Winkelman v. Winkelman

• Decision Date: 06 April 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15145.,15145.
• Citation: 138 N.E. 637,307 Ill. 249
• Parties: WINKELMAN v. WINKELMAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

307 Ill. 249

138 N.E. 637

WINKELMAN

v.WINKELMAN et al.

No. 15145.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1923.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 1923.

Suit by John E. Winkelman against Laura M. Winkelman and others, to have a constructive trust in certain real estate declared. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Hugo M. Friend, judge.

Winston, Strawn & Shaw, of Chicago (John C. Slade and T. Irving Christopher, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Fassett, Abbott & Hughes, of Chicago (John E. Hughes and Edwin H. Abbott, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This appeal is prosecuted from a decree of the circuit court of Cook county declaring a constructive trust in certain real estate conveyed to one of appellants, Laura M. Winkelman, by her father, Frederick A. Winkelman, and his wife, Almira. The deed was executed September 27, 1918. Frederick A. and Almira Winkelman had three children-appellants Laura M. Winkelman and Augusta W. Davidson and appellee, John E. Winkelman. John and Augusta were not living at home with their parents when the deed was executed, but Laura was and always had been living with them, and continued to live with them until after the death of both parents, which occurred since the commencement of this suit. The property conveyed by the deed was of the value of about $100,000, and, with the exception of the grantor's homestead and a residence property in Washington, D. C., was all the real estate the grantor owned. The grantee was an unmarried woman 45 years old, was employed as a teacher at the Lewis Institute, in Chicago, and had always resided with her parents. Appellee was 37 years old at the time the deed was made and lived with his parents until August 31, 1918, when he was married and moved elsewhere. Augusta was older than the appellee and has resided in New York since 1903. The deed is a warranty deed conveying the premises to Laura M. Winkelman, daughter of the grantors and a single woman, ‘in her own right in fee simple, without participation of any possible future husband or any other persons or grantees whatsoever.’ The bill was filed February 7, 1921, and made Frederick A. Winkelman, Almira (his wife), Laura M. Winkelman, and Augusta Davidson defendants. Appellee's contention is that the conveyance was made to Laura in trust to be divided equally among the grantor's three children upon the death of himself and wife.

The bill alleges the grantor, at the time he made the deed, was 77 years old, had for months been sick, and was feeble in body and mind, by reason whereof he was easily susceptible to the influence and persuasions of his daughter Laura, and she corruptly contriving and intending to defraud and deprive complainant of any participation in or enjoyment of any of the property, by undue persuasion and importunity and the overpowering influence exercised by her, and by means of false and fraudulent representations, caused her father to execute to her a warranty deed without any consideration; that the property conveyed was of the value of $100,000; that grantor had two other children living besides the grantee, to whom he intended to devise equal shares in said property; that Laura was living with the grantor in his home, managing it for him and assisting him in business transactions, acting as his agent, and was also supervising the care and nursing of grantor, and he reposed in her complete confidence and trust; that, at the time the deed was made, complainant was absent from home and Augusta resided in New York, and that Laura had ample opportunity to exercise her influence over her father and abuse the trust and confidence he reposed in her.

The bill charges Laura well knew the intention of her father to devise the property in equal portions to his children, and, for the purpose of defrauding, complainant falsely represented to her father that if he would convey the property to her she would manage it for him, pay the net income to him for his life, and to his wife, he she should survive him, during her lifetime, and upon the death of the survivor she would pay the net income from the property in equal shares to herself, her sister and complainant, until such time as her brother and sister, or either of them, demanded a conveyance of an undivided one-third of the property, and immediately upon demand she would convey and deliver to them each a one-third interest; that such a conveyance, she represented would be advantageous to the grantor, and she impliedly threatened that if he did not make the deed she would leave his home. The bill, alleges that because of the grantor's age, health, situation, and confidential relation to his daughter, and because of her knowledge of his affairs, the absence of the other children from home, and because of the confidence he reposed in her, and because of his fear she would leave his home, leaving himself and wife alone in their old age, he was induced by said false and fraudulent representations and undue influence to convey the real estate to his daughter Laura; that the deed was not the act of the grantor, but was procured by the grantee through gross abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in her by the grantor, by which he was deceived and his will and intent were overpowered and controlled; that the complainant first learned the deed had been made about July, 1919, and immediately sought to discover the circumstances under which it had been made; that he disaffirmed the deed and demanded that Laura execute a declaration of trust and give an accounting of her management of the property; that he had notified Laura she had procured the deed by fraud and undue influence, and demanded she fulfill her representations made to the grantor, by means of which she procured the deed; that for a time Laura beguiled the complainant into delay by representing that she would straighten the matter out or adjust it to the satisfaction of all concerned, and finally, when he made an unequivocal demand that she execute a declaration of trust, she refused to do so and declared she was the exclusive and absolute owner of the property, whereupon he filed the bill. The bill prays that Laura be decreed to hold the title to the real estate in trust; that she be decreed to convey one-third of it to complainant and one-third to her sister Augusta, and that she account for the income. The bill alleged personal property was conveyed to Laura by her father at the same time the deed was made, but the court found and decreed against complainant on that proposition, and, as no question of personal property is involved in this appeal we have omitted the references in the bill to personal property.

Laura answered, denying all the charges of fraud and misrepresentation or that she solicited or persuaded her father to make the deed; denies he was feeble in mind and easily influenced; and avers he was in full possession of his mental faculties and capable to transact any business not requiring physical exertion, and was capable to exercise sound judgment in business matters and in the management and disposition of his property; avers the grantor made the deed on his own initiative, without persuasion, solicitation, or procurement of any kind, and denies she made any promises, representations, or false or fraudulent statements to induce him to make the deed; avers she has always lived with her father and mother, and has always enjoyed the trust, confidence, and affection of her father, such as usually exists between parent and child, but denies that she acted as her father's agent in the management of his business, or that any relation of trust or confidence existed between her and her father growing out of any relation of principal and agent; avers her father always managed and directed his own affairs; that he was engaged in the real estate business, was familiar with the management, handling, and conveyance of real estate and the drawing of deeds and other instruments affecting the title to real estate, and had, up to a short time before the date of the deed, maintained an office for the transaction of business; that about two months before the deed was executed he was afflicted with an illness which affected to some extent the use of his limbs, so that he was no longer able to move about as actively as before, but his illness in no manner affected or impaired his mental faculties or his capacity to manage and direct his business not requiring considerable physical exertion; that the deed, except the printed portions, was written by him and was executed and delivered on his own initiative, wholly without persuasion, solicitation, or importunities of respondent; that he knew the contents, the intent, purport, and effect of the deed, and that he intended it as an absolute conveyance of the property to her, and that it was made for a good and valuable consideration; denies the property was conveyed to her in trust, as alleged in the bill. The answer also relied on the statute of frauds (Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 59).

The grantor, Frederick A. Winkelman, answered the bill, denying he was feeble in mind and easily influenced by persuasions of Laura, and averring he was, when the deed was made, in full possession of his mental faculties, capable of exercising sound judgment in business matters and the management and disposition of his property; avers he drew the deed himself, except the printed portions; that he knew its contents, purport, and effect, and intended it to be an absolute conveyance to Laura, and there was no understanding or agreement made between himself and Laura, or intended to be made, whereby she should hold the property in trust, but, on the contrary, it was intended that she should hold the title absolutely in fee simple in her own right; that the deed was executed and delivered on his own initiative...