Wingfield v. Jacques

• Decision Date: 13 March 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-cv-00722-CMA
• Parties: JOSHUA E. WINGFIELD, Applicant, v. TERRY JACQUES, Warden, A.V.C.F., and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

JOSHUA E. WINGFIELD, Applicant, v. TERRY JACQUES, Warden, A.V.C.F., andTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-00722-CMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

March 13, 2020

District Judge Christine M. Arguello

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Applicant, Joshua E. Wingfield, has filed pro se an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. # 1) challenging the validity of his criminal convictions in the District Court of Arapahoe County, Colorado. Having considered the Respondents' Answer (Doc. # 52), Mr. Wingfield's Reply (Doc. # 63), and the state court record, the Court denies the Application.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2009, Mr. Wingfield was convicted by a jury in Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 07CR1653 of possession of a precursor for methamphetamine; possession of chemicals or supplies to manufacture a Schedule II controlled substance; and, conspiracy to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II controlled substance. (State Court Record ("R"), Court File, at 1264).¹ He was adjudicated a habitual criminal and sentenced to an aggregate 48-year prison term. (Id.). The Colorado Court of Appeals summarized Mr. Wingfield's trial court proceedings, in relevant part, as follows:

The police found Wingfield hiding in the bathroom of an Aurora motel room. In the room, officers found the tools and ingredients of a methamphetamine laboratory, including boxes of pseudoephedrine, coffee filters filled with pill binders, a hot plate, cookware, a propane torch, sandwich bags, rubber tubing, a digital scale, potassium iodide, acidic liquid tape, a funnel, and a pickle jar.

The prosecution charged Wingfield with (1) possession of a precursor for methamphetamine or amphetamine; (2) possession of chemicals or supplies to manufacture a schedule II controlled substance; (3) conspiracy to manufacture and distribute a schedule II controlled substance; (4) conspiracy to commit possession of chemicals or supplies to manufacture a schedule II controlled substance; and (5) solicitation to commit possession of a precursor for methamphetamine or amphetamine.

Prior to trial, in July 2007, the court ordered Wingfield to undergo a competency evaluation. In October 2007, after reviewing the competency evaluation, which concluded that Wingfield was competent to stand trial, the trial court found him competent to proceed. Wingfield subsequently requested, and was denied, a second competency hearing [on eight occasions between March 12, 2008 and December 15, 2009].

Wingfield represented himself at trial. Although he admitted being a longtime methamphetamine user and often associating with drug dealers, he claimed that he was in the motel room on the evening of his arrest not as part of a methamphetamine manufacturing operation, but rather to cook a meal for his friends.

The jury convicted him of counts one through three, but acquitted him of counts four and five. . . .

People v. Joshua Elliot Wingfield (Wingfield I), No. 12CA1286, (Colo. App. March 19, 2015) (unpublished) (Doc. # 10-5 at 3-5).

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Wingfield's convictions. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court denied Mr. Wingfield's petition for certiorari review on September 21, 2015. (Doc. # 10-6).

Mr. Wingfield filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to Colo.Crim.P. Rule 35(b) on October 10, 2015, which was denied by the state district court on March 29, 2016. (R., Court File at 1410). He did not file an appeal.

Mr. Wingfield then filed a motion for post-conviction relief on December 1, 2016, which was denied by the state district court in June 2017. (Id. at 1449, 1581). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in People v. Joshua Elliot Wingfield (Wingfield II), No. 17CA1566 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2019) (unpublished) (Doc. # 10-9). Mr. Wingfield did not request certiorari review by the Colorado Supreme Court.

Mr. Wingfield initiated this § 2254 proceeding on March 11, 2019. He asserts the following claims for relief in the Application:

(1) The state trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the court failed to appoint counsel in his post-conviction proceeding and denied his pro se state post-conviction motion summarily, given his mental disabilities. (Doc. # 1 at 4-5).

(2) Pre-trial counsel² was constitutionally ineffective in: (a) failing to conduct a sufficient investigation and present evidence to support Mr. Wingfield's standing to challenge the search of the motel room; and/or, failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges of possession and conspiracy to manufacture for insufficient evidence (id. at 5-9); (b) failing to discover and present evidence to challenge the admission of prior bad acts evidence (id. at 10-13); (c) failing to conduct a sufficient investigation and present evidence to support Mr. Wingfield's incompetence (id. at 13-14); and, (d) in waiving Mr. Wingfield's presence at the incompetency hearing. (Id. at 14-17).

(3) The trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by failing to give him an adequate advisement on his right to testify. (Id. at 9-10).

(4) The trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing defense counsel to waive his presence at the competency hearing. (Id. at 14-15).

(5) Direct appeal counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise the following issues on appeal: (a) trial court error in denying Mr. Wingfield's motion to suppress based on lack of standing; (b) trial court error in failing to grant Mr. Wingfield an extended proportionality review to challenge his sentence; (c) trial court error in denying Mr. Wingfield's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), and in forcing him to stand trial as an insane person; and, (d) juror misconduct/bias. (Id. at 17-26).

In a Pre-Answer Response, Respondents conceded the timeliness of the Application under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. # 10 at 6). Respondents further conceded that Mr. Wingfield exhausted state court remedies for claims 1 and 3. (Id. at 9, 14). Respondents argued, however, that sub-claims 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) were procedurally defaulted in the state courts. (Id. at 10-14, 15-16).

In a June 12, 2019 Order, the Court dismissed claim 5 of the Application, in its entirety, as procedurally barred. (Doc. # 24). The Court directed Respondents to file an Answer that fully addressed the merits of Mr. Wingfield's properly exhausted claims 1, 3 and 4, and whether the procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel allegations in sub-claims 2(a) through 2(d) have substantial merit under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 19 (2012).

Mr. Wingfield subsequently filed three motions to amend his § 2254 Application to assert additional claims. In a July 29, 2019 Order, the Court granted the motions in part, and denied them in part. (Doc. # 42). The Court deemed the § 2254 Application amended to include the following additional claims, which were exhausted in Wingfield I:

(6) the trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's due process rights when the court denied his request for a second competency evaluation and failed to comply with statutory safeguards necessary to ensure against the prosecution of an incompetent defendant.

(7) the trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's due process right to a fair trial by allowing him, while incompetent, to represent himself throughout the 7-day trial.

(8) the trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's constitutional right to a fair trial and to present a defense when it refused to grant him access to the discovery during trial.

(9) the trial court violated Mr. Wingfield's due process right to a fair trial when it forced him to defend against evidence admitted improperly pursuant to Colo. R. Evid. 404(b).

(Id. at 3-4, 9).

The Court also deemed the § 2254 Application amended to include the following claims, which were exhausted in Wingfield II:

(10) direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that Mr. Wingfield was entitled to an ameliorative effect of a subsequent change in the law related to the drug crimes for which he was convicted;

(11) direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the use of an attempted escape conviction as a predicate conviction for habitual offender sentencing; and

(12) direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to raise issues Mr. Wingfield wanted to pursue on appeal and in refusing to allow him to assist in the appeal.

(Id. at 6-9).

The Court addresses the properly exhausted claims below.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The applicant bears the burden of proof under § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).

The court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question the court must answer under § 2254(d)(1) is whether the applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id...