Wingard v. Louisiana
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-122-EWD CONSENT |
| Parties | Jarius WINGARD v. State of LOUISIANA, THROUGH the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Joshua Michael Palmintier, Degravelles Palmintier, Baton Rouge, LA, Benjamin Boone Treuting, Palmintier Law Group, Baton Rouge, LA, for Jarius Wingard.
Phyllis Esther Glazer, Louisiana Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Baton Rouge, LA, for State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety & Corrections, Darrell Vannoy, Randall K. Holden, Brian Smith, Ryan Woolfolk.
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss and For a More Definite Statement1 ("DPSC's Motion"), filed by Defendants the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC") and Ryan Woolfolk2 ("Woolfolk"), and a Motion to Dismiss and For a More Definite Statement3 ("Vannoy's Motion"), filed by Defendant Darrel Vannoy ("Vannoy"). Plaintiff opposes the Motions.4 DPSC and Woolfolk have filed a reply memorandum.5 Oral argument is not necessary.6
As explained further, DPSC's Motion will be granted in part, dismissing some claims with prejudice. As to the claims dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint, providing more factual information to support those claims, if possible. The Vannoy Motion, which asserts the same arguments as those asserted in DPSC's Motion, will be denied as moot since DPSC's Motion will be granted.7
On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola ("LSP"), filed this action in the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the Parish of West Feliciana asserting federal and state law constitutional and tort claims against DPSC, LSP, Vannoy in his official capacity, and Assistant Warden Brent Thompson ("Thompson") (the "Supervisory Defendants"), as well as Captain Randall K. Holden ("Holden"), Sergeant Brian Smith ("Smith"), and Woolfolk (the "Acting Defendants").8 DPSC removed the case to this Court on February 25, 2021 asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.9 All properly-named Defendants have been served and have appeared.10
Plaintiff's version of the circumstances giving rise to this case are as follows: On January 20, 2020, Plaintiff was escorted by Smith and Woolfolk to a cell in Camp C, Tiger 1 of LSP for the purpose of being double bunked with another inmate. Plaintiff and the other inmate objected to the double bunking because both had previously been placed on suicide watch after acting on suicidal ideations. Smith and Woolfolk then escorted Plaintiff to another cell housing another inmate on suicide watch. Again, both objected to the double-bunking.11
At about this same time, Holden was operating the "pinbox" that controlled the cell door locking mechanisms. Holden unlocked the door of cell #12, and the unrestrained prisoner housed in that cell began to exit. Smith and Woolfolk pushed that inmate back into cell #12 without incident and Holden closed and locked the cell door. During this event, Plaintiff remained fully restrained by shackles and hand cuffs and was compliant with orders to remain where he was standing, all while wearing a white paper suicide gown. However, Holden ran down the tierway, yelling and ordering Plaintiff to get on the ground.12 Plaintiff attempted to get on the ground but had difficulty because of the restraints and gown. Holden then tackled Plaintiff with "extreme force." Once Plaintiff was pinned to the ground, Holden "repeatedly bash[ed]" Plaintiff's head into the floor, and then dragged Plaintiff by his restraint belt into nearby cell #9, which resulted in Plaintiff being double bunked with another inmate on suicide watch.13 Holden then ordered Plaintiff to the cell bars and, despite Plaintiff's restraints, sprayed Plaintiff's face and body with several bursts of chemical agent (altogether, the "Incident").14
Plaintiff contends that Smith and Woolfolk observed the Incident but failed to intervene, and that Holden, Smith and Woolfolk failed to activate their body cameras and/or security beepers. Plaintiff contends that footage of the Incident exists, or did exist, until these Defendants destroyed or altered it.15 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants initially refused and/or failed to secure medical treatment for Plaintiff's injuries. However, Plaintiff was eventually taken for treatment after the next officer shift, which treatment was inadequate. Despite subsequent requests, Plaintiff was allegedly prevented from seeing a doctor for several days.16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants also hindered Plaintiff's attempt to contact his family and attorneys.17 Plaintiff claims that all procedural and administrative remedies were exhausted18 and that the suit is timely.19
While not entirely clear, Plaintiff has asserted several claims against Defendants in this proceeding, including Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force, failure to intervene and deliberate medical indifference; § 1983 conspiracy claims; related claims under the Louisiana constitution; and tort claims under La. Civ. Code art. 2315 sounding in negligence, e.g. , failure to train, failure to hire, etc.20 Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, including punitive damages and attorney fees.21
DPSC's Motion takes issue with the viability and specificity of several of the claims for damages, as many lack adequate supporting facts. Specifically, DPSC's Motion seeks dismissal, with prejudice, of: (1) Plaintiff's claims against LSP; (2) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against DPSC and Vannoy; and (3) Plaintiff's state law claims against Vannoy, in his official capacity.22 DPSC's Motion seeks a more definite statement of: (1) Plaintiff's claim under " 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, et seq."; (2) Plaintiff's "conspiracy" claims; and (3) the causes of action purportedly raised in paragraphs 36-38 of the Complaint.23 DPSC's Motion also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's double bunking claim, as well as a " Schultea reply" addressing Woolfolk's assertion of qualified immunity in response to Plaintiff's claim that Woolfolk failed to intervene.24
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,25 the United States Supreme Court addressed the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."26 "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ "27 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."28 It follows that, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ "29 "Where a Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ "30
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint."31 While factual assertions are presumed to be true, "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" alone are not enough to withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6) motion.32
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court is authorized to dismiss an action or claim by a prisoner who is asserting a claim against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity if the court is satisfied that the action or claim is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.33 The statute is intended to afford the Court the ability to separate those claims that may have merit from those that lack a basis in law or in fact.
To determine whether the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A, courts apply the same standard used for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.34 Accordingly, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.35
Defendants seeks dismissal of LSP on the grounds that, as a prison, it is not a juridical entity capable of being sued.36 Plaintiff agrees that LSP is not a juridical entity capable of being sued and thus does not oppose dismissal of his claims against LSP.37 The parties correctly assert that LSP is not a juridical entity capable of being sued under Louisiana law.38 Therefore, DPSC's Motion will be granted, dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims against LSP in their entirety and with prejudice.
DPSC and Vannoy seek dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them, contending that they are not "persons" capable of being sued for monetary damages under § 1983 because DPSC is an executive branch agency of the State and because Vannoy is a state official sued in his...
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