Wingert v. Hradisky
| Citation | 131 N.E.3d 535,433 Ill.Dec. 177,2019 IL 123201 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 123201 |
| Parties | Noah WINGERT, a Minor, BY His Mother and Next Friend, Cassandra Lee WINGERT, Appellant, v. Patsy A. HRADISKY, Special Administrator of the Estate of Kevin Jatczak, Deceased, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
¶ 1 This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County finding section 25(b)(2) of the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Act) ( 740 ILCS 57/25(b)(2) (West 2016) ) facially unconstitutional.
¶ 4 We begin with an overview of the Act. Effective in 1996 (see Pub. Act 89-293 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996) ), the Act mirrors the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act that was provided to state legislators in the early 1990s by the American Legislative Exchange Council. Rosemary E. Williams, Trial of Suit Under United States' Drug Dealer Liability Acts, 145 Am Jur. Trials 1, § 2 (Sept. 2018 Update); see Model Drug Dealer Liability Act (Model Act) (Model Act , Model DDLA.com, http://www.modelddla.com/Model_Act.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CA9Y-X9JP] ). At least 18 states and one territory of the United States have adopted the Model Act or some version of it. Williams, supra , § 2.
¶ 5 The stated purposes of the Act are (1) "to provide a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community injured as a result of illegal drug use," (2) "to shift, to the extent possible, the cost of the damage caused by the existence of the illegal drug market in a community to those who illegally profit from that market," (3) "to establish the prospect of substantial monetary loss as a deterrent to those who have not yet entered into the illegal drug distribution market," and (4) "to establish an incentive for drug users to identify and seek payment for their own drug treatment from those dealers who have sold drugs to the user in the past." 740 ILCS 57/5 (West 2016).
¶ 6 Persons who may bring an action for damages include:
¶ 7 The Act identifies two potential defendants. Under section 25(b)(1), a plaintiff may seek damages from "[a] person who knowingly distributed, or knowingly participated in the chain of distribution of, an illegal drug that was actually used by the individual drug user." Id. § 25(b)(1). The parties here refer to section 25(b)(1) as the "Direct Liability Provision."
¶ 9 The "place of illegal drug activity" referenced in section 25(b)(2)(A) is defined as "each Illinois Representative District in which the individual possesses or uses an illegal drug or in which the individual resides, attends school, or is employed during the period of the individual's illegal drug use, unless the defendant proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 15.
¶ 10 The "illegal drug market target community of the defendant," also referenced in section 25(b)(2)(A), is determined by the degree of the defendant's participation in the illegal drug market, as measured by the amount of drugs possessed or distributed. Id. § 40. Where the defendant's participation in the illegal drug market involves an amount of drugs at the lower end of the statutory scale—a so-called "Level 1 offense" (id. § 15)—the illegal drug market target community is the "Illinois Representative District in which the defendant's place of participation is situated." Id. § 40(1). As the degree of participation in the drug market increases based on the amount of drugs possessed or distributed, the illegal drug market target community also increases in size. Thus, where a defendant's participation in the illegal drug market constitutes a "Level 4 offense," the highest level (id. § 15), the illegal drug market target community of the defendant is the entire state. Id. § 40(4).
¶ 11 Because section 25(b)(2) requires that the area or community in which the illegal drug activity of the individual drug user took place must be within the area or community in which the defendant drug dealer operated, the parties here refer to section 25(b)(2) as the "Area Liability Provision."
¶ 12 A plaintiff may recover both economic and noneconomic damages proximately caused by an individual's illegal drug use, as well as exemplary damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs of suit. Id. § 25(c). A person subject to liability under the Act has a right of contribution against another person subject to liability under the Act. Id. § 55.
¶ 13 Proof of the defendant's participation in the illegal drug market must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, while all other elements must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 60(a). A person against whom recovery is sought who has a criminal conviction under state drug laws or under the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Control Act of 1970 ( 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. ) "is estopped from denying participation in the illegal drug market." 740 ILCS 57/60(b) (West 2016).
¶ 14 The Act generally requires that a claim must be brought not more than two years after accrual of the cause of action (id. § 70) and contains a severability provision pursuant to section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2016) ). 740 ILCS 57/85 (West 2016).
¶ 15 The General Assembly made numerous findings, set forth in section 10 of the Act, in which it recognized, inter alia , the cost to individuals, families, employers, and society of coping with the illegal drug trade; the necessity of using the civil justice system to provide an avenue of compensation for those injured by the marketing and distribution of illegal drugs; and the barriers to recovery for injured parties under existing tort law. Id. § 10.
¶ 16 With this overview of the Act, we turn to the litigation at issue.
¶ 18 This case arises out of the death of Michael Neuman from a drug overdose on June 9, 2012. Plaintiff is Neuman's minor son, Noah Wingert, by his mother and next friend, Cassandra Lee Wingert. Defendant is Patsy A. Hradisky, special administrator of the Estate of Kevin Jatczak, deceased.2 Plaintiff sued Jatczak for damages under the provisions of the Act.
¶ 19 Count I of the fourth amended complaint alleged that, on or about June 9, 2012, and prior thereto, Jatczak owned certain premises in the city of Berwyn, at which he also resided; Jatczak distributed and/or sold Neuman and others illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, and opiates, at the premises; Jatczak used illegal drugs at the premises with Neuman and others; Jatczak knowingly participated in the illegal drug market; and as a direct and proximate result of the use, consumption, and/or distribution of illegal drugs, Neuman was then and there severely injured, resulting in his death on June 9, 2012. The complaint alleged that Noah Wingert has been permanently deprived of his father's support, love, society, affection, companionship, and services and has suffered emotional distress and mental anguish.
¶ 20 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ), asserting that the Act violates the due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions by imposing an irrebuttable presumption of causation that has no rational connection between the fact requiring proof—the defendant's knowing participation in the illegal drug market—and the fact presumed—the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. Defendant also argued that the Act violates due process by utilizing a market share theory of liability purportedly rejected by this court in Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 137 Ill.2d 222, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).3
¶ 21 The trial court denied defendant's motion as to section 25(b)(1) (the Direct Liability Provision) but granted defendant's motion as to section 25(b)(2) (the Area Liability Provision). The court found section 25(b)(2) violates due process and severed it from the Act. The trial court made no Rule 18 findings at that time. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006).
¶ 22 Plaintiff was later granted leave to file a fifth amended complaint, realleging previously dismissed counts to preserve the same for appeal. Count I against Jatczak remained the same but was necessarily limited by the court's constitutional ruling to a claim under section 25(b)(1) of the Act. As to that count, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff failed to present any evidence that could support a finding that Jatczak knowingly provided or distributed the illegal drugs to Neuman that caused his overdose. Plaintiff responded that defendant's summary judgment motion should be denied because section 25(b)(1) of the Act does not require proof that Jatczak provided the drugs that caused Neuman's overdose. All that is required, plaintiff argued, is that Jatczak knowingly...
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