Winkelman v. Moses
| Decision Date | 07 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 12743,12743 |
| Citation | 279 N.W.2d 897 |
| Parties | Marguerite R. WINKELMAN, Applicant, v. The Honorable Scott C. MOSES, Circuit Court Judge, Respondent, and Kenneth E. Winkelman, Intervenor. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark Falk of Black Hills Legal Services, Rapid City, for applicant.
John J. Delaney of Amundson & Fuller, Lead, for intervenor.
DUNN, Justice (on reassignment).
This original proceeding involves a dispute over child custody. Marguerite R. Winkelman and Kenneth E. Winkelman were divorced on August 17, 1973, in Lawrence County, South Dakota. By the terms of the divorce decree, Mrs. Winkelman was given custody of the parties' two minor children, Norman and Karen Winkelman. Shortly after the divorce, Mrs. Winkelman and her two children moved to California. Since that time, Mrs. Winkelman and Karen have consistently and continually remained residents of California. In October of 1974, Mr. Winkelman brought an action for modification of the divorce decree. He requested that the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, South Dakota, grant him legal custody of both minor children. The circuit court modified the divorce decree by entering an order granting Mr. Winkelman custody of Norman and denying Mr. Winkelman's request for custody of Karen. After modification of the divorce decree, Mrs. Winkelman and Karen returned to California. Mrs. Winkelman obtained employment in California as a school teacher. Karen was enrolled in school in California and attended regularly from the time that she and Mrs. Winkelman moved to California until the summer of 1978. In August of 1978, Mr. Winkelman traveled to California and removed Karen from that state and returned her to South Dakota. Mr. Winkelman took this action without first notifying Mrs. Winkelman or school authorities and without any further order of the court. On September 6, 1978, Mr. Winkelman moved the circuit court in Lawrence County to issue an order temporarily restraining Mrs. Winkelman from removing Karen from the custody of Mr. Winkelman and required her to show cause why the amended divorce decree should not be further modified and amended to award full custody of Karen to Mr. Winkelman. The Honorable Scott C. Moses, a circuit judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, granted Mr. Winkelman's motion.
On or about September 27, 1978, Mrs. Winkelman filed a motion for dismissal of the action for modification of the divorce decree on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the South Dakota Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act embodied in SDCL 26-5. In December of 1978, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss. The Honorable Scott C. Moses entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order on February 9, 1979, denying Mrs. Winkelman's motion to dismiss. The basis for such denial was that the original divorce was granted in Lawrence County, the divorce decree was modified in Lawrence County, Karen Winkelman had attended school in South Dakota over five years ago, and Karen was currently in the state with Mr. Winkelman under the court's temporary restraining order.
On March 16, 1979, Mrs. Winkelman made application to this court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the circuit court in Lawrence County from exercising jurisdiction and from conducting any further proceedings in this custody matter. In her application for a writ of prohibition, Mrs. Winkelman contends that the circuit court in Lawrence County does not have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by modifying the initial divorce decree. Mrs. Winkelman argues that such jurisdiction is lacking as a result of the application of the South Dakota Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the Act). 1 SDCL 26-5. In order to move more fully understand the Act's application to and impact upon the circumstances present in this case, we must be cognizant of the underlying purposes of the Act. These purposes are enumerated in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 103-104, § 1 (the Model Act) as follows:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states (8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Accordingly, we will construe the Act to promote the general purposes as stated in the Model Act above.
The Act establishes two major bases for jurisdiction which can be applied alternatively. See, Model Act § 3, Commissioners' Note, p. 107. The first major basis for jurisdiction is home state jurisdiction embodied in SDCL 26-5-6 (Model Act § 3(a)(1)) as follows:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if this state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state.
The applicable definition under the present circumstances provides that the home state is that state "in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months." SDCL 26-5-5(5). Further, periods of temporary absence of any of the persons involved are counted as part of the six-month period. SDCL 26-5-5(5). We deem abductions or other unilateral removals of children without notice and approval, such as the removal of Karen from the custody of Mrs. Winkelman by Mr. Winkelman, the noncustodial parent, to be of no effect upon the residency of the child or to be within the classification of a "temporary absence" to be counted as part of the six-month home state period. It would be completely contrary to the intent and purpose of the Act for a noncustodial parent to qualify for the six-month home state period by abduction. California is the home state under the Act since Karen lived with her mother in California for a period of approximately five years immediately prior to the commencement of these proceedings. See, Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976); Wheeler v. District Court In & For City & Co. of Denver, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974); Clark v. Superior Ct. In And For County Of Mendocino, 73 Cal.App.3d 298, 140 Cal.Rptr. 709 (1977); Howard v. Gish, 36 Md.App. 446, 373 A.2d 1280 (1977). In fact, the provisions of the Act clearly provide that six months after Mrs. Winkelman and Karen moved to California this state was divested of jurisdiction to make a child custody determination as the home state. See, Bryant v. Bryant, 545 S.W.2d 938 (Ky.1977); Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 764 (Ky.App.1974).
The second major basis for jurisdiction involves significant connection and availability of evidence embodied in SDCL 26-5-7 (Model Act § 3(a)(2)) as follows:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
It would appear that Karen and Mr. Winkelman do have a significant connection with this state in that the initial divorce decree and modification of that decree were entered by the circuit court in Lawrence County; that Karen, her brother Norman, and Mr. Winkelman all reside in Lawrence County; that Karen attended school in South Dakota prior to moving to California with Mrs. Winkelman; and that Karen currently attends school in South Dakota because of the temporary restraining order referred to above. Further, substantial evidence is probably available in this state concerning Karen's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Therefore, the circuit court of Lawrence County, South Dakota, could meet the minimum requirements of jurisdiction under the Act to make the child custody determination by modification decree. 2 We find, however, that South Dakota is an inconvenient forum to make such a custody modification determination under the circumstances of this case and that the...
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