Winn v. New Orleans City
| Decision Date | 25 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO: 12-1307 |
| Parties | JEFFREY WINN v. NEW ORLEANS CITY, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 32) filed by all Defendants. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. All federal claims against Ronald Serpas ("Serpas") in his official capacity are DISMISSED as duplicative of claims against the City of New Orleans (the "City"). Plaintiff's claims against the City for violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The only claims remaining for trial are Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against the City and Louisiana state law claims against Serpas.
This is a civil rights action in which the Plaintiff, Jeffrey Winn, alleges wrongful termination from the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD"). The facts of this matter are summarized in a previous Order and Reasons, wherein the Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See generally Winn v. New Orleans City, 919 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. La. 2013). Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. The factual allegations are substantially similar to the original complaint. The amended complaint differs from the original, however, in two material respects: (1) Plaintiff only named two Defendants: the City and Serpas; and (2) Plaintiff has added a claim under the First Amendment and omitted certain claims under Louisiana state law.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ). A claim is "plausible on its face" when the pleaded facts allow the court to "[d]raw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must "draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009). The Court need not, however, accept as truelegal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a "sheer possibility" that the plaintiff's claims are true. Id. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 S. Ct. at 1955). Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiffs' claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255-57. The Court's review "is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Lone Star Fund V(U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff has asserted claims against Serpas (in his official capacity) and the City for violation of Plaintiff's First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 Plaintiff has also asserted claims against Serpas under state law for violations of the Louisiana Constitution. The Court addresses the causes of action against each defendant separately.
Whether Plaintiff may maintain a certain cause of action against Serpas depends on whether those causes of action arise under federal or state law. Plaintiff asserts both federal and state law claims. The Court bifurcates its analysis accordingly.
Plaintiff asserts his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a private right of action to redress violations of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Claims under Section 1983 may be brought against individuals in their personal or official capacity. Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009). Personal-capacity suits seek to impose individual liability on government officials. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Official-capacity suits, on the other hand, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). In other words, provided that the governmental entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit "is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus, the only immunities available to a defendant sued in his official capacity are those that may be asserted by the governmental entity, qua entity. Id. Personal affirmative defenses such as absolute or qualified immunity are therefore inapplicable in official-capacity suits. Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd, 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at159.
Given the foregoing, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Serpas in his official capacity must be treated as claims against the City. See Bean v. Hunt, No. 11-3157, 2013 WL 5890573, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 1, 2013). Because Plaintiff's official-capacity claims are redundant and without independent legal significance, see Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1999), they are dismissed.2 See Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (); Shanks v. Parish of Jefferson, La., No. 04-1057, 2004 WL 1737904, at *1 (E.D. La. July 30, 2004) ().
Defendants purport to move for dismissal of Plaintiff's first amended complaint in its entirety, yet fail to address the viability of Plaintiff's state law causes of action. The Court will not raise this issue sua sponte. Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims against Serpas shall remain pending.
It is well-established that a civil rights plaintiff may assert claims against a municipal entity. Of course, the sine qua non for municipal liability—or the liability of any defendant under Section1983—is an underlying constitutional violation. See Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 866-67 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Thus, the Court first examines whether Plaintiff states a valid claim for the violation of his federal rights.
Plaintiff alleges the City violated his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court addresses each claim in turn. For the following reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff only states a valid claim under the First Amendment.
According to his complaint, Plaintiff testified for the defense in the trial of fellow police officers accused of murdering Henry Glover and burning his body. Plaintiff alleges the City terminated his employment in retaliation for his compelled testimony. These allegations suffice to state a claim for retaliatory discharge.
A government employer "cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). A prima facie case of retaliatory discharge requires the plaintiff to prove five elements: (1) that he suffered an adverse employment decision; (2) that he spoke as a private citizen, i.e., not as a government employee pursuant to official duty; (3) that the speech involved a matter of public concern; (4) that his interest in speaking outweighed the government's interest in the efficient provision of public services; and (5) that the speech precipitated the adverseemployment decision. See Gibson v. Kilpatrick, 734 F.3d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 2013).3 The Court addresses each element in turn.
"Adverse employment decisions include discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Juarez v. Aguilar, 666 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiff alleges the City terminated his employment, the first element of a prima facie case is satisfied.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Garcetti v. Caballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), provides the starting point for analysis under the second prong. The plaintiff in Garcetti worked as a calendar deputy for the district attorney's office. Id. at 413. During the course of his employment, the plaintiff reviewed a certain affidavit in support of a search warrant and concluded it contained"serious misrepresentations." Id. at 414. The plaintiff voiced his concerns in a "disposition memorandum" circulated to his supervisors, in which he recommended dismissal of the case. Id. Despite again expressing his reservations with the affidavit—this time during an in-person meeting with his supervisors and the warrant affiant—the prosecution continued. Id. The plaintiff eventually gave testimony favorable to the defense in a hearing before the trial court. See id. at 414-15. The plaintiff alleged he was subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions following these events. Id. at 415. He filed suit under Section 1983 for violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The Court confined its analysis to whether the disposition memorandum constituted protected...
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