Wingate v. Fulford
| Decision Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1700,19-1700 |
| Citation | 987 F.3d 299 |
| Parties | George WINGATE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Scott FULFORD ; Dimas Pinzon, Defendants - Appellees, and S. A. Fulford, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Victor M. Glasberg, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Alexander Francuzenko, COOK CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Bernadette E. Valdellon, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael D. Arena, COOK CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Richardson joined. Judge Richardson wrote a concurring opinion.
George Wingate III was driving down Jefferson Davis highway around 2 a.m. one morning when his check engine light came on. Mr. Wingate pulled his car over near a streetlight to look under the hood. A Stafford County deputy patrolling the area, Deputy Scott Fulford, saw Mr. Wingate's vehicle. Suspecting the car was disabled, Deputy Fulford pulled behind Wingate, hoping to help. But the officer's roadside assistance quickly transformed into an investigatory stop, then an arrest, after Mr. Wingate declined to comply with Deputy Fulford's request for identification.
This appeal arises out of Mr. Wingate's civil suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Virginia common law, challenging his stop, arrest, and subsequent prosecution. The district court denied Mr. Wingate's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Deputy Fulford and Lt. Pinzon ("the Officers") on each of Mr. Wingate's claims. On appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a trial on damages.
The parties do not dispute the material facts of this case.
In the early morning hours of April 25, 2017, Mr. Wingate was driving southbound on Jefferson Davis Highway in Stafford County, Virginia. At some point between 1 and 2 a.m., Wingate's check-engine light came on. He pulled his car off to the side of the road and parked it in front of the CarStar car dealership, under an illuminated streetlight. Mr. Wingate left his lights on, popped the hood, and began to investigate. As a former mechanic, he believed that he might be able to resolve the problem. Mr. Wingate circled around to the trunk of his car where he pulled out a bag of tools. He placed the bag on the front passenger seat, then began to look under the hood. Finding nothing, Mr. Wingate reentered his car and tried to diagnose the issue using an automotive code reader that connected to his phone via Bluetooth. The reader later indicated that one of his engine's cylinders was misfiring.
Around this time, Deputy Fulford was driving northbound on the highway. The deputy saw Mr. Wingate's vehicle off to the side of the road. Deputy Fulford was concerned that the car was "disabled," so he turned around, pulled behind Mr. Wingate, and began to get out of the car. Upon seeing the patrol vehicle, Mr. Wingate got out of his car and walked over to greet the officer. Deputy Fulford asked Mr. Wingate what was going on and where he was going. Mr. Wingate explained that he was driving to his girlfriend's house in Stafford but had experienced some car trouble along the way.
Deputy Fulford then requested Wingate's identification. After Mr. Wingate asked why he had to disclose his identity, Deputy Wingate activated his mic and requested backup. The two men then engaged in the following exchange:
Lt. Pinzon arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. Lt. Pinzon informed Mr. Wingate that there had been "a lot of catalytic converter thefts in [the] area," and noted, "It's kind of weird, it's 2 o'clock in the morning, and you're out here on the side of the road in the same area where the businesses have all been hit." Id. at 1:43:32–45. Mr. Wingate responded, "Well, I haven't committed any crimes." Id. at 1:43:45–49. Undeterred, the Officers again asked for Mr. Wingate's ID. Id. at 1:43:50–52, 1:44:11–13. Mr. Wingate again asked why he needed to identify himself. Id. at 1:44:13–1:45:05. Eventually, the Officers attempt to arrest him, citing Stafford County Ordinance § 17–7(c). Id. at 1:45:04–1:47:20. Section 17–7(c) makes it a crime to refuse an officer's request for identification "if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety requires such identification." J.A. 322.
Mr. Wingate resisted the Officers’ attempts to place him in handcuffs. Eventually, he broke free from the Officers’ hold and began to flee, running across the street and out of the dash camera's frame. Id. 1:47:18. Mr. Wingate stopped when Lt. Pinzon drew his Taser and pointed it in his direction. Lt. Pinzon then grabbed Mr. Wingate by the shirt, ordered him to the ground, and "threw him to the ground with one arm when [Mr. Wingate] didn't comply." J.A. 291. After a brief struggle, Lt. Pinzon and Deputy Fulford put Mr. Wingate in handcuffs and placed him in the back of the patrol car. The Officers searched Mr. Wingate's car incident to arrest. The search revealed a bag of tools, a pair of gloves, and a title certificate. Mr. Wingate did not, however, have ramps or a Sawzall—tools commonly used to steal catalytic converter belts. J.A. 114, 138.
Mr. Wingate was criminally charged for failing to identify himself; intentionally preventing a law enforcement officer from lawfully arresting him; knowingly attempting to intimidate or impede a law-enforcement official; and possessing an open certificate of title.1 But on the date set for trial, the prosecuting attorney assigned to the case dropped all of the charges. The attorney informed Deputy Fulford that defense counsel "had brought up some case law that made [§ 17–7(c)] appear possibly unconstitutional." J.A. 62. Deputy Fulford's understanding was that they dropped the charges because "they didn't want to risk losing [the ordinance]." J.A. 63.
Mr. Wingate filed this suit in July 2018, asserting claims against Deputy Fulford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Virginia common law. Mr. Wingate then amended his complaint to join Lt. Pinzon as a defendant. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the Officers’ motion and denied Mr. Wingate's. Mr. Wingate timely appealed.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard applied by the district court. Henry v. Purnell , 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc ). Summary judgment is only appropriate if "no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ordinarily, when a district court's grant of summary judgment disposes of cross-motions for summary judgment, "we consider each motion separately on its own merits," resolving "all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion." Id. Here, however, the parties do not present competing versions of the facts but competing views of the law. Thus, we review the propriety of the district court's rulings on both motions in tandem.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. These protections extend to "brief investigatory stops ... that fall short of traditional arrest."
United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). For investigatory stops, "the balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause." Id. To that end, law enforcement need only reasonable, articulable, and particularized suspicion that someone is engaged in criminal activity to justify these brief interactions. United States v. Sprinkle , 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
That this standard requires less than probable cause does not render its burden illusory. "[A]n officer who stops and detains a person for investigative questioning ‘must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ " Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). We have often emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires particularity—"a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." See , e.g. , United States v. Massenburg , 654 F.3d 480, 486 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Slocumb , 804 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Griffin , 589 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009). Although the need for reasonable and particularized suspicion is "somewhat abstract," Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, it unquestionably requires more than "an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Slocumb , 804 F.3d at 682.
To be sure, Deputy Fulford did not trigger the Fourth Amendment's protections by merely driving up to Mr. Wingate to provide roadside...
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