Winkle v. Kropp, Civ. A. No. 28558.

Citation279 F. Supp. 532
Decision Date02 February 1968
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 28558.
PartiesGeorge H. WINKLE, Petitioner, v. George A. KROPP, Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

D. Michael Kratchman, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. of Michigan, and Robert C. Goussy and William J. Mullaney, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

McCREE, Circuit Judge (sitting by designation).

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner, George H. Winkle, was convicted in a Michigan circuit court of carrying a concealed weapon and of having possession of burglar tools, and is presently incarcerated in the State Penitentiary of Southern Michigan. He contends that the evidence upon which his conviction was based was obtained through an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Respondent contends that the search which disclosed the damaging evidence was, by accepted judicial standards, a reasonable one, and that, in any event, the evidence was rendered admissible by the following proviso in the section of the Michigan Constitution which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures:

Provided, however, That the provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any court of criminal jurisdiction * * * any narcotic drug or drugs, any firearm, rifle, pistol, revolver, automatic pistol, machine gun, bomb, bomb shell, explosive, blackjack, slungshot, billy, metallic knuckles, gas-ejecting device, or any other dangerous weapon or thing, seized by any peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state. Mich.Const. of 1908 (as amended), Art. II, § 10.

Petitioner contends, with regard to this proviso, that it violates the Fourth Amendment and can therefore not be relied upon by state courts to render evidence admissible.

Winkle's conviction was affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Winkle, 358 Mich. 551, 100 N.W.2d 309 (1960). The petition for habeas corpus and certiorari which he filed in the Michigan courts was denied. He then sought Supreme Court review of this denial of post-conviction relief, and in Winkle v. Bannan, 368 U.S. 34, 82 S.Ct. 146, 7 L.Ed.2d 91 (1961), the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration in light of Mapp v. State of Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), which had been decided shortly after the filing of Winkle's petition for certiorari. On remand, the Michigan Supreme Court again denied relief. In re Winkle, 372 Mich. 292, 125 N.W.2d 875 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 645, 85 S.Ct. 611, 13 L.Ed.2d 551 (1965), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 967, 85 S.Ct. 1102, 14 L.Ed.2d 157 (1965). Having thus exhausted the remedies provided by the state, Winkle filed the instant petition.

The facts of the case are these. At approximately 2:00 a. m. on July 21, 1957, in Madison Township, Michigan, state policemen Golm and Pandol observed a car make a left turn against a red light and proceed to a motel 100 feet further along the highway. The car was driven by Winkle, who was accompanied by Lee Casteel. The troopers followed the Winkle car up to the motel driveway, honking twice. Winkle, who had previously telephoned the motel to inquire about accommodations, got out out of the car and walked toward the police car, and met Golm on the way. While Golm was conversing with Winkle, Pandol questioned Casteel.

Golm informed Winkle that the car had been stopped because it went through a red light. Golm asked for Winkle's driver's license, and Winkle displayed a Florida license bearing the name of George Henry Winkle. Winkle also displayed registration bearing the name of Henry Williams and explained that the car belonged to his brother-in-law. Winkle told Golm that he and his companion (whom he referred to as Philbrick, although his name was Casteel) intended to go fishing for 2 or 3 weeks around Detroit, and then return to Indianapolis, where he lived in a motel and his companion lived in an apartment on Central Avenue. In the meantime, Casteel told Pandol that he was going to see some girls in Toledo and return to Indianapolis in a few days, where he and Winkle shared an apartment on Central Avenue. Golm later questioned Casteel and Pandol questioned Winkle, and, although it is disputed, we accept the conclusion of the Michigan Supreme Court that both officers were aware of the conflicting stories.

Following the questioning, Pandol removed the keys from the ignition of the car and opened the trunk, where he found drills, chisels, keys, nitroglycerine, and other items ultimately introduced to prove Winkle's possession of burglar tools. Also found in the trunk was a bowling ball bag, which contained the 38-caliber revolver introduced to prove Winkle's possession of a concealed weapon.

When Golm was cross-examined at Winkle's trial, the following colloquy took place:

Q. Mr. Pandol came to the back of the car with the keys he had just obtained from the ignition, you had no reason to believe then that a felony was being committed in your presence?
A. Well, at the time I thought that something was strange, because of the two different stories that they had given us. We suspected something.
Q. I am talking about felony. You had no reason to suspect a felony was being committed in your presence?
A. No, not actually, no.
Q. And you had no information that a felony had been committed by the defendant?
A. That's correct.

And the following transpired during the cross-examination of Pandol:

Q. Let me ask now again: In your opinion, what is it that you expected to find by a search of that automobile to establish that particular violation?
A. When you search a car you never know what you are going to find.
Q. That isn't what I asked you, Trooper Pandol. Believe me, I know you never know what you are going to find when you start searching. That I know too.
But the question I want answered is: What, in your opinion, did you think you needed to find in order to be able to charge the occupants of that car with the violation that you saw committed in front of you?
Mr. Glaser: I am going to object to the use of the word, occupants. You certainly couldn't charge both occupants.
Q. The occupant, the driver of the car.
A. Nothing.
Mr. Glaser: You mean Mr. Winkle?
Mr. Tucker: Yes.
Q. (Continuing): What did you expect to find that would substantiate the fact that this misdemeanor had been committed by him?
A. Well, I wouldn't say we expected to find anything as far as the misdemeanor was concerned.
Q. All right. Fine. Is that your answer? I don't want to stop you, if you have got anything further to say.
A. As far as the red light was concerned, probably nothing.
Q. All you had to do at that point was to determine whether they were residents or non-residents and whether or not to issue a ticket or not issue a ticket, or not take them in or take them in?
A. Yes.
Q. Nothing in and about that automobile that would help you to determine whether or not a crime was committed, or a misdemeanor committed?
A. No, sir.
Q. Yet nevertheless you went up there without permission of anyone, took the keys out of the dash board, went back and opened the trunk of the car. Isn't that true?
A. That's correct.
Q. You didn't, I am assuming you didn't, get any permission from either Mr. Winkle or the now deceased passenger?
A. No, sir they were under arrest.
Q. Pardon?
A. They were under arrest.
Q. Had you apprised them of that?
A. No, I hadn't apprised them of it, as far as I was concerned, they were under arrest.
Q. Had you communicated that to them?
A. I hadn't directly told them they were under arrest, no.
Q. OK., that's your answer?
A. Yes.
Q. So without having apprised them of that fact, you still proceeded to make a complete and thorough search of that automobile?
A. That's right.
Q. Now, before this discovery that you made by reason of the search, nothing up to that point had created any suspicion on your part that these men were involved in the commission of a felony?
A. No, sir.
Q. It is only when you opened the trunk and saw its contents is when you made this discovery these men were in possession of contraband, as it were?
A. That's right.
Q. And it is then you placed them under arrest?
A. For the felony, yes.

In considering Winkle's contention that the search of the car violated his rights under the United States Constitution, attention will first be directed to the matter of the reasonableness of the search. Only if the search is found to be unreasonable need there be any discussion of the proviso of the Michigan Constitution set forth above.

I

Seven of the justices of the Michigan Supreme Court considered Winkle's request for post-conviction relief, and all seven determined that the warrantless search had met the standard of reasonableness established by the Fourth Amendment. The justices differed, however, in the reasoning upon which their common conclusion rested.1

Justice Kelly, with whom Justice O'Hara concurred, stated:

The facts and conflicting statements of petitioner and his associate were completely inconsistent and irreconcilable with those of innocent travelers on the highway.
These facts would not only justify a law-enforcing officer who was reasonably discreet and prudent to conduct the search that uncovered the nitroglycerin, detonator caps, and a complete set of burglar tools, plus a concealed weapon, but were of such a nature that any failure to
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9 cases
  • Sitz v. Department of State Police
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • September 14, 1993
    ...federal courts had not hesitated to reverse Michigan courts that failed to recognize the supremacy of federal law. In Winkle v. Kropp, 279 F.Supp. 532, 539 (ED Mich., 1968), rev'd on other grounds 403 F.2d 661 (CA6, 1968), Federal District Judge Wade McCree held:Whatever innovations might b......
  • People v. Barker
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • July 31, 1969
    ...Winkle case, Winkle was not entitled to relief because his conviction had become final before Mapp was decided.15 In Winkle v. Kropp (E.D.Mich.1968), 279 F.Supp. 532, reversed on other grounds (C.A.6, 1968), 403 F.2d 661, the court held that the Michigan exception is violative of the Fourth......
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    ...Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782; Staples v. United States (C.A.5) 320 F.2d 817; and Winkle v. Kropp (E.D.Mich.) 279 F. Supp. 532, vac. 403 F.2d 661, cert. den. 394 U.S. 1003, 89 S.Ct. 1600, 22 L.Ed. 2d 781, reh. den. 395 U.S. 941, 89 S.Ct. 2002, 23 L.Ed.2......
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