious bodily injury. The judge sentenced him to concurrent life terms on the rape charges and concurrent nine to ten year sentences on each the remaining charges.
Winfield appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. He contended that the judge erred by (1) denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case; (2) permitting inflammatory photographs of the victim's injuries into evidence; (3) redacting a portion of his taped statement to the police; and (4) refusing to allow him to impeach the victim's mother for bias with her pending criminal charges. The Appeals Court rejected these arguments and affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court denied his application for leave to obtain further appellate review. He filed the petition for habeas corpus on October 26, 2011.
A federal court may not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus for a person in state custody unless the state court decision is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the decision was an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Factual determinations made by the state court are presumed correct and a petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumption of correctness applies to both state trial and appellate court factual determinations. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).
Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this contention, he argues that the Commonwealth's case was based upon circumstantial evidence, and thatAppeals Court's finding as to the sufficiency of the evidence required impermissibly great inferential leaps. Specifically, petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator, rather than his wife.
In determining whether evidence is sufficient to uphold a conviction, the relevant constitutional question is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). As here, when a state court has reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the appropriate constitutional standard, a federal court may overturn that decision "only if the state court decision was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011); see also Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (). However, when "the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, [the] court must reverse the conviction." O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 301 (1st Cir. 2009) and United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995).
Here, the Appeals Court determined that "the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, permitted a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the indictments." Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 723 (2010). The Appeals Court concluded that the evidence presented against defendant allowed a rational jury to find him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cavazos, 132 S.Ct. at 4; Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319.
As the Appeals Court noted, the primary evidence presented against defendant includedboth medical evidence of the victim's injuries and his recorded police interview. First, the Appeals Court found that the jury could have concluded that the burns and skull fractures were inflicted around midday on October 13, 2005, and that the victim likely would have cried when she suffered these injuries. Based on defendant's recorded statements, he was home alone around midday with the victim and his eight-month-old daughter on the day the injuries were inflicted. As a result, defendant had access to the victim at the time the injuries were inflicted without the presence of another adult to hear the victim cry. Second, in addition to access, defendant had the means to commit the crime, as a small curling iron was found in the bathroom. As the Appeals Court noted, the jury could have found that the victim's burns were consistent with the same shape and size of a small hot curling iron. Third, the jury also properly considered the fact that defendant expressed displeasure over the presence of the victim in his home. He stated in his interview that he never wanted his wife to care for the victim and he admitted that he disliked the victim's mother. The jury could thus reasonably infer that defendant was hostile towards the victim, which is relevant to motive. Under the circumstances, the Appeals Court was not "objectively unreasonable" in its determination that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the...
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