Winland v. Sec'y, DOC

Decision Date22 March 2019
Docket NumberCase No: 2:16-cv-2-FtM-99MRM
PartiesDOUGLAS K. WINLAND, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
OPINION AND ORDER1

Before the Court is Petitioner Douglas K. Winland's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) filed on April 1, 2016, and the Secretary of the Department of Corrections' Response in Opposition (Doc. 17) filed on September 12, 2018. Petitioner did not file a reply brief and the time to do so has past. The Petition is fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Petition.

BACKGROUND

Winland, who is incarcerated within the Florida Department of Corrections, challenges his 2012 conviction and sentence. On November 6, 2010, Winland drove his van to the residence of Luis Colon. Colon and Winland's live in girlfriend for the pasteighteen years, Sherry Hetz, were having an affair. Winland had known about the affair for about a month. Winland drove the van to Colon's residence and waited outside by the street for Colon to exit. When Colon exited the house via the garage door, Winland drove his van into the driveway, jumped out of the van, and pointed a shotgun at Colon. Colon ran back into the house through a door in the garage. As Colon was running into the house, Winland fired a single shot from the 12-gauge shotgun. The pellets from the shotgun struck the door but missed Colon.

Winland was tried by a jury of his peers in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Lee County, Florida and found guilty of: attempted second-degree murder with a firearm (Count I), aggravated assault with a firearm (Count II), and shooting at, within, or into a dwelling or building (Count III). Adjudicated in accordance with the verdict, Winland was sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of twenty years in prison. The Second DCA affirmed per curiam on August 16, 2013. Winland v. State, 119 So. 3d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [table]. Winland did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review.

Winland filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 dated May 12, 2014. On July 1, 2014, the Post-Conviction circuit court entered an order finding: (1) the Rule 3.850 motion was timely and contained the proper oath but failed to comply with Rule 3.850's "formatting requirements;" and (2) the majority of the grounds for relief (18 of 19) were "facially insufficient." Winland filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion on August 18, 2014. (Ex. 11). After response from the State (Ex. 13), the Post-Conviction Court denied Winland's amended Rule 3.850 motion without a hearing on November 14, 2014. (Ex.14). On appeal Florida's Second District Court ofAppeal (Second DCA or Appellate Court) affirmed per curiam. Winland v. State, 177 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (Ex. 14). Mandate issued on August 13, 2015. (Ex. 17); Winland v. State, 177 So.3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) [table]. (2D14-5973).

On October 22, 2015, Winland filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Ex. 18). The petition was dismissed as untimely. (Ex. 19). Winland v. State, 2015 WL 9948099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). On October 13, 2015, Winland filed an untimely and successive rule 3.850 motion. (Ex. 20). The motion was denied as both untimely and successive (Ex. 21) and Winland appealed. The Second DCA affirmed per curiam. Winland v. State, 202 So. 3d. 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Petitioner now files this Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondent, filed a limited response to the petition, incorporating a motion to dismiss the Florida Attorney General and dismiss the Petition as untimely filed. (Doc. 9). Winland filed a reply to the limited response. (Doc. 12). The Court found the Petition to be timely filed and dismissed the Florida Attorney General. (Doc. 13).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). Under AEDPA, the standard of review is greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts. Alston v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure thatstate-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).

Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(a) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(b) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Notably, a state court's violation of state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).

"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). The Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since 'a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).State courts "must reasonably apply the rules 'squarely established' by [the Supreme] Court's holdings to the facts of each case. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).

Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). Moreover, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court todecline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court." Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122.

Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) ("[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.") (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010)).

The Supreme Court has held that review "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Thus, the Court is limited to reviewing only the record that was before the state court at the time it rendered its order. Id.

Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011))....

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